State v. Quintero
| Decision Date | 03 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 29959.,29959. |
| Citation | 141 Idaho 619,115 P.3d 710 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ricky Ricardo QUINTERO, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for respondent. Justin M. Curtis argued.
The State of Idaho (State), appeals the district court's order dismissing a charge against Ricky Ricardo Quintero (Quintero) on the basis that the district court lacked jurisdiction. Because the information contained a statement of territorial jurisdiction and cited the applicable section of the Idaho Code, the district court had jurisdiction. We reverse the decision of the district court.
The State charged Quintero with several counts, including a charge of removing a firearm from a law enforcement officer pursuant to I.C. § 18-915A. As to this count, the information stated:
That the Defendant, RICKY RICARDO QUINTERO, on or about the 11th day of February, 2003, in the County of Canyon, State of Idaho, did willfully and knowingly remove or attempt to remove a firearm from the possession of a law enforcement officer, to-wit: Douglas Daniels, Canyon County Sheriff Officer number 5218, while Deputy Daniels was acting in the lawful course, scope and capacity of his duties, to-wit: by struggling with Deputy Daniels, grabbing his service pistol and pulling the weapon approximately halfway from the holster until the Deputy was able to force the hand of Rickey Ricardo Quintero away from the pistol. All of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section 18-915A and against the power, peace and dignity of the State of Idaho.
The matter proceeded to a jury trial. After the State rested, Quintero moved for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of removing a firearm from a law enforcement officer, which he later characterized as a motion to dismiss. Counsel for Quintero stated:
Judge, the basis of my motion is that the (sic) Count II does not allege a violation of 18-915A, specifically (b). The information does not allege that Mr. Quintero knew or had reason to know that the other person was employed as a law enforcement officer. That is the material element of the crime. It hasn't been alleged. And basically, at this point, there is no jurisdiction because there's been no crime alleged.
After hearing the parties' arguments and taking additional time to review the issue, the district judge orally ruled:
I find this information to be jurisdictionally defective. There is a failure to state a fact from the statute essential to establish the offense charged, and it's my opinion that if I allow the case to go to the jury, I will be committing clearly appealable error.
. . .
It's just my final opinion in this matter that I have no choice but to dismiss Count II and not permit that to go to the jury.
. . .
I was somewhat perplexed yesterday, as the defense counsel noted, because it was a motion for judgment of acquittal and I do feel the State met their elements at trial. I just see Count II of the amended information to be jurisdictionally defective because of the fact that it does not contain what I would be required to instruct upon.
The district judge entered a written order entitled Order Granting Judgment of Acquittal from which the State appealed.
Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised at any time, Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 471, 903 P.2d 58, 60 (1995), and over which appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998). "Whether an information conforms to the requirements of law is also a question subject to free review." State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) (citing State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 285, 287, 805 P.2d 491, 493 (Ct.App.1991)).
Preliminarily, even though the district judge's order was labeled a "judgment of acquittal," it is clear from the motion and the district judge's reasoning in ruling on the motion that the order was actually a dismissal of the charge of removing a firearm from a law enforcement officer. The district judge did not resolve any factual elements in favor of Quintero and the dismissal was procedurally based. In fact, at the time she dismissed the charge, the district judge noted: "yesterday when the State rested, it's the opinion of this Court that the State in trying this case had met all of the elements sufficiently to survive — on Count II to survive a motion for judgment of acquittal." Acquittal of a charge after trial, when some or all of the factual elements are resolved, cannot be equated with a dismissal where the dismissal occurred before any facts were resolved or a decision on the merits was rendered. State v. Werneth, 101 Idaho 241, 244, 611 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1980). Despite the order's title, this was in reality a dismissal of the charge based upon insufficiency of the allegations in the information.
As to the district court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction, "[t]he indictment or information filed by the prosecution is the jurisdictional instrument upon which a defendant stands trial." Jones, 140 Idaho at 757, 101 P.3d at 701 (citing State v. Izzard, 136 Idaho 124, 127, 29 P.3d 960, 963 (Ct.App.2001)). "Subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal case is conferred by the filing of an `information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was committed within the State of Idaho.'" Jones, 140 Idaho at 757, 101 P.3d at 701-02 (quoting State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227, 91 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2004)). "Since the indictment or information provides subject matter jurisdiction to the court, the court's jurisdictional power depends on the charging document being legally sufficient to survive challenge." Id. at 758, 101 P.3d at 702. To be legally sufficient, an indictment or information must meet two standards:
First, there is the question of whether an indictment or information is legally sufficient for the purpose of due process during proceedings in the trial court. Second, there is the separate question of whether an indictment or information is legally sufficient for the purpose of imparting jurisdiction.
Id. In this case, Quintero's challenge was solely jurisdictional. This Court's recent opinion in State v. Jones is instructive. In Jones, the information omitted the element of "willfulness" as required for a violation of the crime charged. The defendant pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced. The defendant did not object until after the entry of judgment. In holding the information was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, this Court stated: "[W]hen an objection to a charging document is not made until after the entry of judgment, if the applicable code section is named in the charging document its language may be read into the text of the charge." Jones, at 759, 101 P.3d at 703 (emphasis added).
Like the information in Jones, the information in this case alleged the crime was committed in Idaho and referenced the applicable section of the Idaho Code. Similar to the information in Jones, where the "willfulness" element of...
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...of the territorial jurisdiction of the court and a citation to the applicable section of the Idaho Code." State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 622, 115 P.3d 710, 713 (2005). There is no dispute that the complaint alleged that Anderson committed the crime in Idaho. By specifically citing I.C. §......
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