State v. Lanscak, 85-1518

• Decision Date: 25 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-1518,85-1518
• Citation: 404 N.W.2d 192
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Steven LANSCAK, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

Page 192

404 N.W.2d 192

STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Steven LANSCAK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 85-1518.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Feb. 25, 1987.

Charles L. Harrington, Appellate Defender, and Raymond E. Rogers, Asst. Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Lona Hansen, Asst. Atty. Gen., and David Welu, Dallas Co. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Heard by DONIELSON, P.J., and SCHLEGEL and SACKETT, JJ.

DONIELSON, Presiding Judge.

The defendant, John Steven Lanscak, appeals from his conviction, following a jury trial, for first-degree robbery and attempt to commit murder. The defendant contends that the district court erred in overruling his motion for a change of venue. The defendant also contends that the district court should have given the jury instructions stressing that a certain witness had made prior inconsistent statements. We affirm.

The defendant was accused of feigning car trouble and then robbing and shooting a passing motorist who stopped to help in Dallas County. The Des Moines Register reported the incident the following day, and for the next seventeen months before trial the Register and the Dallas County newspaper would periodically report on the progress of the police's investigation of the crime and the possible suspects. Nine months before trial, the Register ran an article repeating the details of the attack and the victim's condition and treatment since the attack. The article indicated the victim, Robert Crowl, had suffered bouts of depression resulting from the attack and that he had difficulty obtaining disability benefits.

Approximately four months before trial, the Register reported that the defendant and two other suspects had been arrested and charged with the attempted murder of Crowl. Several days later the Dallas County newspaper similarly reported the defendant's arrest. The week before trial, the Dallas County newspaper reported that the county attorney had adequate information to show that the defendant attempted to murder Crowl. The article also indicated that the defendant had been charged in the case.

On appeal, the defendant claims that as a result of these newspaper articles, he could not get a fair trial in Dallas County because the local media publicized the crime extensively and because the victim, Crowl, was well known in the area. The defendant also contends that because a certain witness had made prior inconsistent statements at trial, the court should have instructed the jury that (1) the witness's prior inconsistent statements could be considered in evaluating the credibility of the witness's trial testimony, and (2) that if a prior inconsistent statement had been made under oath in a deposition, it could be considered as substantive evidence in the case.

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(10)(b) states that a trial court should grant a motion for a change of venue if it is convinced from the evidence introduced in support of the motion that there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant cannot receive a fair and impartial jury trial in the county. Our review on this issue is de novo, and we will reverse only if the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. State v. Spargo, 364 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Iowa 1975). "A defendant who seeks reversal of a conviction on the basis of denial of his motion for change of venue must show either actual prejudice on the part of the jury or must show that the publicity attending the case was so pervasive and inflammatory that prejudice must be presumed." Id.; State v. Gavin, 360 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa 1985).

Exposure to news accounts does not by itself create a substantial likelihood of prejudice in the minds of prospective jurors. State v. Johnson, 318 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Iowa 1982). In evaluating the impact of news reports on prospective jurors, we look to the newspaper articles themselves and the passage of time between the news accounts and the trial. Gavin, 360 N.W.2d at 819-20; State v. Hickman, 337 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Iowa 1983). News reports which objectively and factually report the occurrence of the crime and the events surrounding the criminal proceedings do not give rise to the kind of inflammatory publicity which causes a substantial likelihood of prejudice in the minds of prospective jurors. Johnson, 318 N.W.2d at 422. For purposes of determining jury prejudice, the crucial question is not what a juror has been exposed to, but whether the juror holds such a fixed opinion of the merits of the case that he or she cannot judge impartially the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Gavin, 360 N.W.2d at 819. We also look to the voir dire response of each juror when considering a claim of prejudicial pretrial publicity. Hickman, 337 N.W.2d at 515; State v. Marr, 316 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1982). Where each juror candidly recalls his knowledge of pretrial publicity and states that he or she can put aside exposure to pretrial publicity and come to a decision based on evidence produced at trial, no valid claim can be made showing a substantial likelihood of prejudice. Marr, 316 N.W.2d at 181.

In the instant case, we believe that an examination of both the newspaper articles and the voir dire reveals that there was no substantial likelihood of prejudice from pretrial publicity and that the defendant is not entitled to relief on this claim.

An examination of the pretrial publicity discloses that on the whole very objective and factual reporting took place. No view on the guilt or innocence of defendant was ever expressed by the news media. The media's coverage of the crime and the subsequent activities surrounding the subsequent criminal investigation was fair, accurate, and was not misleading. No emotional editorials were ever published concerning the defendant or other suspects. Each of the articles constituted an objective description of the basic facts of the incident and the subsequent criminal investigation or the preliminary pretrial procedures in the case. The stories appearing on April 16, 18, and 25, 1985, went no further than reporting defendant's arrest and the ensuing investigation. There was no attempt by the media to inflame the passions of the public mind or to sensationalize the event.

We additionally note that nearly all newspaper articles appeared from four to seventeen months prior to defendant's trial. This period before trial is significantly more removed from the period of the time of trial than those held not prejudicial in Hickman, 337 N.W.2d at 515 (where newspaper articles appeared less than two months prior to trial), and in Johnson, 318 N.W.2d at 423 (where newspaper articles appeared approximately three months before trial). There was therefore a sufficient period of time to dissipate any prejudicial effect that might have been created by any adverse publicity.

We find only one newspaper article which may be even remotely regarded as prejudicial. The Dallas County newspaper the week before trial published an article in which it was reported that the county attorney believed he had adequate information to show that the defendant attempted to murder Crowl. We do not, however, believe that the county attorney's statement so sensationalized the case as to create a substantial likelihood that defendant could not receive a fair trial. Just as jurors know that major criminal offenses carry severe penal sanctions, State v. Armento, 256 N.W.2d 228, 230 (Iowa 1977), it would also be realistic to expect potential jurors to know that the county prosecutor would not bring a case to trial unless he or she believed there was adequate evidence to secure a conviction. Though perhaps such statements by the county prosecutor are better left for trial, we nevertheless find that this statement, without more, did...