State v. Lafaso

• Citation: 251 A.3d 935
• Decision Date: 29 January 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-253,19-253
• Parties: STATE of Vermont v. Scott Miglorie LAFASO
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

251 A.3d 935

STATE of Vermont
v.
Scott Miglorie LAFASO

No. 19-253

Supreme Court of Vermont.

June Term, 2020
January 29, 2021

Travis W. Weaver, Rutland County Deputy State's Attorney, Rutland, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Matthew Valerio, Defender General, and Joshua S. O'Hara, Appellate Defender, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Robinson, Eaton, Carroll and Cohen, JJ.

COHEN, J.

¶ 1. Defendant Scott Miglorie Lafaso appeals multiple convictions following a jury trial. He argues that he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and that the superior court erred in not excluding certain trial testimony from the jury's consideration. We affirm.

¶ 2. Defendant and complainant were once in a romantic relationship and lived together in Rutland, Vermont. After some time, defendant moved out and, following a period of intermittent contact, complainant ended their relationship. In September 2017, intent on renewing affections, defendant twice entered complainant's home without complainant's permission. On the second occasion, defendant held complainant down, first on a couch and then on a bed, and grabbed complainant's phone out of her hand as she tried to call the police.

¶ 3. On September 11, 2017, the State charged defendant with burglary, unlawful restraint, stalking, interference with access to emergency services, and two counts of unlawful trespass.¹ Failing to make bail at arraignment that day, defendant was incarcerated pending trial. His first attorney soon filed a motion to withdraw, which the court granted. The court then appointed a public defender to represent defendant. That public defender herself successfully

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moved to withdraw, as did her replacement. A fourth and final attorney was appointed to represent defendant on November 27, 2017.

¶ 4. On January 8, 2018, defense counsel filed, and the court approved, a stipulated schedule agreeing to complete discovery by May 1 and to be ready for a one-day trial by June 1 of that year. On May 23, defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss the charges, informing the court of his dissatisfaction with his continued incarceration and the repeated replacement of, and lack of information from, his lawyers. Defendant complained that he had "been robbed of [his] rights to speedy trial," and asked the court to "take action and protect [his] rights." The following day, the court scheduled the case for a jury draw on September 5, 2018. Then, on May 29, the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 49 because defendant was represented, and his attorney had not signed the motion. See V.R.Cr.P. 49(d) ("Every written motion, written notice or similar paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name ....").

¶ 5. On June 7, defendant filed a motion to review the status of counsel, which was followed by a docketed letter to the court where defendant described continued grievances with his lawyer and wrote, "I have been locked up now for over ten months, no weight of [the] evidence, paper work, no lawyer calls. Nothing!" The court held a status conference on July 16, where defendant agreed to keep his attorney. At that status conference, defense counsel represented to the court that the parties had engaged in unsuccessful plea negotiations the previous month.

¶ 6. As scheduled, the court convened a jury draw on September 5, 2018, but no jury was drawn for defendant's case. The record reflects that the case was not reached because there was no trial date when defense counsel was available. A new jury draw was held on October 3, at which defense counsel stated that the parties were engaged in continued plea negotiations but agreed that if another case scheduled for October 16 were resolved, defendant's case would be tried that day. However, that same day—October 3—without explanation in the record, defendant's case was instead scheduled for a change-of-plea and sentencing hearing to be held on December 18. The record is similarly silent as to why that hearing was rescheduled for January 15, 2019, but the January 15 hearing was in turn rescheduled for January 28, this time the record indicating that defense counsel requested the change because he was unavailable on January 15.

¶ 7. At the January 28 hearing, defense counsel informed the court that the plea negotiations had been fruitless and the case would have to be tried after all. Defendant said the following at that hearing: "I've been in jail for eighteen months here. I would like to wrap this up. I'm trying to live my life here, not spend it all in jail here." When the court explained that the matter would be set for the next available jury draw, defendant protested: "Another time, so I'll be sitting another six, eight months in jail. This is ridiculous." The court scheduled the matter for a February 27 jury draw, when a jury was finally empaneled. Defendant received his trial on March 19, 2019, 554 days—just over eighteen months—after arraignment.

¶ 8. As expected, the matter was tried in one day, the evidence consisting of testimony from complainant and six other witnesses, as well as photographs and an audio recording. The jury returned guilty

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verdicts on all charges and the court later entered judgment accordingly.

¶ 9. On appeal, defendant argues that the eighteen-month delay before trial violated his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, warranting a reversal of the convictions and dismissal of the charges. Defendant further argues that if the charges are not dismissed, he is entitled to a new trial because the superior court erred in not striking certain trial testimony, a matter we discuss more fully after examining the speedy trial claim.

I. Right to Speedy Trial

¶ 10. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The speedy trial guarantee applies to the states by operation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). We begin our consideration of defendant's argument by outlining the purposes and characteristics of the speedy trial right, which inform and frame our analysis. The right protects the interests of criminal defendants, including preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing the anxiety and concern associated with pending criminal charges, and limiting the possibility that their defenses will be impaired. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The right also advances societal interests like reducing the inefficiency in the fair and accurate administration of justice stemming from backlogged court dockets, limiting the economic pressures caused by overcrowded pretrial detention centers, and safeguarding society from extended pretrial release of dangerous offenders. See id. at 519-21, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Additionally, while some pretrial delay is appropriate—for example, to conduct discovery—delay can be used by both sides for inappropriate purposes, such as to erode an adverse witness's memory or cause the outright loss of evidence. See id. at 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Finally, it is impossible to identify the precise point at which the speedy trial right is violated, and the only available remedy for its violation is strong medicine—dismissal of the charges. Id. at 521-22, 92 S.Ct. 2182.

¶ 11. Given the purposes and characteristics of this "slippery" right, we are instructed to employ a balancing test, weighing relevant factors in the specific context of the case at hand. Id. at 522, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. These factors include the "[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. These should be considered along "with such other circumstances as may be relevant," and no one factor is necessary or sufficient to find a deprivation of the speedy trial right. Id. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182.

A. Length of Delay

¶ 12. The length-of-delay factor serves two roles: First, because some pretrial delay is inevitable in criminal proceedings, to trigger examination of the other factors, the defendant must show "that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from presumptively prejudicial delay." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (quotation omitted). Like the rest of the analysis, this threshold test is "dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. 2182. For example, "the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a

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serious, complex conspiracy charge." Id. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Second, if the defendant makes this showing, we balance the...