State v. Lanesboro Produce & Hatchery Co.

Decision Date15 February 1946
Docket NumberNo. 34000.,34000.
Citation21 N.W.2d 792,221 Minn. 246
PartiesSTATE v. LANESBORO PRODUCE & HATCHERY CO.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., William C. Green, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Harold C. Lindgren, Co. Atty., of Blue Earth, for plaintiff.

John F. D. Meighen and Bennett O. Knudson, both of Albert Lea, for defendant.

MAGNEY, Justice.

Defendant was arraigned on the following information: "I, Harold C. Lindgren, County Attorney * * * hereby inform the court that * * * at the city of Blue Earth * * * Lanesboro Produce & Hatchery Company, a corporation * * * engaged in the business of buying farm produce, including poultry, with its principal place of business at Wells, Minnesota, did wilfully, wrongfully and unlawfully, in violation of Section 6248-3, Mason's Minnesota Statutes, Supplement 1940, Minnesota Statutes 1941, Section 17.15, discriminate between different sections, localities, communities, cities and villages of the state of Minnesota by purchasing farm products at a higher price and rate in one locality than was paid for such farm products of the same kind, quality and grade by such corporation in other sections, localities, communities, cities and villages, in that at the time and place aforesaid it did purchase poultry from various and divers persons in the city of Blue Earth, Faribault County, Minnesota, at higher prices and rates than were paid for such poultry by said corporation in Jackson, Sherburn, Lakefield, Alden, and Winnebago, all in the state of Minnesota, after making due allowance for the difference in the actual cost of transportation from the locality of purchase to the locality of manufacture or sale, * * *."

Defendant demurred to the information. The court made no ruling on the demurrer, but pursuant to Minn.St.1941, § 632.10, Mason St.1927, § 10756, reported the case to this court for decision of the legal and constitutional questions involved and certified the following questions:

"1. Does the law, pursuant to which said information is filed, viz.: 6248-3 Mason's Minnesota Statutes, as amended, being Section 17.15 Minnesota Statutes [1941], violate the provisions of Section 1, of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?

"2. Does the said law violate Clause 3 of Section 8, of Article 1, of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that Congress shall have power to regulate interstate commerce?

"3. Does said law violate the provisions of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?

"4. Does the said law violate the provisions of Section 7 of Article 1, of the Constitution of the State of Minnesota?

"5. Is said law so vague indefinite and uncertain that it denies the defendant due process of law, equal protection of the laws and liberty of contract, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the state of Minnesota?

"6. Does the decision in State v. Northwest Poultry & Egg Co., 203 Minn. 438 , render said law unconstitutional as to the crime charged herein by said information?"

1. Under the heading "Assignments of Error," defendant makes this statement: "* * * the basic contentions of the defendant are: This case comes within the rule of State v. Northwest Poultry & Egg Co., 203 Minn. 438, 281 N.W. 753. The terms of the Statute used to define this class of acts constituting unlawful discrimination are so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to deny due process of law."

Only one question, therefore, is actually presented to this court, and that is whether the statute in question is so vague, indefinite, and uncertain as to deny due process of law.

The material portions of Minn.St.1941, § 17.15, Mason St.1940 Supp. § 6248-3, the statute here involved, read as follows: "Any person engaged in the business of buying any farm products for manufacture or sale thereof, who shall discriminate between different sections, localities, communities, cities, or villages, * * * in this state, by purchasing any [such] farm products at a higher price or rate in one locality * * * than is paid for farm products of the same kind, quality, and grade by such person in another section, locality, community, city, or village, * * * after making due allowance for the difference, if any, in the actual cost of transportation from the locality of purchase to the locality of manufacture or sale, * * * shall be deemed guilty of unfair discrimination, which is hereby prohibited and declared to be unlawful."

The statute further provides that it shall not be considered unfair competition to meet the prices of competitors.

L.1937, c. 420, § 2, amended the act above quoted by adding the following provisions "or who shall fail to deduct full transportation costs from the purchase price paid; or who shall fail to deduct the actual costs of hauling when such products are gathered by wagon or truck; * * *." This amendment to the original act was considered shortly after its enactment, in State v. Northwest Poultry & Egg Co. 203 Minn. 438, 281 N.W. 753 (hereinafter called the Northwest Poultry case), and held unconstitutional. The original act, upon which the information in the instant case is based, was not considered in that decision. Defendant contends that the above case directly answers in his favor the questions here certified.

The clause "or who shall fail to deduct the actual costs of hauling when such products are gathered by wagon or truck" is the provision which was discussed and held invalid in the Northwest Poultry case, on the ground that it is so vague, indefinite, and uncertain as to deny due process of law. The court, at page 442 of 203 Minn., 281 N.W. 755, stated the purpose of enactments of this kind in the following language: "This statute requires that the `actual cost of transportation * * * by wagon or truck' be deducted from the purchase price. Exhibited is a clear legislative intent to prevent the destruction of local produce dealers through unfair discrimination by competitors more amply buttressed with capital. Monopolies gained through the misuse of an economic advantage to the direct injury of small merchants and the ultimate injury of producing and consuming classes are to be forestalled. That the police power of the state may be exerted to this end is not to be doubted. State v. Fairmont Creamery Co. 168 Minn. 378, 210 N.W. 163, 608; Central Lbr. Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157, 33 S.Ct. 66, 57 L.Ed. 164."

In discussing the expression "actual cost," the court said at page 443 of 203 Minn., 281 N.W. 756:

"* * * Whether actual cost in this case is limited to gasoline, or whether it extends to depreciation, license fees, insurance, repairs, the wages of the driver, or the actual worth of the services of an operator if driven by the owner is not stated. The statute neither provides which items comprise the actual cost of transportation nor how they are to be computed as to one trip, nor yet how the total is to be apportioned if several purchases are collected from a number of producers located varying distances from the point of manufacture or sale in the course of one trip. No intent is apparent from a reading of the statute by which these questions can be solved.

"* * * But as to the particular case alleged we are compelled to hold that the terms used to define this class of acts constituting unlawful discrimination are so vague, indefinite, and uncertain as to deny due process of law." (Italics supplied.)

Mr. Justice Stone, in a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Mr. Justice Peterson, said at page 444 of 203 Minn., 281 N.W. 756:

"* * * The transportation of goods by automobile is no longer new. Competent accountants, experienced in that field, certainly may reduce cost of transportation by truck to something equivalent to the ton-mile or passenger-mile basis so familiar in railroad accounting. * * *

"That is not uncertain or vague which by the orderly processes of litigation can be rendered sufficiently definite and certain for purposes of judicial decision. Hence, my submission is that the statute here involved is constitutional because its criteria of legal action are susceptible of reasonably certain and just application to facts presentable by evidence."

As stated, in the Northwest Poultry case the clause of the statute held invalid made unlawful as unfair discrimination the failure "to deduct the actual costs of hauling when such products are gathered by wagon or truck." That seems to imply that the dealer must deduct from each individual purchase the actual costs of hauling. The court makes the statement in that case that the statute there considered does not provide which items comprise the actual cost and how they are computed "as to one trip," nor how the total is to be apportioned where several purchases are made from a number of producers located at various distances from the point of manufacture or sale "in the course of one trip." The clause here questioned makes it unlawful as unfair discrimination to discriminate between different sections localities, communities, cities, or villages by purchasing farm products at a higher price in one locality than is paid for such products in another locality, after making due allowance for the difference, if any, in the actual cost of transportation from the locality of purchase to the locality of...

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