State v. Lantz

Decision Date11 April 1922
PartiesSTATE v. LANTZ.
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court

Submitted April 4, 1922.

Syllabus by the Court.

Ordinarily where a statute creating an offense contains a statement of all of the facts necessary to constitute it, an indictment charging such offense in the language of the statute is sufficient.

An indictment, charging a violation of a statute prohibiting the operation of motor vehicles upon certain parts of the public roads in excess of a certain speed, is not bad because it fails to charge the particular point or place at which the alleged offense was committed, the act charged to have been committed being a violation of the law, if committed anywhere within the county.

An act of the Legislature (Laws 1921, c. 112), creating a statutory offense, should define the acts necessary to constitute such offense with such certainty that a person may determine whether or not he has violated the law at the time he does the act, which is charged to be a violation thereof.

An act of the Legislature (Laws 1921, c. 112), making it a crime to operate an automobile around a curve on a public road without having the same under control, or without reducing the speed thereof to a reasonable and proper rate, is violative of sections 10 and 14 of article 3 of the Constitution of this state, and is void for uncertainty and indefiniteness.

Certified Questions from Circuit Court, Barbour County.

Grant Lantz was indicted for driving and operating a motor vehicle around a curve without having the same under control and without reducing the speed to a reasonable and proper rate and his motion to quash was overruled, and the questions certified. Motion to quash indictment sustained.

E. T England, Atty. Gen., and R. Dennis Steed, Asst. Atty. Gen for the State.

J. Blackburn Ware, of Belington, for defendant.

RITZ J.

The circuit court of Barbour county, having overruled a motion to quash an indictment charging that the defendant did drive and operate a motor vehicle, to wit, an automobile, around a curve in the public road of Union district, Barbour county, without having said automobile under control, and without reducing the speed to a reasonable and proper rate, certifies the questions arising upon such motion to this court.

The indictment is based upon provisions contained in section 96 of chapter 112 of the Acts of the Legislature of 1921, the pertinent provisions being found in subsection K and subsection P of said section 96. The part of subsection K material here is:

"Upon approaching * * * a sharp * * * curve * * * and in traversing such * * * curve, a person operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle shall have the same under control, and shall reduce the speed to a reasonable and proper rate."

Subsection P makes it a misdemeanor to violate any of the provisions of said section 96, and provides punishment therefor. The indictment charges that the defendant--

"did unlawfully drive and operate a motor vehicle, to wit, an automobile, around a curve in the public road, in Union district, in said Barbour county, and he, the said Grant Lantz, in traversing the said curve, with the said automobile aforesaid, did not then and there have the same under control and did not reduce the speed of the said automobile to a reasonable and proper rate, contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided, against the peace and dignity of the state."

Two objections are made to the indictment: The first, that it does not charge the offense with sufficient certainty; and the second, that the statute upon which the indictment is based, so far as it undertakes to create a criminal offense, is void.

It will be observed that the indictment in this case charges the offense in the language of the statute, and ordinarily an indictment for a statutory crime is sufficient if the offense be charged in the language of the statute creating it. There are exceptions to this rule, it is true. Where the language used in the statute creating the offense does not contain a statement of the facts which constitute the crime, then it is necessary to amplify the statutory language by stating in the indictment all pertinent facts necessary to constitute the offense. The argument here is that this indictment is bad because it simply charges that the defendant operated his automobile around a curve in Union district in violation of the statute, without pointing out the particular curve around which he was operating the automobile, at the time it is charged the offense was committed. If the offense could only be committed at a particular place, then, of course, the place of its commission would become an essential element of the crime, and would have to be alleged, but in this case the statute undertakes to inhibit the operation of automobiles at an unsafe speed around any curve upon any public road, so that the place in the county at which the offense is committed is not at all an essential element of the crime. The requirement of certainty in this character of indictment goes no further than to compel the pleader to state in the indictment all facts necessary to constitute the offense. If the party accused cannot prepare his defense because of lack of information or particularity in the averments, he may demand a bill of particulars, and, upon a proper showing, the prosecuting attorney will be required to furnish him the same. We are of opinion that, inasmuch as the offense attempted to be charged in this case is complete, no matter where committed in the county, the indictment is not bad because it does not specify or describe the particular curve upon which the automobile is claimed to have been operated in violation of law. State v. Sneed, 16 Lea (Tenn.) 450, 1 S.W. 282; Matthews & Buzzard v. State, 25 Ohio St. 536; State v. Buxton, 31 Ind. 67; State v. Finney, 99 Iowa 43, 68 N.W. 568; State v. Buchanan, 32 R.I. 490, 79 A. 1114; White v. State, 82 Tex. Cr. App. 274, 198 S.W. 964.

A more serious objection to the indictment is that based upon the unconstitutionality of the statute, so far as it undertakes to make the conduct interdicted a criminal offense. It is insisted that the definition of the offense in the statute is so indefinite and uncertain as to make it void because in violation of section 10 of article 3 of the Constitution forbidding anyone to be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; and section 14 of the same article, which requires, among other things, that...

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  • State v. Grinstead
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • July 16, 1974
    ...... See State ex rel. Davis v. Oakley, W.Va., 191 S.E.2d 610 (1972); State ex rel. Myers v. Wood, 154 W.Va. 431, 175 S.E.2d 637 (1970); State v. Lantz, 90 W.Va. 738, 111 S.E. 766 (1922). The authority to enact laws, being exclusively a legislative function, cannot be transferred or abdicated to others. State v. Harrison, 130 W.Va. 246, 43 S.E.2d 214 (1947). The constitutional prerequisite to a valid statute is that the law shall be complete ......

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