State v. Lampl
| Decision Date | 28 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | A13A1072.,Nos. A13A1071,s. A13A1071 |
| Parties | The STATE v. LAMPL. Lampl v. The State. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Tracy Graham–Lawson, Dist. Atty., Kathryn Lauranne Powers, Elizabeth A. Baker, Asst. Dist. Attys., for Appellant.
Brian Steel, Atlanta, for Appellee.
On September 14, 2011, a Clayton County grand jury indicted John James Lampl for the offenses of conspiracy in restraint of free and open competition (Count I), false statements and writings (Counts II–VII), and perjury (Count VIII). The grand jury's indictment stemmed from an earlier investigation by a Clayton County special purpose grand jury which had been impaneled pursuant to OCGA § 15–12–100 for the purpose of investigating public corruption and various crimes allegedly committed by currently or previously elected county officials and county employees. As Lampl was neither a county official nor a county employee, he moved to dismiss all counts of the indictment, contending that he was the "target" of an unlawful investigation by the special purpose grand jury and that he should not have been compelled to testify at the special purpose grand jury proceedings.
The perjury charge was based on a portion of Lampl's testimony to the special purpose grand jury. In its ruling on the motion to dismiss, the trial court found that the special purpose grand jury was not authorized to conduct an investigation of Lampl, who was an employee of the City of Morrow, and was not authorized to investigate Lampl's involvement with "Olde Towne Morrow," a real estate development project for the City of Morrow. The trial court further found that the special purpose grand jury was not authorized to subpoena Lampl to testify regarding matters which exceeded the scope of its investigation. Accordingly, the trial court granted Lampl's motion to dismiss with regard to the perjury count (Count VIII) of the indictment, and it also granted his motion to suppress the statements that he made to the special purpose grand jury. However, the trial court denied Lampl's motion to dismiss with regard to the remaining counts of the indictment (Counts I–VII), finding that the indictment was brought by a properly constituted grand jury which was authorized to indict Lampl for these offenses.
Both parties appeal from the trial court's ruling, and their cross-appeals are consolidated for our review. In Case No. A13A1071, the State contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the perjury count because the special purpose grand jury did not exceed the scope of its investigation. The State argues that the investigation into the Olde Towne Morrow project, as well as the questioning of Lampl, potentially involved corruption at the county level. The State further contends that the trial court erred in suppressing Lampl's statements because (1) the special purpose grand jury had the authority to subpoena Lampl; (2) Lampl testified voluntarily; and (3) there was no violation of Lampl's constitutional rights. In Case No. A13A1072, Lampl contends that the trial court erred in denying his plea in bar and motion to dismiss with regard to the remaining counts (Counts I–VII) of the indictment, arguing that the State had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by, inter alia, exceeding the legal limitations of the special purpose grand jury and allowing the special purpose grand jury to subpoena and compel Lampl to testify at the grand jury proceedings even though he was the intended target of the unauthorized investigation. Lampl argues that dismissal of the indictment was warranted because the State's misconduct was so outrageous and fundamentally unfair that it shocks the universal sense of justice mandated by the due process clause. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments.
1. The State contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the perjury count (Count VIII) of the indictment. Essentially, the State argues that the special purpose grand jury was authorized to investigate the Olde Towne Morrow project because it potentially involved corruption at the county level, and that the special purpose grand jury did not exceed the scope of its investigative authority when it subpoenaed Lampl and questioned him with regard to his involvement in the city project. We disagree.
A special purpose grand jury may be impaneled "for the purpose of investigating any alleged violation of the laws of this state or any other matter subject to investigation by grand juries as provided by law." OCGA § 15–12–100(a). Although a special purpose grand jury is limited to investigative purposes and has no power to return an indictment,1 the law otherwise relative to regular grand juries applies to special purpose grand juries. See OCGA § 15–12–102. With respect to regular grand juries, their duties "shall be confined to such matters and things as [they are] required to perform by the Constitution and laws or by order of ... the superior court of the county [in which they are impaneled]." OCGA § 15–12–71(a).
In this case, the Clayton County Superior Court entered an order impaneling the special purpose grand jury "for the purpose of investigating public corruption and various crimes allegedly committed by currently or previously elected county officials and county employees." It is undisputed that Lampl was an employee of the City of Morrow, and that he was neither a currently or previously elected county official or county employee. Furthermore, our review of the transcripts of the special purpose grand jury proceedings indicate that the investigation focused on Lampl and the contracting irregularities related to the Olde Towne Morrow project, a matter that did not involve county officials or county employees. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that the special purpose grand jury did not have the authority to investigate Lampl or the Olde Towne Morrow project.
Likewise, we agree with the trial court that the special purpose grand jury lacked the authority to subpoena Lampl for the purpose of investigating the Olde Towne Morrow project and his involvement in the same. While a special purpose grand jury may subpoena witnesses and compel evidence, its power to do so is limited to matters which relate directly or indirectly to the authorized investigation. See OCGA § 15–12–100(c). Here, the special purpose grand jury was not authorized to investigate Lampl or the Olde Towne Morrow project. As Lampl's perjury charge arose out of his testimony during this unauthorized investigation, the trial court did not err in dismissing the perjury count. See State v. Bartel, 223 Ga.App. 696, 696–697, 479 S.E.2d 4 (1996) () (emphasis supplied).
2. The State makes the additional argument that we should reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand the case to allow the State to present additional evidence regarding the authorized scope of the special purpose grand jury's investigation. It contends that the trial court erroneously prevented the State from presenting evidence on this issue. Specifically, the State argues that the trial court erred by (i) failing to consider redacted portions of the superior court order impaneling the special purpose grand jury; (ii) refusing to permit the State to proffer an unredacted copy of the order; and (iii)...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Lampl
...in investigating Olde Towne Morrow and subpoenaing Lampl and that the perjury count was thus properly dismissed. State v. Lampl, 325 Ga.App. 344(1), 750 S.E.2d 685 (2013). Regarding the superior court's refusal to dismiss the remainder of the indictment, the appellate court concluded that e......
-
State v. Lampl, A13A1071.
...Baker, for Appellant.Brian Steel, Atlanta, for Appellee.RAY, Judge.In the consolidated case of State v. Lampl [and Lampl v. State ], 325 Ga.App. 344, 750 S.E.2d 685 (2013), this Court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing a particular count of the indictment charging Lampl with perjur......