State v. Lane

• Decision Date: 12 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. 20061126.,No. 20070878.,20070878.,20061126.
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Brandon R. LANE, Defendant and Appellee, Peggy Hay and Patricia Hay, Victims and Appellants.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

212 P.3d 529

2009 UT 35

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Brandon R. LANE, Defendant and Appellee, Peggy Hay and Patricia Hay, Victims and Appellants.

No. 20070878.

No. 20061126.

Supreme Court of Utah.

June 12, 2009.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Christopher D. Ballard, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for the State.

James H. Faust, Todd R. Mecham, Salt Lake City, for Lane Heidi M. Nestel, Salt Lake City, for the Hays Paul G. Cassell, Douglas E. Beloof, Margaret Garvin, Salt Lake City, amicus National Crime Victim Law Institute.

Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Honorable John R. Anderson.

DURHAM, Chief Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 Appellants, Peggy Hay and Patricia Hay (collectively, the Victims), appeal the district court's grant of Defendant/Appellee Brandon R. Lane's Motion to Dismiss his plea in abeyance.¹ Neither the State nor Lane appealed the dismissal; thus we must determine whether the Victims may independently appeal the dismissal of Lane's plea in abeyance. We hold that they cannot because no party to the case appealed the lower court's dismissal of the case and the dismissal deprives the Victims of standing. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On February 19, 2005, the Victims and their husbands, brothers Dan and John Hay, were traveling eastbound on Highway 40 near Duchesne. The Victims were riding in the back seat of the vehicle, and their spouses were riding in the front of the vehicle. Lane was traveling westbound on the same two-lane highway.

¶ 3 While traveling at an excessively high speed despite the wet and foggy conditions of the morning, Lane moved into oncoming traffic in an attempt to pass a semi truck. Lane's vehicle collided head on with the vehicle driven by John Hay. As a result of the collision, both John Hay and Dan Hay died at the scene of the accident. Peggy Hay suffered life-threatening injuries and Patricia Hay sustained serious injuries.

¶ 4 On July 15, 2005, criminal charges were filed against Lane, including two counts of negligent homicide, a class A misdemeanor. Lane was arraigned on August 15, 2005. Following the arraignment, the Victims and their families made regular contact with investigating and prosecuting agencies, requesting updates of any new developments. Also on August 15 the Victims allege² that Lane's attorney mailed a letter to the prosecutor in which a plea agreement was discussed and the date of September 12, 2005, was acknowledged as the date the plea agreement would be finalized during Lane's sentencing hearing.

¶ 5 On August 31, 2005, the Duchesne County prosecutor, Karen Allen, met with the Victims to discuss the emerging plea bargain between Lane and the State. The Victims allege that during the meeting, the prosecutor "deliberately deceived and misled the victims as to what the plea bargain would be, when the plea would be taken, and what consequences [Lane] would have as a result of the plea." Specifically, the Victims assert that the prosecutor advised them that only one count of negligent homicide would be held in abeyance, the term of abeyance would be three years, and Lane would plead guilty to the second count of negligent homicide and be sentenced on that charge.

¶ 6 During this meeting, the Victims notified the prosecutor that they wanted to address the court and that they would be requesting restitution. The Victims claim that the prosecutor told them they could read victim impact statements at the sentencing hearing, which would likely be in January 2006. They also claim the prosecutor told them that the hearing scheduled for September 12, 2005, was only a status hearing and that they need not attend.

¶ 7 On September 12, Lane entered into a plea agreement in which he pled guilty to the two counts of negligent homicide, among other charges. The agreement specified that the plea would be held in abeyance for a period of twelve months, after which time Lane would be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas and have the case dismissed with prejudice. Along with other terms, Lane agreed to pay $1,500 in restitution, and the State agreed not to pursue any further restitution.

¶ 8 At the plea hearing, the prosecutor advised the court that $1,500 would not be sufficient to cover the Victims' losses, which totaled "over a million dollars" at the time of the hearing, and that the Victims would likely view the restitution amount as "a slap in the face." In response, the court converted the $1,500 into a plea in abeyance fee. However, the district court ultimately awarded no restitution to the Victims. The Victims were not present at the hearing and were not given an opportunity to be heard during Lane's sentencing.

