State v. Lambert
| Decision Date | 30 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | ID No. 1410004532 |
| Citation | 278 A.3d 71 |
| Parties | STATE of Delaware, v. Michael E. LAMBERT, Defendant. |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
Lindsay Taylor, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Benjamin S. Gifford IV, Esquire, Law Office of Benjamin S. Gifford, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the Defendant.
Clark, R.J.
This decision addresses Defendant Michael Lambert's motion for postconviction relief. His motion requires the Court to examine the two issues that generally arise in ineffective assistance of counsel claims: trial counsel's performance, and whether trial counsel's allegedly deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. In this case, the Court must also resolve an issue of first impression when it considers the first of these two inquiries.
Prior to trial, Mr. Lambert's trial counsel ("Trial Counsel") diligently and competently litigated a suppression issue. The Court denied the motion and Trial Counsel sought to preserve his right to appeal that decision. Unlike in the federal system and in many states, Delaware does not permit a defendant to enter a conditional guilty plea to preserve appeal rights. At trial, Trial Counsel attempted to work around this gap in Delaware practice. Namely, he attended Mr. Lambert's bench trial but did nothing to defend him. He declined to make an opening statement, declined to cross-examine the State's witnesses, made no objections, presented no witnesses, and made no closing argument. While declining these measures, he incorrectly believed that he was participating in a "stipulated trial." To the contrary, Trial Counsel sought the functional equivalent of a conditional guilty plea to preserve Mr. Lambert's appeal rights.
Here, concerns of judicial economy did not justify his approach. For the reasons discussed below, Trial Counsel performed deficiently when he did not provide Mr. Lambert a defense, and the Court must presume that those deficiencies prejudiced Mr. Lambert. As a result, Trial Counsel's representation deprived Mr. Lambert of his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel.
Mr. Lambert's motion for postconviction relief must be GRANTED , and he is entitled to a new trial.
As in any postconviction motion, the procedural background drives as much of the Court's decision as the factual background. Before discussing the procedural and factual background, however, the Court will first discuss the applicable law that controls the Court's decision.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applied to Delaware through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his [defense]."1 The accused's right to counsel is one of the most fundamental components of the criminal justice system.2 It is the most pervasive because it affects the defendant's ability to assert all other available rights.3 Recognizing the Right to Counsel's importance, the United States Supreme Court has long held that the Right includes the right to the effective assistance of counsel.4 If counsel provides no actual assistance to the accused, then the constitutional guarantee has been violated.5 The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that this guarantee is designed to both ensure fair trials, and, in a broader sense, to promote confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.6
The primary framework for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims comes from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington .7 In the Strickland decision, the Court established a two-part inquiry to evaluate such claims. A defendant who asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must show that: (1) counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness (the "performance prong"), and (2) there was a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different (the "prejudice prong").8
Under the first Strickland prong, a review of an attorney's performance must be deferential. It requires that courts limit hindsight and evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.9 The Strickland Court provided no specific guidelines other than to instruct the lower courts to determine if counsel's performance was reasonable when compared to "prevailing professional norms."10
When conducting the inquiry, a court must first presume that counsel performed his or her role reasonably.11 A defendant must also overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, "the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ "12 Thus, a defendant who raises a claim of ineffective assistance must specifically identify exactly what action or omission by counsel fell outside the scope of reasonable professional judgment.13 The Court must then determine "whether, in light of all of the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance."14
With respect to the prejudice prong, the Strickland Court explained that "an error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the criminal judgment if the error had no effect."15 As a result, any deficiency in counsel's performance must prejudice the defense before it becomes ineffective assistance.16 Prejudice, in Strickland terms, occurs when the attorney's errors create a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for counsel's errors.17
The United States Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Cronic18 on the same day it issued the Strickland decision. In Cronic , the Supreme Court articulated three limited exceptions that excuse a defendant from demonstrating actual prejudice. As the Court recognized in Cronic , these three scenarios include "circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified."19 If one of these three exceptions applies, prejudice is presumed. Then, the defendant is relieved of his or her obligation to demonstrate a fair probability that the outcome would have been different but for the error.
The first Cronic exception arises when there is a complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of the criminal process.20 A "critical stage" of the process includes one of many pretrial and post-trial stages through sentencing.21 A non-exhaustive list of such stages include arraignments, post-indictment identification lineups, preliminary hearings, the plea bargaining process, trials, and sentencings.22 The second exception applies when "counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing."23 The third exception provides for a presumption of prejudice when "the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial."24
The Delaware State Police ("DSP") arrested Mr. Lambert after its officers received a report from the Anne Arundel County Sheriff's Office (the "Sheriff"). The Sheriff reported that Mr. Lambert had robbed and shot an individual in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. Mr. Lambert then attempted to carjack a vehicle, was unsuccessful, but nevertheless fired his handgun at the vehicle's driver as she escaped. He then successfully carjacked another vehicle at gunpoint. The Sheriff described the stolen vehicle and reported that when Mr. Lambert fled Maryland, he travelled directly to his residence in Houston, Delaware.
After receiving this information, DSP surveilled the Houston residence. Outside the home, the police observed a vehicle matching the make, model, and color of the one reported stolen from the Anne Arundel area. The vehicle at the residence had a partially covered Maryland license plate. Several characters on the plate were visible. The visible characters matched corresponding characters found on the stolen vehicle's plate.
DSP then surrounded the residence to ensure that Mr. Lambert did not escape. At that point, DSP detectives applied for a search warrant through the videophone process with Justice of the Peace Court No. 2 in Rehoboth. As they applied for the warrant, an individual left the residence. DSP immediately apprehended that individual and he told the officers that Mr. Lambert remained inside. Mr. Lambert then exited the residence at the request of the police and DSP secured the premises while they awaited the warrant. Their search eventually recovered a firearm and ammunition that Mr. Lambert, a prior convicted felon, admitted in a videotaped confession that he possessed. The State then charged him with Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited, and Receiving Stolen Property.
Prior to trial, Trial Counsel filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence that DSP had seized. He also sought to exclude Mr. Lambert's confession as fruit of the poisonous tree. Trial Counsel based the motion on the premise that DSP had executed the search before the Justice of the Peace Court issued the warrant. In the motion, Trial Counsel cited helpful authority to support his motion and effectively structured the motion's factual allegations.
The Court then held a pretrial evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the State presented four DSP witnesses: Sergeant Skinner, Detective Vernon, Detective O'Leary, and Detective Daddio. On direct examination, the witnesses’ combined testimonies described the videophone warrant application process. They also described (1) DSP's efforts to secure the premises while they waited for the court to approve the warrant, (2) the timing and manner of warrant execution, and (3)...
To continue reading
Request your trial