State v. Larson

• Decision Date: 12 July 1979
• Docket Number: No. 47518.,47518.
• Citation: 281 NW 2d 481
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Donald Floyd LARSON, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

281 N.W.2d 481 (1979)

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Donald Floyd LARSON, Appellant.

No. 47518.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 25, 1979.

Rehearing Denied July 12, 1979.

Meshbesher, Singer & Spence, Ronald I. Meshbesher, and Carol M. Grant, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Fabel, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Gary Hansen, Spec. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Thomas J. Ryan, County Atty., Pine City, for respondent.

Heard before ROGOSHESKE, PETERSON, and YETKA, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.

ROGOSHESKE, Justice.

Defendant Donald Floyd Larson was found guilty by a district court jury on one count of first-degree murder (fatally shooting his neighbor and former friend, James Falch, Sr.), two counts of second-degree murder (fatally shooting his wife, Ruth, and Falch's oldest son, James Falch, Jr.), and one count of third-degree murder (fatally shooting his son, Mark), and was acquitted by reason of mental illness on one count of first-degree murder (fatally shooting his stepson, Scott Powell). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment for life, 40 years, 40 years, and 25 years. The principal issues presented by defendant's appeal from the judgment of conviction are whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to hold a post-verdict hearing to impeach the verdict for alleged jury misconduct and whether the trial court properly instructed the jury. We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying a post-verdict hearing and any errors in instructing the jury were not prejudicial beyond a reasonable doubt.

The evidence justified the jury in finding these very abbreviated and essential facts: In January 1976 defendant learned that his wife, Ruth, was having an affair with their neighbor, James Falch, Sr., who resided on an adjoining farm. He agreed to his wife's request for a divorce. On April 23, 1976, Ruth, who had admitted being intimate with Falch, ridiculed defendant concerning his ability as a lover, demanded all of defendant's machinery as part of a property division, and threatened to deprive defendant of the opportunity to see their 5-year-old son, Mark, the only child of their marriage.

On April 24, 1976, defendant returned to his farm after a trip to the Twin Cities to discover James Falch, Sr.'s pickup truck and trailer filled with items which had been loaded from defendant's house. Defendant encountered Falch and his wife on the porch of the farmhouse and punched Falch in the mouth, threatening to kill him. Defendant drew two pistols, acquired and loaded before he came to the farm, and shot Falch in the shoulder. Defendant turned from the house and was confronted by Falch's son, James Falch, Jr., age 12, who, having witnessed defendant's acts and heard his threats, screamed and swore at defendant. Defendant shot Falch's son at close range three times, killing him. Returning to the house, defendant tried to prevent his wife from calling the police. As he was struggling with her, one of the pistols discharged, killing their 5-year-old son, Mark. Defendant then raised the gun and shot his wife in the back of her head twice, killing her. Defendant next turned to Falch and shot him in the back of the head, causing his death. Defendant then went outside and ordered two of Falch's sons, Stephen, age 8, and Bradley, age 6, and Scott Powell, age 12 (Ruth's son by a previous marriage), to get out of the trailer. When they failed to move, he pulled the trigger of one of his pistols. Upon finding both pistols empty, defendant reloaded. The two Falch boys ran into the field and escaped, but Scott Powell ran into the house, where, confronted with the bodies of his mother and half brother, he began to cry and scream uncontrollably. Defendant, who followed Scott into the house and tried unsuccessfully to stop his hysterical screams, shot him in the head and killed him.

Defendant then picked up the empty cartridges and the keys to all the vehicles and sped to Minneapolis. In Minneapolis, he threw both pistols and his jacket into the Mississippi River. He abandoned his car and checked into a motel, where he was found in a semiconscious state after ingesting pills and vodka.

The issues raised by defendant are: (1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to hold a summary hearing to impeach the verdict? (2) Were the trial court's instructions erroneous and prejudicial to defendant's right to a fair trial? (3) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to view photographs of the dead bodies of two of the children and defendant's wife, or in allowing the jury to hear James Falch, Sr.'s tape-recorded dying declaration? (4) Is the verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness of the death of Scott Powell reversibly inconsistent with the verdicts of guilty of the deaths of four other persons?

