State v. Lane
| Decision Date | 02 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. S-17-150,S-17-150 |
| Parties | STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Michael E. LANE, appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Nathan S. Lab, of McGough Law, P.C., L.L.O., Omaha, for appellant.
Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Siobhan E. Duffy, Lincoln, for appellee.
Michael E. Lane accepted a plea agreement and entered a no contest plea to incest, a Class III felony, on October 31, 2016. At the sentencing hearing, the district court for Douglas County pronounced that Lane was sentenced to 4 to 4 years' imprisonment, with credit for 11 days served, and a term of 2 years' postrelease supervision. Lane appeals. Lane claims that he should be able to withdraw his plea, because at the plea hearing, the State and the district court misinformed him that he would not need to register as a sex offender. As explained below, we reject this assignment of error. Lane challenges his sentence in certain respects. However, because, as we explain below, we are vacating his sentence due to plain error, we do not reach these assignments of error. Finally, Lane alleges ineffectiveness of trial counsel. We do not reach the merits of Lane’s ineffectiveness of counsel claims. We affirm Lane’s conviction, but because we find error in the sentencing, we vacate Lane’s sentence and remand the cause for resentencing.
Following the denial of Lane’s motion to suppress, pursuant to a plea agreement in which Lane agreed to enter a no contest plea, the State filed an amended information charging Lane with incest, a Class III felony, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-703 (Reissue 2016).
At the plea hearing, the State provided a factual basis for the charge. In sum, the victim, who is Lane’s niece, reported an incident which occurred on or about November 7, 2015. Lane had been living with the victim’s family for about a month when the events giving rise to the conviction occurred. The crime occurred in Douglas County, Nebraska.
At the plea hearing, the district court informed Lane of his constitutional rights and that by pleading, Lane would be giving up all of those rights but for the right to appeal and the right to counsel, and Lane stated that he understood and still wished to plead. While informing Lane of the penalties associated with the crime charged, the court asked the State whether the offense required registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4001 et seq. (Reissue 2016). The State responded that the offense did not require registration under SORA. The parties agree that this advisement by the State and by the district court was incorrect and that an incest conviction requires registration under SORA. See § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(A)(XIV). Lane’s counsel did not object or make a statement regarding this erroneous statement at the plea hearing.
Lane pled no contest. The district court found that the plea was made freely, knowingly, and voluntarily and accepted the plea. The district court found Lane guilty of the charge and sentenced him to 4 to 4 years' imprisonment, with credit for 11 days served, and a term of 2 years' postrelease supervision.
This appeal followed. On appeal, Lane seeks to withdraw his plea, challenges his sentence, and alleges ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
Lane claims that (1) because the district court and the State misinformed him that he would not be subject to sex offender registration, he should be permitted to withdraw his plea, and (2) the district erred in the sentence it imposed. Lane further claims that (3) he was prejudiced by ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
A trial court is given discretion as to whether to accept a guilty plea, and an appellate court will overturn that decision only where there is an abuse of discretion. State v. Russell , 291 Neb. 33, 863 N.W.2d 813 (2015).
Plain error may be found on appeal when an error unasserted or uncomplained of at trial, but plainly evident from the record, prejudicially affects a litigant’s substantial right and, if uncorrected, would result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process. State v. Ramirez , 287 Neb. 356, 842 N.W.2d 694 (2014).
Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel may be determined on direct appeal is a question of law. State v. Mora, 298 Neb. 185, 903 N.W.2d 244 (2017). In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, an appellate court decides only whether the undisputed facts contained within the record are sufficient to conclusively determine whether counsel did or did not provide effective assistance and whether the defendant was or was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient performance. Id.
As we explain below, we affirm Lane’s conviction. However, we find plain error in connection with sentencing, because on the record before us, the district court failed to complete SORA notification obligations. See § 29-4007. Accordingly, we affirm Lane’s conviction but vacate his sentence and remand the cause for resentencing. Further, we are unable to reach the merits of Lane’s claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
On appeal, Lane contends that he should be allowed by this court to withdraw his plea on the basis that his plea was the product of being wrongly advised by the district court and the State that he was not subject to SORA and its registration duties. We reject this assignment of error. For completeness, we note that our rejection of Lane’s claim regarding the propriety of his plea considers only this basis asserted by Lane.
To support a finding that a defendant has entered a guilty plea freely, intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly, a court must inform a defendant concerning (1) the nature of the charge, (2) the right to assistance of counsel, (3) the right to confront witnesses against the defendant, (4) the right to a jury trial, and (5) the privilege against self-incrimination. State v . Bol , 294 Neb. 248, 882 N.W.2d 674 (2016). The record must also establish a factual basis for the plea and that the defendant knew the range of penalties for the crime charged. Id.
In State v. Schneider , 263 Neb. 318, 640 N.W.2d 8 (2002), we held that a defendant’s duties to register as a sex offender are a collateral consequence to a defendant’s sentence. Because the SORA registration duties at issue are not punitive, a trial court may inform a defendant of the duties imposed under SORA before accepting pleas of guilty or no contest, but is not required to do so, and a plea is not rendered involuntary or unintelligent because a defendant was not aware of his or her registration duties. See id. See, also, State v. Payan , 277 Neb. 663, 765 N.W.2d 192 (2009). Compare Doe v . Nebraska , 734 F.Supp.2d 882 (D. Neb. 2010) (). Thus, under Schneider , the district court’s incorrect advisement regarding the collateral SORA consequence of Lane’s plea does not invalidate his plea or warrant the relief of withdrawal.
We have reviewed the record, and on the record before us, we determine that the district court failed to complete the SORA notification requirements of § 29-4007, which the court is mandated to do in a conviction for an offense triggering SORA duties. As a result, we find plain error in sentencing and we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
Lane was convicted of incest pursuant to § 28-703, which is a registrable offense under § 29-4003(1)(b)(i)(A)(XIV). The
State suggests that we vacate the sentence and remand this cause for additional sentencing proceedings, because the record does not show that the district court complied with its duty to inform Lane, in writing, about his duty to register under SORA. See § 29-4007. We agree with the State.
Section 29-4007 provides, in relevant part:
We have stated that the notification requirements of § 29-4007 are mandatory. State v. Pathod , 269 Neb. 155, 690 N.W.2d 784 (2005). In Pathod , we noted that the plain language of § 29-4007 states that when sentencing a person, the court "shall" provide written notification and copies of the notification and corresponding journal entry to various parties.
In Pathod , the sentencing court failed to enter a journal entry or notify the defendant at sentencing, but the notice signed by the defendant was filed the day after sentencing and was included in the record. Given all the facts in Pathod , we concluded that the court’s error in SORA compliance did not invalidate the sentence.
Although the facts we have before us differ, we apply an analysis similar to Pathod in the instant case. Here, the State notes that on this record, the court failed to provide written notification to Lane at...
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