¶ 9 Once the Victims learned that a plea agreement had been entered and that the terms of that agreement were materially different from their understanding based on the representations of the prosecutor, they filed a complaint with the Eighth District Victims' Rights Committee. The Eighth District eventually transferred the complaint to the Third District Victims' Rights Committee due to a conflict of interest. The Third District Victims' Rights Committee concluded that the Victims' rights had been violated: the Victims were not treated with fairness, dignity, and respect; they were deprived of their right to be present and heard; and they were stripped of their right to restitution.

¶ 10 Relying on the findings of the Victims' Rights Committee, on August 3, 2006, the Victims filed in the district court a Motion to Set Aside Plea and for Evidentiary Hearing claiming that their rights had been violated and that the plea in abeyance was illegal because the prosecutor cannot waive a victim's right to restitution.

¶ 11 After staying the plea in abeyance for approximately three months to allow the Victims time to file a memorandum in support of their motion, the district court entered an order on November 9, 2006, denying the motion. On November 20, 2006, the district court held a teleconference between the parties in order to allow the Victims the opportunity to express their views regarding Lane's sentencing but advised the parties that the court had previously ruled definitively on the plea. On December 6, 2006, the Victims appealed from the district court's denial of their motion. The case was accepted by the court of appeals on December 20 2006. The district court agreed to continue to stay the abeyance period while the Victims pursued their appeal.

¶ 12 In June 2007, while the Victims' appeal was pending, Lane filed in the district court a Motion to Dismiss his plea in abeyance with prejudice pursuant to Utah Code section 77-2a-2(5). The pertinent portion of the statute reads "[a] plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer than 18 months if the plea was to any class of misdemeanor." Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(5) (2008). In accordance with the statute, the district court granted Lane's motion and dismissed the case with prejudice because Lane's pleas had been held in abeyance for more than eighteen months. The Victims also appealed this order. Neither Lane nor the State appealed from any of the district court's rulings. The court of appeals consolidated both appeals and certified the case to this court. Following oral arguments, all participants submitted supplemental briefing on the issue of jurisdiction.

ISSUE

¶ 13 The issue of whether the Victims can independently appeal from a dismissal of Lane's plea in abeyance is dispositive; therefore, we do not reach any other issues.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 14 Because this appeal asks us to analyze whether the Victims themselves can appeal from a dismissal of a plea in abeyance, we must interpret the meanings of the Victims' Rights Amendment³ of the Utah Constitution and sections of the Rights of Crime Victims Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38-1 to -14 (2008). "[I]nterpreting the Utah Constitution and the Utah Code presents questions of law, [and] we review these questions for correctness...." State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, ¶ 19, 44 P.3d 756.

ANALYSIS

¶ 15 Threshold questions in any case on appeal are whether there is an actual controversy and whether the appellants have standing to pursue the appeal. In this case we do not proceed past these threshold considerations because (1) the dismissal of the case below and failure of either party to the case to appeal renders this appeal moot, and (2) even if the appeal were not moot, the Victims' Rights Amendment of the Utah Constitution and the Rights of Crime Victims Act specifically prohibit the Victims from appealing any criminal judgment.

I. THE CASE IS MOOT DUE TO THE FAILURE OF EITHER PARTY TO THE CASE TO APPEAL THE DISMISSAL

¶ 16 A victim is not a party to a criminal case and is not afforded the right to appeal the dismissal of a criminal judgment. Under the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, an appeal is proper when filed by either the defendant or the prosecution. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1 (2008). Specifically, among other matters, the defendant may appeal from "a final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea," and the prosecution may appeal from "a final judgment of dismissal ... [or] an order granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty." Id.

¶ 17 Only the State and the defendant are actual parties to a criminal action. For example, in State v. Harrison, 2001 UT 33, 24 P.3d 936, we held that it was error for the trial court to allow the guardian ad litem to participate in a criminal trial because the victim was not a party to the case. Id. ¶ 30. Additionally, in State v. Sun Surety Insurance Co., 2004 UT 74, 99 P.3d 818, we held that because the surety company was not a party to the criminal case, "an independent direct appeal was improper." Id. ¶ 9.

¶ 18 Moreover, if a case is dismissed and neither party appeals, the dismissal is final, the case is moot, and any appeal by a nonparty is moot. "[W]e will not adjudicate issues when the underlying case is...