Defendant's principal contention is that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to hold a post-verdict hearing to impeach the verdict. Defense counsel moved for such hearing, pursuant to Rule 26.03, subd. 19(6), Rules of Criminal Procedure,¹ citing Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 258 Minn. 325, 104 N.W.2d 301 (1960). The grounds for the motion were that newspaper interviews of several jury members after discharge of the jury and a statement of a juror heard by defense counsel that defendant had been in trouble before revealed prejudicial juror misconduct. In the newspaper interviews, one juror expressed the opinion that the mental illness defense is "just an easy way out," despite stating on voir dire that he was not skeptical or doubtful of the mental illness defense. Another stated that "as someone in the law enforcement business, I have to believe it's wrong to excuse things like this," despite expressing on voir dire that he was not doubtful of the mental illness defense.

The trial court refused to conduct a post-trial hearing, stating:

"I am going to deny the motion of the defendant for a summary hearing. I think we have rather covered that. I will state again, and it may be repetition, that all of the arguments that have been presented to me relative to any personal feeling on the part of jurors Mans or Soderquist about the defense of mental illness is clearly negated because of the fact that they did join in a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness in the one case the victim Scott Powell, which to me is just absolute evidence that they followed the Court\'s instructions generally in considering that the defendant\'s mental illness defense."

Rule 26.03, subd. 19(6), Rules of Criminal Procedure, codifies for criminal cases the procedures outlined by this court in Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 258 Minn. 325, 104 N.W.2d 301 (1960), for civil cases. In Zimmerman v. Witte Transp. Co., 259 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn. 1977), we set out the standard of review and purpose of a Schwartz hearing:

"The granting of a Schwartz hearing is generally a matter of discretion for the trial court. Its purpose is to avoid harassment of jurors and to provide a record on appeal in cases where, after the jury renders the verdict, the losing party becomes aware of facts which indicate the possibility of jury misconduct."

In Olberg v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 291 Minn. 334, 343, 191 N.W.2d 418, 424 (1971), we further clarified that "nothing should prevent the trial court from ordering a Schwartz hearing on the grounds of an oral assertion by counsel or hearsay affidavit" and "the trial courts * * * should be liberal in granting a hearing." Rule 26.03, subd. 19(6), implicitly requires defendant to establish a prima facie case of jury misconduct before a Schwartz hearing is mandated. To establish a prima facie case, a defendant must submit sufficient evidence which, standing alone and unchallenged, would warrant the conclusion of jury misconduct. See, State v. Lawlor, 28 Minn. 216, 223, 9 N.W. 698, 702 (1881). Although the trial court may allow the prosecution to submit evidence rebutting jury misconduct, it may ignore that evidence in ordering a hearing. The trial court need not, however, blindly accept the assertions submitted by defense counsel.

In this case, the trial court was justified in ruling that the newspaper articles and other assertions by defense counsel did not demonstrate jury misconduct. Certainly, alleged statements of jurors reported in newspapers must be viewed skeptically. The edited version of what a reporter writes that he heard a juror say after trial may correspond very little to what a juror actually asserted and argued in the jury room during deliberations. Besides, as the trial court stated, the jurors, who allegedly discounted the mental illness defense, concurred in a verdict which acquitted defendant by reason of mental illness of the killing of Scott Powell. Surely, a Schwartz hearing is not warranted every time a newspaper article can be read as revealing the possibility of jury misconduct. As for the juror who stated in the presence of defense counsel that "this isn't the first time the defendant has been in trouble," the most convincing explanation is not that the juror was deceitful on voir dire when he said he did not know defendant's history. It is more plausible that the juror was simply repeating the testimony of one of the expert witnesses that defendant admitted having been in trouble most of his life. Although trial courts should generally be liberal in granting Schwartz hearings in both civil and criminal trials, we hold that the trial court was well within its discretion in ruling that the newspaper articles and affidavit of defense counsel did not establish a prima facie case of jury misconduct.

Defendant next argues that certain jury instructions were so prejudicial as to require a new trial. The trial court instructed the jury that defendant's plea of not guilty was not evidence of his innocence. We have recently stated that such an...