State v. Lafferty
| Decision Date | 15 October 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-724,97-724 |
| Citation | 967 P.2d 363,1998 MT 247,291 Mont. 157 |
| Parties | , 1998 MT 247 STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Linda Lou LAFFERTY, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Brad L. Arndorfer; Arndorfer Law Firm, Billings, for Appellant.
Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Micheal Wellenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney; Shawn Cosgrove, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, for Respondent.
¶1 Linda Lou Lafferty (Lafferty) was charged with, and pled guilty in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, to, the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), reserving her right to appeal the court's denial of her motion to suppress all evidence, which was premised on the absence of the requisite ¶2 The dispositive issue is whether the District Court erred in denying Lafferty's motion to suppress on the basis that the investigative stop was based on a particularized suspicion.
particularized suspicion to justify the investigative stop of her vehicle. She raises that issue, and others, on appeal and we reverse and remand with instructions.
¶3 The relevant facts relating to Lafferty's motion to suppress all evidence in her DUI case on the basis that the stop of her vehicle was invalid for lack of particularized suspicion are as follows. In the afternoon hours of April 6, 1996, Montana Highway Patrol Officer Brad Sangray (Sangray)received a dispatcher's report of a drunk driver proceeding eastbound from Park City, Montana. The identity of the caller was not provided and, indeed, it later was ascertained that the caller was anonymous. In any event, the caller merely described the vehicle as a white over blue Ford pickup with a partial license plate of "5-T." The caller provided no further particulars.
¶4 Sangray traveled westbound from Billings, Montana, on U.S. Highway 90 and observed a pickup matching the description provided by the dispatcher traveling eastbound. He crossed the median and drove at a high rate of speed until he caught up with the pickup, which had a "5-T" license plate; Sangray then followed the pickup at a distance of six to ten car lengths. While following the pickup for approximately one mile, Sangray saw it cross the fog line on the right side of the highway twice and drive on the fog line once; the tape from the activated video camera in his patrol vehicle confirmed his testimony. The pickup was not speeding. Sangray activated his emergency lights and stopped the pickup, which was being driven by Lafferty, on the basis of the dispatcher's report and the crossing of the fog line, which Sangray testified "is not normal traffic procedure." Sangray also testified that he would not have stopped the pickup absent his independent observations of the pickup crossing the fog line.
¶5 Lafferty testified that she noticed Sangray's vehicle as he came up behind her and kept a close eye on it via her rearview and side mirrors. She also testified it was her normal practice to drive close to the fog line on the right side of the road and, indeed, that she was taught to do so in the defensive driving course required for her employment with the government. She did not notice whether she crossed the fog line on the afternoon in question, but testified that she could have done so since she drives right next to it. Lafferty agreed that it would not be safe to make major "swerves" across the fog line and back into the traffic lane, but stated that her vehicle was not "weaving" and that any "swerve" she made over the fog line while looking in her vehicle's mirrors would have been minor. After viewing the video, Lafferty agreed that her pickup did cross the fog line.
¶6 Counsel for Lafferty argued that Lafferty's driving did not constitute a traffic violation and, as a result, the circumstances--that is, the dispatcher's report and Sangray's observation of Lafferty's driving--were insufficient to form the basis for a particularized suspicion that Lafferty was DUI. The State of Montana (State) argued that crossing the fog line constituted "improper lane travel" and, therefore, a violation of the law and that Sangray had a sufficient particularized suspicion to justify an investigative stop.
¶7 At the close of the hearing on Lafferty's motion to suppress, the District Court denied the motion, subject to the condition that crossing the fog line constitutes a traffic violation, and requested briefs on that legal question. In doing so, the court observed that, in this case:
[T]he driving is not something that maybe the ordinary citizen would be particularly concerned about.... [B]ut there is something about the manner in which the defendant's vehicle in this case wanders a little over that fog line and back that doesn't look right.
I don't know, maybe the officer could explain it; to me there is something about that that is different than somebody's momentary After briefing, the District Court concluded that "[t]he law requires one to stay within one's driving lane until it is ascertained that one can leave one's lane safely." It determined, based on Sangray's observations and its own observation of the video, that Lafferty crossed the fog line and left her lane without first ascertaining that it was safe to do so, thereby justifying Sangray's investigatory stop. On that basis, the District Court denied Lafferty's motion to suppress and Lafferty appeals.
inattention that wanders across the fog line....
¶8 Did the District Court err in denying Lafferty's motion to suppress on the basis that the investigative stop was based on a particularized suspicion?
¶9 When circumstances create a particularized suspicion that a person is committing an offense, a peace officer may stop the person or the vehicle containing the person to determine whether to arrest the person. Section 46-5-401, MCA. In order to prove the existence of a particularized suspicion sufficient to stop a vehicle, the prosecution must show objective data from which an experienced peace officer can make certain inferences and a resulting suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle is engaged in wrongdoing. State v. Pratt (Mont.1997), 286 Mont. 156, ----, 951 P.2d 37, 40, 54 St.Rep. 1349, 1351 (citation omitted).
¶10 Whether a particularized suspicion exists to justify an investigative stop is a question of fact which depends on the totality of the circumstances. Pratt, 286 Mont. at ----, 951 P.2d at 40, 54 St.Rep. at 1351. That is not to say, however, that such a determination cannot also include conclusions of law. Indeed, in this case, it is clear that--in determining that a particularized suspicion existed--the District Court concluded that Lafferty committed a traffic violation by leaving her driving lane without ascertaining that it was safe to do so. We review a district court's denial of a motion to suppress to determine whether its findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether those findings were correctly applied as a matter of law. State v. Lee (1997), 282 Mont. 391, 393, 938 P.2d 637, 639 (citation omitted).
¶11 We recently set forth a three-factor analysis for evaluating a citizen informant's information with regard to a possible drunk driver: 1) whether the informant identifies himself or herself to law enforcement; 2) whether the report is based on the...
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