State v. Lane
| Decision Date | 16 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | NO. COA11-53,COA11-53 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US) |
| Parties | STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TYQUAN RASAIJ LANE, Defendant. |
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 18 August 2010 by Judge W. Allen Cobb, Jr., in New Hanover County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 May 2011.
Defendant Tyquan Rasaij Lane appeals from judgments entered after he was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, felony breaking and entering, second degree kidnapping, and possession of a firearm by a felon. After careful review, we find no error.
On 14 September 2009, Bobby Ray Piggott, the victim, was playing dominoes on the front porch of his house with his son Derrick Jackson and his roommate Bryan Rivers. While Mr. Piggott was inside his house getting a drink, two men with handguns ran onto the porch. One man, who was later identified by Mr. Piggott and Mr. Rivers as defendant, wore blue jeans, a white T-shirt, a hat, and a black bandana across his mouth. The other man, who was later identified by Mr. Piggott as Troy Wilson, wore a dark colored shirt, camouflage or fatigue shorts, and a red bandana across his mouth. Mr. Jackson ran into the house yelling, "[t]hey got guns, they got guns," then ran out the side door to a nearby store where he called the police. Mr. Rivers put his hands up and then also ran to the nearby store.
The two men then ran into Mr. Piggott's house and demanded his money. Mr. Piggott gave them $400 from his pocket. The men then demanded any other money located in the house. When Mr. Piggott denied having any more money, Mr. Wilson hit him on the head with his gun and defendant hit him across the nose with his gun. Mr. Piggott then took the men into his bedroom and gave them another $300. The men demanded Mr. Piggott's "work," whichhe claimed he did not have.1 Defendant searched the bedroom while Mr. Wilson held his gun on Mr. Piggott. No additional items were taken from the house and the men spent several minutes dividing Mr. Piggott's $700 between them.
The men then asked Mr. Piggott where his gun was located, and he told them it was "out back." The robbers forced Mr. Piggott to lead them to a storage building behind the house and began to search it. Defendant contemplated taking one of Mr. Piggott's motorcycles that was in the storage building. Soon thereafter, one of the men looked out the window and saw a police officer approaching the house. Mr. Wilson demanded that Mr. Piggott help them avoid arrest. Mr. Piggott said there was a "manhole" in the closet of the storage building that gave access to the space under the building. The two men began to remove the contents of the closet to clear the access. Mr. Wilson took off his bandana, and Mr. Piggott could see his face as they stood side by side. Defendant went down into the access area, but came back when he discovered that there was no way out. Defendant no longer had his mask on and stood about two feet away from Mr. Piggott. When both men went down the manhole, Mr. Piggott escaped and told the police what happened.
Mr. Wilson and defendant were apprehended by the police after they were seen fleeing from Mr. Piggott's house. One of the officers brought Mr. Wilson to Mr. Piggott who identified him as one of the two people who robbed him. Another officer placed defendant in the back of his patrol car, which was at the end of Mr. Piggott's block. An officer drove Mr. Piggott to the patrol car where he identified defendant as the second person involved in the robbery. When defendant was searched, a knife was found in his pocket as well as a large quantity of money with blood on it. The blood on the money was later determined through DNA evidence to be Mr. Piggott's.
Defendant was indicted on charges of robbery with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, felony breaking and entering, second degree kidnapping, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Mr. Piggott identified defendant in court as one of the men who had robbed him. Mr. Rivers also identified defendant in court as one of the robbers.
The jury found defendant guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, felony breaking and entering, second degree kidnapping, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant was sentenced to103-133 months for the robbery and conspiracy convictions, 34-50 months for the kidnapping and possession of a firearm convictions, and 10-12 months for the breaking and entering conviction. Defendant timely appealed to this Court.
Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court committed plain error in denying his motion to suppress Mr. Piggott's in-court and out-of-court identifications; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the kidnapping charge; (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the conspiracy to commit armed robbery charge; and (4) the trial court committed plain error in its instructions to the jury regarding conspiracy. We will discuss each of defendant's arguments in turn.
First, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress Mr. Piggott's out-of-court and in-court identifications because the show-up procedure was impermissibly suggestive and created a substantial likelihood of misidentification. We disagree.
Defendant in this case filed a pre-trial motion to suppress, which was denied during trial; however, defendantfailed to object to Mr. Piggott's testimony at trial. Because "a pretrial motion to suppress . . . is not sufficient to preserve for appeal the issue of admissibility of evidence," State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 66, 540 S.E.2d 713, 723 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 838, 151 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2001), defendant has not preserved this issue for review. Consequently, as defendant recognizes, our review is limited to determining whether the trial court committed plain error in denying the motion to suppress. "[A] prerequisite to our engaging in a 'plain error' analysis is the determination that the [trial court's action] constitutes 'error' at all." State v. Torain, 316 N.C. 111, 116, 340 S.E.2d 465, 468, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 836, 93 L. Ed. 2d 77 (1986). In this case, we conclude that the trial court did not err, much less commit plain error, in denying defendant's motion to suppress.
When reviewing the trial court's order denying a motion to suppress, it is well established that the trial court's findings of fact "are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting." State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001) . The trial court's conclusions of law must be supported by the findings of fact and "reflect[] a correct application ofapplicable legal principles to the facts found." State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 11, 484 S.E.2d 350, 357 (1997).
Here, the trial court found as fact, inter alia:
Defendant presents a general argument that findings of fact 26 and 29 are incomplete and not supported by the evidence.Defendant does not cite any authority and does not present a coherent argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings. Nevertheless, upon review of the evidence presented on voir dire, we hold that the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the evidence.
Defendant does, however, specifically assert that the trial court failed to include a finding of fact that Mr. Piggott overheard someone say "[we] got the other one" on the officer's microphone. While there was testimony to support such a finding, we hold that the absence of the finding does not prejudice defendant in any way since there was no material conflict in the evidence at voir dire. See State v. Vick, 341 N.C. 569, 580, 461 S.E.2d 655, 661 (1995) ().
Next, we examine the trial court's conclusions of law. The trial court concluded that the show-up "was not so impermissibly suggestive as to violate [defendant's] right to due process of law[,]" and that, "even if impermissibly suggestive, [the show-up] was reliable and did not produce a substantial likelihood of misidentification, given the totality of the circumstances . . . ." Defendant argues that these conclusions...
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