State v. Lassiter

• Decision Date: 17 February 1926
• Docket Number: 1.
• Citation: 131 S.E. 577,191 N.C. 210
• Parties: STATE v. LASSITER ET AL.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

131 S.E. 577

191 N.C. 210

STATE v. LASSITER ET AL.

No. 1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

February 17, 1926

Appeal from Superior Court, Gates County; Cranmer, Judge.

Len Lassiter and Dennis Ballard were indicted for offering a bribe to a justice of the peace, and, from a judgment imposing a prison sentence on named defendant, he appeals. New trial.

"Corroborating evidence" defined.

The defendants, Len Lassiter and Dennis Ballard, were indicted for offering a bribe to one J. A. Eason, a justice of the peace of Gates county. The said justice of the peace issued a warrant against the defendant Dennis Ballard, charging the possession and sale of liquor in October or November, 1924. While the case was pending before said justice of the peace the state contends that the defendant Ballard, through Len Lassiter, approached the witness, J. P. Blanchard, who clerked in the store of Eason, and told Blanchard "that Ballard had requested him (Lassiter) to deliver a message to Mr. Eason, and tell Eason that if he would dismiss the case against Ballard that Ballard would pay him $100." Ballard was not present at the time Lassiter made this statement to Blanchard, the clerk of Eason, and Eason was not present, having gone to Norfolk on business. The only substantive evidence offered at the trial was the testimony of Len Lassiter, which is as follows:

"I live in Gates county, and know the defendant Ballard. I live some distance from him. His home was raided by officers looking for whisky. A warrant was issued for him by Mr Eason. The trial was set for Saturday. On Wednesday before the trial Ballard was passing my home, and I hailed him, and had him to take a barrel of sweet corn to the station to be shipped to Norfolk. While there, I told Ballard I did not believe he was guilty of having liquor for sale. I told Ballard that I thought it was a case that a justice could dispose of. On Thursday before the trial I was in Gatesville and went to see Mr. Eason. He was not at home. I saw Mr. Blanchard, and asked him about Mr. Eason. Blanchard asked me if I wanted to see him about anything particularly, and I told him, 'No,' that Dennis Ballard had a case to be tried on Saturday, and wanted to find out from Mr. Eason if the case could be disposed of by compromise or payment of a fine of $50 or $100. On Saturday, the morning of the trial, I again saw Mr. Blanchard, and asked if he had seen Mr. Eason, at which time he said that he had, and that Mr. Eason said it was not a matter he could dispose of. Ballard was not present. He never gave or offered me any money or any other thing of value. I had no intention of bribing Mr. Eason or doing any wrong. Ballard did not know that I went to Mr. Blanchard or Mr. Eason. I went as a friend to the negro, believing at the time it was a case that the justice had final jurisdiction over, and for no other purpose."

Thereupon the state offered J. P. Blanchard as a witness, and he was permitted to testify that Lassiter told him (Blanchard) to tell Eason that, if he (Eason) would dismiss the case against Ballard, Ballard would pay Eason $100. The defendant Ballard objected to this evidence. The objection was overruled; the court stating that the testimony was admitted for the sole purpose of corroborating the witness Lassiter.

The state also offered J. A. Eason, who was permitted to testify that Blanchard told him that Lassiter had told Blanchard "that Dennis Ballard said that, if he (Eason) would throw the case on the charge of liquor against Ballard out of court, Ballard said he would pay Eason $100, and that he (Lassiter) knew it would be paid." The defendant Ballard objected to this testimony. The objection was overruled. The court admitted the testimony for the sole purpose of corroborating the testimony of the witnesses Blanchard and Lassiter The defendant contends that the testimony objected to was hearsay and incompetent. The state contends that the testimony was competent, not as substantive, but as corroborative, evidence.

Bridger & Eley, of Winton, for appellant.

D. G. Brummitt, Atty. Gen., and Frank Nash and Charles Ross, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.

BROGDEN J.

Hearsay evidence is defined in King v. Bynum, 49 S.E. 956, 137 N.C. 495, as follows:

"Evidence, oral or written, is called hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part upon the competency and credibility of some person other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it."

In the case of Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch, 290, 3 L.Ed. 348, Chief Justice Marshall held the principle to be that hearsay...