State v. Lancaster

• Decision Date: 30 November 1907
• Parties: STATE v. LANCASTER ET AL.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

105 S.W. 858

119 Tenn. 638

STATE v. LANCASTER ET AL.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

November 30, 1907

Appeal from Chancery Court, Hamilton County; T. M. McConnell Chancellor.

Bill by the state of Tennessee against George D. Lancaster, executor and others, to have property declared escheated to the state. From a judgment of dismissal, the state appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Attorney General Cates, District Attorney Whitaker, Brown & Spurlock and T. C. Lattimore, for the State.

A. W. Gaines and Pritchard & Sizer, for appellees.

NEIL J.

The bill in this case was filed for the purpose of having certain property declared escheat to the state, but was dismissed on demurrer, from which decree the complainant prayed and obtained an appeal to this court.

The bill alleges that one Ella C. White died in Hamilton county about December 25, 1904, without issue, and without any relatives entitled by the laws of descent to inherit the estate of which she died seised and possessed; that she owned at her death eight pieces of real estate specially mentioned in the bill, and also certain personal property described in the inventory of her estate filed by the defendant George D. Lancaster, as executor.

It is further alleged that about a month before her death Mrs. Ella C. White executed a will wherein the said George D. Lancaster was nominated as executor, and in this will she disposed of her estate in the following manner:

To each of the defendants Dr. H. Berlin, Rev. Thos. W. Tobin, Mrs. C. V. Brown, and her children, Edith Brown and Benjamin Brown, she gave certain sums of money, and the residue of her estate to defendant the Sisters of St. Dominick, and authorized the executor to sell and dispose of all of the estate and distribute the proceeds among the parties just mentioned.

It is further alleged that at the time this will was executed the testatrix was not of sound mind and disposing memory, and that the will was also procured from her by undue influence, and was without effect to convey title; that the said will was, however, probated in common form; and that the executor therein named took out letters testamentary, and has since been engaged in the administration of the estate, and has sold and reduced to money the greater portion, if not all, of the estate, and now has the proceeds in his hands ready for distribution under, and in accordance with, the terms of the will.

It is further alleged that the defendants Mrs. Bridget M. Brosnon, John W. White, Mrs. Ella T. McDermott, Julia Kerney, Katherine Kerney, Arthur W. White, Mrs. Ella McHale Fineran, Edward McHale, Thomas McHale, William McHale, and Joe McHale are the brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, respectively, of William P. White, the husband of the said Ella C. White, who predeceased his wife; that as such nephews and nieces of William P. White they are setting up claim to said property by virtue of some alleged will executed in their favor by said Ella C. White. Complainant charges that, if any such will was in fact executed, the said Ella C. White was of unsound mind, and that the same was procured by undue influence.

The bill prayed for process for the persons mentioned, and that the title of the property not disposed of be decreed to the complainant, and also the proceeds of that disposed of. The defendants who are described above as the nephews and nieces of William P. White filed a demurrer setting forth the following objections to the bill:

First, that the bill alleges the fact that Mrs. White died testate, and this allegation could not be avoided by the further allegation that she was mentally incapable at the time the will was executed, or was under the effect of undue influence; second, that it appears from the face of the bill that it is a proceeding to contest a will, whereas, the court of chancery has no power to entertain such a controversy, and the complainant no right to institute one; third, because the bill seeks to reach the proceeds of the sales in the hands of the executor, while complainant's recourse, if any it has, is against the property itself, left by the decedent, and that the present holders of the property which has been sold are not made parties to the suit.

The demurrer was incorporated in the answer, but was first called to the attention of the court, and in the view we take of the case it is unnecessary to consider the questions made upon the answer.

An answer was filed by George D. Lancaster and Dr. H. Berlin and other persons mentioned with him, but no question arises upon this branch of the case. The bill having been dismissed on demurrer, the question is simply whether a cause of action is stated upon the face of the bill.

