State v. Lampien, Docket No. 34145 (Idaho App. 11/3/2008), Docket No. 34145.
| Decision Date | 03 November 2008 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 34145. |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MELANIE LAMPIEN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. Peter D. McDermott, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of five years, with a minimum period of confinement of three years, for harboring a felon, affirmed.
Thompson, Smith, Woolff & Anderson, Idaho Falls, for appellant. Stevan H. Thompson argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Melanie Lampien appeals from her judgment of conviction and sentence for harboring a felon. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
In late August 2006, several law enforcement and probation and parole officers went to Lampien's apartment looking for her husband, Nicholas McKenna. Based on conversations with McKenna's probation officer, Lampien had known since at least June that McKenna was wanted for outstanding felony probation violations and for questioning regarding several recent burglaries in the area. Although Lampien knew that McKenna was hiding in the apartment, Lampien met the officers outside her apartment and told them that she had not seen McKenna and did not know his whereabouts. The officers informed Lampien that, if it was discovered that she was harboring McKenna or assisting him in avoiding arrest, she would be charged for her actions. Lampien continued to deny knowledge of McKenna's whereabouts. Suspecting McKenna was in the apartment and not believing Lampien's statements to the contrary, approximately an hour later two police officers and two probation and parole officers entered Lampien's apartment without their weapons drawn. Once inside the apartment, the officers were confronted by McKenna, who brandished a firearm. A struggle ensued and one of the police officers and the two probation and parole officers were injured by gun shots. McKenna died during the struggle.
The state charged Lampien with harboring a felon. I.C. § 18-205. A nonbinding plea agreement was reached whereby Lampien would plead guilty and the state would recommend probation and would not oppose a withheld judgment. Lampien entered a guilty plea and proceeded to sentencing. At Lampien's sentencing, the district court allowed the police officer and the two probation and parole officers who were shot to give victim impact statements over Lampien's objection. The officers advocated that Lampien receive a prison term, largely because they did not believe Lampien when she stated that she did not know McKenna possessed a gun and in order to deter others from harboring felons. The district court sentenced Lampien to a unified term of five years, with a minimum period of confinement of three years. Lampien filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. Lampien appeals, challenging the charging information, the officers' victim impact statements, and the excessiveness of her sentence.
Lampien argues that the charging information filed in her case was defective because it did not contain all of the necessary elements for proving a violation of I.C. § 18-2051 and, therefore, her guilty plea should be set aside. Specifically, Lampien contends that the statute requires that McKenna, in order to be a wanted felon, must have committed a new felony offense. Instead, however, the information alleged that McKenna was wanted for outstanding felony probation violations. Because Lampien did not object to the information before pleading guilty, she also argues that Idaho Criminal Rule 12 should be interpreted to allow her to attack the sufficiency of the information for the first time on appeal. The state counters that Lampien's challenge to the sufficiency of the information may not be raised for the first time on appeal, that Lampien waived this claim by entering a guilty plea, and that Lampien has not raised a jurisdictional challenge.
Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law, over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) (Jones). In a criminal case, the filing of an information alleging that an offense was committed within the State of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 757-58, 101 P.3d at 701-02. Because the information provides subject matter jurisdiction to the district court, the jurisdictional power depends on the charging document being legally sufficient to survive challenge. Id. at 758, 101 P.3d at 702. Whether a charging document conforms to the requirements of law and is legally sufficient is also a question of law subject to free review. Id.
A challenge asserting the charging information is jurisdictionally deficient is never waived and may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal. Id. at 758, 101 P.3d at 702. If an alleged deficiency is raised by a defendant before trial or entry of a guilty plea, the charging document must be found to set forth all facts essential to establish the charged offense to survive the challenge. State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165, 168, 75 P.3d 219, 222 (Ct. App. 2003). When the information's jurisdictional sufficiency is challenged after trial, it will be upheld unless it is so defective that it does not, by any fair or reasonable construction, charge the offense for which the defendant was convicted. Jones, 140 Idaho at 759, 101 P.3d at 703; State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 285, 287, 805 P.2d 491, 493 (Ct. App. 1991). A reviewing court has considerable leeway to imply the necessary allegations from the language of the information. Jones, 140 Idaho at 759, 101 P.3d at 703; Robran, 119 Idaho at 287, 805 P.2d at 493. In short, when considering a post-trial challenge to the jurisdictional sufficiency of the information, a reviewing court need only determine that, at a minimum, the information contains a statement of the territorial jurisdiction of the court below and a citation to the applicable section of the Idaho Code. State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 622, 115 P.3d 710, 713 (2005).
Idaho Criminal Rule 12 provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Pretrial motions. Any defense objection or request which is capable of determination without trial of the general issue may be raised before the trial by motion. The following must be raised prior to trial:
. . . .
(2) Defenses and objections based on defects in the complaint, indictment or information (other than it fails to show jurisdiction of the court or to charge an offense which objection shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceedings).
Objections to the sufficiency of a charging document based on due process grounds are waived unless raised before trial. Jones, 140 Idaho at 758, 101 P.3d at 702. In Jones, the defendant entered a plea of guilty. On appeal, Jones contended that the information was deficient because it failed to charge an offense. Jones argued the information failed to charge an offense because it omitted a material element of the crime. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that, when a challenge to the sufficiency of an information is not raised until after entry of the judgment, if the applicable code section is named in the charging document its language may be read into the text of the charge. Id. at 759, 101 P.3d at 703. Therefore, the Court concluded that Jones had waived a due process challenge to the information and that the information was sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Id. at 758-59, 101 P.3d at 702-03.
On appeal, Lampien asserts that the information did not charge an offense because it omitted a material element of I.C. § 18-205. The facts of this case are indistinguishable from Jones. In this case, no challenge was made to the information before Lampien pled guilty. Therefore, any argument as to the insufficiency of the information on due process grounds was waived by lack of a timely objection before the district court. Furthermore, because the information contained a statement of the territorial jurisdiction of the court below and the statutory code section, we conclude that the information was sufficient to charge an offense and convey jurisdiction in the district court. Lampien's argument to the contrary is without merit.
Lampien makes several arguments regarding the officers who made victim impact statements at her sentencing hearing. First, Lampien argues that it was an abuse of discretion and created a manifest injustice pursuant to I.C. § 19-5306 for the district court to allow the officers to make victim impact statements at Lampien's sentencing. The state counters that Lampien has failed to demonstrate error in the district court's decision that the officers were victims and, additionally, a sentencing court is allowed to consider a broad range of information when fashioning an appropriate sentence.
A sentencing judge may properly conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited, either as to the kind of information he or she may consider or the source from which it may come. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949); State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 470, 816 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Bivens, 119 Idaho 119, 120, 803 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Ct. App. 1991). Support for such a broad inquiry during sentencing is also found in I.C. § 19-5306. Chapman, 120 Idaho at 470, 816 P.2d at 1027.
Idaho's victims' rights statute, I.C. § 19-5306, provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Each victim of a criminal or juvenile offense shall be:
. . . .
(e) Heard, upon request, at all criminal justice proceedings considering a plea of guilty, sentencing, incarceration, placing on probation or release of the defendant unless manifest injustice would...
To continue reading
Request your trial