State v. Larrabee
Decision Date | 03 April 1908 |
Docket Number | 15,454 - (23) |
Citation | 115 N.W. 948,104 Minn. 37 |
Parties | STATE v. FRANK D. LARRABEE |
Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Defendant was convicted in the municipal court of Minneapolis of the violation of a city ordinance in driving an automobile at the intersection of certain streets of the city. From an order, Waite, J., denying his motion for a new trial, he appealed. Affirmed.
Rule of the Road -- City Ordinance.
A municipal ordinance required that "every person using any vehicle on any street * * * shall drive * * * his vehicle at the right of the center of the street, and when turning to the left to enter an intersecting street, he shall not turn to the left until his vehicle shall have passed beyond the center of such intersecting street," and provided that the ordinance did not apply to two classes of cases therein defined. On the evidence in the case it is held:
1. That the ordinance prescribing the course which the stream of travel must take was within the police power of the city to enact.
2. That defendant's conduct as shown by the evidence brought him within the terms of the ordinance.
3. That defendant's conduct did not come within the cases excepted by the provisos of the ordinance.
Benton & Molyneaux, for appellant.
Frank Healy and Clyde R. White, for the State.
Appellant was arrested for unlawfully driving an automobile at a certain intersecting street crossing contrary to the terms of an ordinance. A fine of five dollars was imposed, with an alternative sentence. From an order denying a new trial, this appeal was taken.
The ordinance in question reads as follows:
The parentheses are ours, and serve to indicate the co-ordination and subordination of the various parts of the last proviso.
1. Defendant insists that the ordinance must be held inapplicable to defendant in this case. The record justified the trial court in holding that the defendant was not within the first proviso because he undertook to cross the center line of the street at a place more than one hundred feet distant from the objective point on the left side. Nor is the defendant exonerated by the second proviso, because there were a number of vehicles, some standing, and some moving in the same direction with the defendant. The street was in suitable condition for use in its full width. The presence of vehicles on the side of the street in which defendant was did not constitute "a temporary obstruction" within the meaning of the proviso. On the contrary, this was appropriate use of that side of the street. All the rules...
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