State v. Lamar, 88-1770
| Decision Date | 21 February 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-1770,88-1770 |
| Citation | 538 So.2d 548,14 Fla. L. Weekly 510 |
| Parties | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 510 The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Jorge LAMAR, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Steven T. Scott, and Ralph Barreira, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellant.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Marti Rothenberg, Asst. Public Defender, for appellee.
Before HUBBART, FERGUSON and LEVY, JJ.
Following Jorge Lamar's arrest for murder, Lamar was taken to the police station and informed of his Miranda rights. He refused to speak and requested an attorney. As the officer was preparing to end the interview, Lamar made the following statement: "I got away with the murder in Chicago, and I'll get away with this one." The officer asked Lamar to clarify the statement and Lamar further remarked: "I beat it, and I'll beat this one." The trial court denied Lamar's motion to suppress but granted his motion in limine to exclude the post-arrest statements. The state appeals the order granting Lamar's motion in limine. We reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to redact the references to extraneous crimes.
Clearly Lamar's post-arrest statements constituted an admission. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction to entertain the state's appeal pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(B). See also State v. Brea, 530 So.2d 924 (Fla.1988) (); State v. Palmore, 495 So.2d 1170 (Fla.1986) (); State v. Hale, 505 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) ().
The state, while originally suggesting that the complete statements should be admissible, later agreed that the references to any collateral crimes should be redacted. Thus we do not address the issue of whether that portion of Lamar's statements evidencing collateral crimes is admissible under the rule established in Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). Rather, the issue before us is the more limited question of whether the motion in limine improperly excluded that portion of Lamar's declaration in which he stated "I'll get away with this one" and "I'll beat this one."
Lamar's statements, while not actual "confessions of crime", do constitute "admissions of crime" in the sense that Lamar's guilt could be inferred therefrom. It is well established that "admissions of facts or circumstances from which guilt can be inferred ... are in general admissible in evidence against the party making them...." Parrish v. State, 90 Fla. 25, 105 So. 130, 133 (1925)....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Perera v. State
...from which guilt may be inferred is admissible as a general admission against the party who made the statement. See State v. Lamar, 538 So.2d 548, 549 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). See also Pieczynski v. State, 516 So.2d 1048, 1051 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)(holding that the defendant's statement that he was......
-
St. Louis v. State, 90-1868
...to the threats as collateral crimes should have been eliminated, as the state agreed to do in the similar case of State v. Lamar, 538 So.2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). We find no error in the admission of the pretrial and in-court identifications of appellant and no reversible error in the pros......
-
Manly v. State, 93-3017
...Further, the statement standing alone does not imply guilt and no reasonable jury could infer guilt therefrom. See State v. Lamar, 538 So.2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (a statement can be considered an admission only if one can infer guilt from the statement We also reject the state's alternati......
-
Henry v. State, 93-3673
...criminal activities does not render it inadmissible if it can be interpreted as an admission against interest. See State v. Lamar, 538 So.2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); State v. Patterson, 516 S.W.2d 571 We do not address the issues with regard to the sentence because of the necessity to retry ......