State v. Lampe
| Decision Date | 02 March 1965 |
| Citation | 133 N.W.2d 349,26 Wis.2d 646 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Clayton Ray LAMPE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
David L. Walther, Milwaukee, for appellant.
Bronson C. LaFollette, Atty. Gen., William A. Platz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, Hugh R. O'Connell, Dist. Atty., Aladin A. DeBrozzo, Deputy Dist. Atty., Milwaukee, for respondent.
The defendant does not seek to withdraw his plea of guilty nor does he seek a new trial. He had counsel and by his admittedly voluntary plea of guilty the defendant waived all defenses and nonjurisdictional defects except that the information charged no offense. Hawkins v. State (1965) Wis., 132 N.W.2d 545; 42 A.L.R.2d 1013; 14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, p. 953, sec. 272. By the plea the defendant admitted the facts charged but not the crime and in this respect a plea of guilty is like a demurrer. Nor has the defendant waived his right to question the sufficiency of the information. If the insufficiency is of such a nature that no crime known to law has been alleged the defect is jurisdictional and is not waived by the plea. If, however, in spite of the insufficiency some crime is alleged, then sec. 955.09(3), Stats., might be operative. This section provides, among other things, that the sufficiency of an information must be raised before trial or be deemed waived. In this case no waiver in either event would result because the requirement of the section has not happened in that there has yet been no trial. The entering of a plea of guilty is not a trial but the waiver thereof. Pulaski v. State (1964), 23 Wis.2d 138, 126 N.W.2d 625. On this ground Watson v. State (1926), 190 Wis. 245, 208 N.W. 897, cited by the state, may be distinguished because in that case the objection was not raised before the impaneling of the jury. The language in Spoo v. State (1935), 219 Wis. 285, 262 N.W.2d 696, that a plea of guilty constitutes a waiver under sec. 355.09, Stats.1935, now sec. 955.09(3) of a subsequent objection to sufficiency of the information is overruled.
The defendant's argument goes beyond a technical insufficiency of an information charging the crime and raises the question of whether the information charges any offense. If the defendant is correct that no offense is charged then the court had no jurisdiction to proceed to judgment. In re Carlson (1922), 176 Wis. 538, 186 N.W. 722.
The defendant contends the information charges no crime because it does not allege the check made by the defendant purported to have been made by another person. Sec. 943.38(1), Stats., 1 creating the crime of forgery, provides, 'Whoever with intent to defraud falsely makes or alters a writing * * * so that it purports to have been made by another' and it is this provision that the defendant claims is not charged in the information. The information alleged that on the 16th day of August, 1963,
'* * * the said defendant, Clayton Ray Lampe, did feloniously with intent to defraud falsely make a certain writing of a kind whereby legal rights and obligations are created and transferred, commonly known as a bank check, of the tenor following, to-wit:
[A photostatic copy of the check was thereto attached]
so that it falsely purported to have been made by Emery Walker, contrary to Section 943.38(1) of the statutes * * *.'
The attached check was dated 8-16-1963, No. 16, was on a personalized-check form of the First Wisconsin National Bank, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, with the name Emery Walker printed thereon together with the magnetic-account number and other data. The check was made payable to the order of Carol E. Garon for $16.65 and below the printed name Emery Walker was written Emery Walker.
The defendant argues 'Emery Walker' was not alleged as another person and could be an alias of the defendant or a fictitious name conjured up at the time the check was written, and if so, the statute was not violated. It is true that under some circumstances the use of a fictitious name or an assumed name may not amount to forgery. However, if a person attempts to pass off the fictitious name as representing a person other than himself, such use would constitute a forgery. It is not necessary that the person purported to have made the instrument be a person in existence or a real person so long as the instrument purports not to be the act of the one altering or making the instrument. Likewise, the use of an assumed name may be a forgery if done for a fraudulent purpose. There are also circumstances under which an assumed name may be used for legitimate purposes and the use would not amount to a forgery. See on this problem Greathouse v. United States (4th...
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State v. Campbell, 2006 WI 99 (Wis. 7/12/2006)
...and void. Bush, 283 Wis. 2d 90, ¶18 (citing Champlain v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 751, 754, 193 N.W.2d 868 (1972); State v. Lampe, 26 Wis. 2d 646, 648, 133 N.W.2d 349 (1965)). ¶ 46 There may be other exceptions to the principles about subject matter jurisdiction and competency. But none of this he......
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City of Eau Claire v. Booth
...N.W.2d 868 (1972) (a complaint which charges no offense is jurisdictionally defective and the conviction is void); State v. Lampe, 26 Wis.2d 646, 648, 133 N.W.2d 349 (1965) (“If the defendant is correct that no offense is charged then the court had no jurisdiction to proceed to judgment.”);......
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State v. Campbell
...Bush, 283 Wis.2d 90, ¶ 18, 699 N.W.2d 80 (citing Champlain v. State, 53 Wis.2d 751, 754, 193 N.W.2d 868 (1972); State v. Lampe, 26 Wis.2d 646, 648, 133 N.W.2d 349 (1965)). ¶ 46 There may be other exceptions to the principles about subject matter jurisdiction and competency. But none of this......
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Mack v. State
...known to law has also been termed jurisdictional. Champlain v. State, 53 Wis.2d 751, 754, 193 N.W.2d 868 (1972); State v. Lampe, 26 Wis.2d 646, 648, 133 N.W.2d 349 (1965). See also, United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1965). "A complaint which charges no offense is jurisdictionall......