State v. Landes

• Decision Date: 07 January 1908
• Citation: 21 S.D. 606,114 N.W. 717
• Parties: STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Defendant in error, v. H. R. LANDES, Plaintiff in error.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

21 S.D. 606

114 N.W. 717

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Defendant in error,

v.

H. R. LANDES, Plaintiff in error. South Dakota Supreme Court Error to Circuit Court, Davison County, SD Hon. Frank B. Smith, Judge Affirmed Simons & Bradford Attorneys for plaintiff in error. S. W. Clark, Attorney General T. J. Spangler, State’s Attorney Attorneys for the State. Opinion filed January 7, 1908

FULLER, P. J.

Plaintiff in error is now serving a life sentence in the penitentiary at Sioux Falls for the murder of John Doe, whose true name is unknown, and the admission in evidence of his sworn confession tending to connect him with the commission of that crime as an aider and abettor, and therefore punishable under our statute as a principal, is the first point urged for a reversal.

According to his confession and corroborating testimony, the offense was committed by means of a gunshot wound inflicted on the 16th day of July, 1906, in the railway yards at the city of Mitchell, where the dead body of the victim was soon afterward discovered by various persons, and on the following day the accused and one Herman Edward Vey were apprehended at the neighboring village of Fulton by a local peace officer, who immediately turned them over to the sheriff of Davison county. On their return to Mitchell in the custody of this officer Vey appears to have made a voluntary declaration of his guilty participation in the crime, but implicated the accused as the person who fired the fatal shot. The circumstances connected with the confession hero under consideration are shown by the following testimony of Mr. Spangler, adduced as a foundation for its introduction in evidence on behalf of the prosecution:

“My name is T. J. Spangler. I reside in Mitchell, S. D. I am State’s attorney of Davison county. Witness shown paper marked ‘Exhibit A’ and states that he saw this paper before. It is an affidavit made by the defendant, who gave his name as H. R. Williams at that time. I was present at the time the paper was written. I know who wrote it. The defendant was in the sheriff’s office in this courthouse, and I said to him: ‘You are up against it. Mr. Vey has told how you did the shooting of this man down on the track.’ He says, ‘Has he said that?’ And he became angry and said, ‘If he has told that, I will tell just how it happened.’ And I took this paper and he detailed the facts, and I wrote them down. When I had finished, I read it over to him, and asked him to hold up his hand, and be sworn to the facts stated in the affidavit, and he did so, and signed the affidavit in my presence. I took it down to my office, and put my seal on it, and signed it myself. There were no promises or inducements offered to him prior to his making that statement.”

As there can be no fixed rule by which to determine whether a confession is voluntary or involuntary, the question of its competency as evidence against the accused must be decided upon the facts peculiar to the case and the circumstances under which it was made. The confession of a person in custody to one having legal authority to prosecute or punish him should be rejected when it appears that the same resulted from !anything calculated to induce the fabrication of a false statement concerning his participation in a crime. While the competency of the confession before us is too perceptible to justify the citation of supporting authority, and we are not called upon here to sanction the doctrine of the following cases, we quote therefrom without comment as follows:

“The fact that a confession was made in answer to a question assuming the guilt of the person confessing, or was obtained by artifice, falsehood, or deception, or procured by a caution to the accused to tell the truth, if he said anything, does not render the confession inadmissible in evidence. Unless there is a positive promise of favor, made or sanctioned by a person in authority, or the inducement held out is calculated to make the confession untrue, it will be admissible.”

State v. Staley, 14 Minn. 107 (Gil. 75).

“Whether the confessions of a person accused of crime are voluntary or not is a question of fact to be determined by the judge who tries the cause; and his decision that they were voluntary and admitting the evidence will not be reversed, unless a case of clear and manifest error is shown. In such a case it is not sufficient to reverse the decision that the witness pressed the respondent to disclose the really guilty party behind him that he might be punished, and suggesting that he, the respondent, might be called as a witness against the really guilty party, in which case they would have to get him pardoned, telling him at the same time that he could make him no promises.”

State v. Squires, 48 NH 364.

“An extrajudicial confession will not be received in evidence unless it has been freely and voluntarily made. If it has been extorted by fear or induced by hope of benefit, profit, or amelioration, it should be excluded; but mere advice or admonition to the defendant to speak the truth, which does not import a threat or benefit, will not render a confession then given incompetent.”

State v. Kornstett, 62 Kan. 221, 61 Pac. 805.

“The mere fact that two officers who had arrested a boy 13 or 14 years old without a warrant upon suspicion of having committed a crime, after searching him, stripping him of his clothing, and, putting him into a cold cell at the police station, took him from the cell late at night and questioned him for two hours, without warning him of his right not to answer, or offering him opportunity to consult friends or counsel, does not render his confession in the conversation inadmissible on his trial for the crime.”

Commonwealth v. Cuffee, 108 Mass. 285. “A prisoner’s confession to the officer arresting him or holding him in custody will not be rejected merely because it was made in answer to a question which assumed his guilt.” State v. Berry, 50 La. Ann. 1309, 24 South 329. “Where the circumstances proved show a confession of guilt was freely and voluntarily made, it should be admitted in evidence, although there may be evidence of threats and promises made at the time the confession was obtained.” Bartley v. State, 156 Ill. 234, 40 N.E. 831. “A confession procured by artifice is not for that reason inadmissible, unless the artifice used was calculated to produce an untrue confession.” State v. Fredericks and Reed, 85 Mo. 145. “A confession which is affirmatively shown to have been made voluntarily; though made while the defendant was under arrest: and...