State v. Langford

• Decision Date: 07 May 1888
• Citation: 8 S.W. 237,95 Mo. 97
• Parties: The State v. Landgraf, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

8 S.W. 237

95 Mo. 97

The State v. Landgraf, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri

May 7, 1888

Appeal from St. Louis Criminal Court. -- Hon. James C. Normile Judge.

Affirmed.

Simon S. Bass for appellant.

(1) The law is well settled by numerous decisions, and has the support of the best jurists, that the defendant will not be guilty of murder, if the wound was not mortal, and that the maltreatment of the wound or the medicine administered to the patient and not the wound itself, was the cause of death. This proposition should have been presented to the jury. The failure to do so was highly prejudicial to the defendant and deprived him entirely of his defence. 3 Greenl. Evid., sec 139; 2 Bish. Crim. Law, sec. 680; State v. Parsons, 21 Ala. 300; State v. Scatts, 5 Jones, N. C. 420. (2) The court declared "premeditatedly" means thought of beforehand for any time, however short. The long-established instruction has been, "premeditatedly" means, "thought of beforehand for any length of time, however short." State v. Harris, 76 Mo. 361; State v. Snell, 78 Mo. 240; State v. Ellis, 74 Mo. 207. (3) The court erred in its definition of the word, "deliberately." (4) The court erred in instructing the jury that if the defendant shot the deceased intentionally and with the intention of killing her, he could be convicted of murder in the first degree. This was inconsistent with all the other instructions in the case.

B. G. Boone, Attorney General, A. C. Clover, Circuit Attorney, and C. O. Bishop for the state.

(1) The court committed no error in defining deliberation. There was no evidence of any kind of provocation for the shooting. (2) The definition of premeditation is substantially, if not literally correct. The jury could not have been misled. (3) The instruction in regard to the medical treatment is absolutely correct. The principle of law is well settled that if death ensues from a wound, given in malice, though not in its nature mortal, but which being neglected or mismanaged the party dies, this will not excuse the prisoner who gave it; but he will be held guilty of the murder unless he can make it clearly appear that the maltreatment of the wound, and not the wound itself, was the sole cause of death. 3 Greenl. Evid., sec. 139. If the wound is mortal, or dangerous, the person who inflicted it cannot shelter himself under the plea of erroneous treatment. State v. Parsons, 21 Ala. 300; Commonwealth v. Hackett, 2 Allen [Mass.] 136, 141. If the person dies by the action of the wound and by the medical or surgical action jointly, the wound must clearly be regarded sufficiently a cause of the death. And the wound need not even be a concurrent cause, much less need it be the next proximate one, for if it is the cause of the cause, no more is required. 2 Bish. Crim. Law [7 Ed.] sec. 639. (4) The court instructed the jury that "in order to convict the defendant of murder in the first degree, you must believe and find from the evidence that defendant not only shot deceased, Annie Tisch, intentionally, but that he shot her intending to kill her. In this connection, however, you are instructed that, in the absence of qualifying facts and circumstances, a person is presumed to have intended the natural, ordinary, and probable result of his acts. Wherefore, if you believe from the evidence that defendant intentionally shot Annie Tisch in a vital part with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a loaded pistol, from which death ensued, you will find that he intended to kill, unless the facts and circumstances given in evidence show to the contrary." Appellant claims that this instruction is inconsistent with every other instruction in the cause and is not the law. Wherein it is inconsistent does not appear. That it is the law, authorities may be cited in abundance. There can be no murder without an intent to kill. State v. Wieners, 66 Mo. 13. And when the act is malicious and manifestly dangerous to human life and does produce death, the law will presume an intent to kill. Instructions in the very language of this have been approved. State v. Thomas, 78 Mo. 327, 337; State v. McGee, 85 Mo. 647, 648.

Norton, C. J. Ray, J., absent.

OPINION

Norton, C. J.

Defendant was indicted in the St. Louis criminal court at its May term, 1885, for murder in the first degree for killing one Annie Tisch in the city of St. Louis, in March, 1885. After repeated continuances, he was put upon his trial at the March term, 1887, of said court, and was convicted of murder in the first degree. The case is before us on defendant's appeal, and it is insisted that the court erred in giving instructions, and in order to a proper disposition of the objections relied upon, reference to the evidence is necessary.

A voluntary statement made by defendant after his arrest was put in evidence, and is as follows: "I got acquainted with that girl in Belleville about nine months ago, and we worked together there, and I got closely and intimately acquainted with her (hinting at illicit intercourses). I promised to marry her so soon as I could provide a home for her in this city. I found employment in a machine-shop, and brought her over and put her in a boarding-house at Christy avenue. In a few days I learned that she had intercourse with others in that boarding-house; I upbraided her for it and asked her how it came that she looked so pale and sickly now; she excused herself as being sick, didn't sleep well; and I was satisfied that she was not true to me; and she even played dirty tricks on me, so I resolved to kill her rather than to carry on the way she did; I had set the tenth inst. as the day of our marriage, and made this evening an appointment with her; we would meet at my brother's," and there he said he got in a dispute with her and shot her. This statement was made the night of the shooting and soon after he was arrested.

Joseph Landgraf, a brother of defendant, testified that, during the day of the night on which deceased was shot, defendant came to where he was at work, and during the conversation said: "I have made the motion before already to kill the girl; I am going to kill her to-night;" having requested his brother to let him bring deceased to his house and being refused; "if you don't let me take her to your house I will take her to an assignation house and I will kill her there."

The following statement, made by deceased, in the presence and hearing of defendant, the day after she was shot, was put in evidence: "Annie Tisch is my name; I am twenty-one years of age; this man before me I identify as Henry Landgraf; he is my lover; he is the man who shot me last night, whether with a revolver or anything else I don't know; I stayed at Mrs. Duffy's, 908 Charles street; a gentleman who stays there gave me a scrap-book, and Henry told me the negro had told him that two gentlemen stopping in the same house were too intimate with me, and Landgraf wanted to shoot me; this was on Tuesday night, March 3, 1885; yesterday he came again and wanted me to leave the house and move down town; I went with him about eight o'clock, p. m.; took the cars and got off at Arsenal street and walked to the house on Lemp avenue; I did not enter the house where his sister lives; Landgraf said nothing to me and shot me; that is all I know."

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