Our statutory provisions upon the law of escheats are contained in sections 3825 to 3837, inclusive, of Shannon's Code. These provisions, so far as necessary to be quoted in order to give a general view of the subject, are as follows:

Section 3825 provides that "the estate, real and personal, of any person dying intestate within this state, without issue, and leaving no relatives entitled by the law of descent to his estate, shall go to the common school fund." A subsequent part of this section contains a provision in favor of the widow which need not be specially mentioned here.

Section 3826 reads: "It shall be the duty of the district attorney in all cases in which he has a good right to believe an escheat has occurred in his district, to file a bill in the chancery court of the county wherein the land so escheated may lie, in the name of the state of Tennessee, and without security, to have the same declared escheated."

Section 3827: "Besides the state of Tennessee as complainant, said attorney shall make parties defendant to said bill the personal representatives of the deceased, and all other persons who are in possession, or in any manner or way claim an interest in or to such property; and if such parties are residents of the state of Tennessee, they shall be served with process; if non-residents, shall be made parties by publication, according to law."

The next section provides that, in addition to the classes of defendants just named, there shall be made a publication for 30 days in a newspaper published in the county, or if no newspaper be published in the county, then the nearest newspaper so published, calling upon unknown heirs of such deceased person, "and all persons claiming under him or her in any manner or way whatever, to enter his, her or their appearance as defendants to said bill or suit, and all persons having an interest in the same may come into court and defend the same according to the rules of said court."

The next section concerns the fee of the district attorney.

The next section provides that the same proceedings shall be instituted against the personal representative and his sureties, after the lapse of two years, for any balance of personal estate in his possession, and upon the same terms and conditions as those above mentioned, as well as against any other person having possession of or claiming the same.

Section 3831 provides that the court shall hear proof, and, if satisfied that it would be best for said land to be sold, shall decree the sale thereof by the clerk.

The next three sections provide the terms of sale, and declare the duties of the clerk with respect to collections.

Section 3835 declares that when all the money is paid the court shall vest the title of the land in the purchaser by decree.

Section 3836 reads: "All monies or lands so declared escheated or belonging to the state shall, if money, be paid to the treasurer of the state, who shall report the same to the next legislature thereafter; or if lands, and the court should not decree a sale of the same, the said district attorney shall, in writing, report the same to the comptroller, whose duty it shall be to report the same to the next legislature thereafter."

The next and last section provides for the right of appeal to this court.

We have several cases upon the subject of escheat in this state ( Williams v. Wilson, Mart. & Y. 248; Pinson v. Ivey, 1 Yerg. 296; Hinkle's Lessee v. Shadden, 2 Swan, 46; Puckett v. State, 1 Sneed, 355; Catham v. State, 2 Head, 553; Parchman v. Charlton, 1 Cold. 380, 388; Garretson v. Brien, 3 Heisk. 534; Baker v. Shy, 9 Heisk. 91; State v. Allen, 2 Tenn. Ch. 42; Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S.W. 1042, 64 L. R. A. 458; State v. Unknown Heirs, 113 Tenn. 298, 86 S.W. 717), but it will be necessary for us to refer specially to only a few of these cases, as bearing upon the particular phase of the question presented in the present controversy.

In Hinkle's Lessee v. Shadden, supra, it is said: "By a well-established principle of the common law, of feudal origin and policy, whenever the blood of the person last seised became extinct, and the title of the tenant in fee failed, from want of heirs or other cause, the land escheated, or reverted to the original grantor, or lord of the fee, from whom it proceeded. And although feudal tenures do not exist in this country, yet it is a well-established principle of American jurisprudence that, when the title to land fails from defect of heirs, the state steps in the place of the feudal lord, by virtue of its sovereignty, as the original and ultimate proprietor of all the lands within its jurisdiction."

It was further said in that case that whenever the owner dies intestate, without leaving any inheritable blood, there is a failure of competent heirs, "and the lands vest immediately in the state by operation of law, and no inquest of office is requisite in such cases."

To the same effect is Puckett v. State, supra.

In Williams v. Wilson it was held that, where property subject to escheat...