State v. Latapie
| Decision Date | 28 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 21CA12 |
| Citation | 2023 Ohio 1505 |
| Parties | State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. April Ann Latapie, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Timothy P. Gleeson, Logan, Ohio, Attorney for Appellant.
Jason D. Holden, Gallia County Prosecuting Attorney, Gallipolis Ohio, for Appellee.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶1} Appellant, April Ann Latapie ("Latapie"), appeals the Gallia County Court of Common Pleas judgment entry that sentenced her to a mandatory 60-day prison term and an additional 24-month prison term, followed by a 24-month community-control sanction. The court also reserved a 30-month prison term to be served if Latapie violated the conditions of her community-control sanction. Latapie's sentence included other components that are not contested in this appeal, such as post release control and a driver's license suspension.
{¶2} Latapie maintains that her sentence is contrary to law for various reasons. The state argues that Latapie's sentence is not contrary to law because it is authorized by R.C 4511.19(G)(1)(d)(i). After reviewing the parties' arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we sustain Latapie's assignment of error in part. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for a modification of Latapie's sentence consistent with our decision.
{¶3} On March 2, 2021, a grand jury indicted Latapie for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and drugs or both ("OVI"), and that she had been convicted or pleaded guilty to five or more prior OVIs within 20 years of the date of the current offense in violation of R.C 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and (G)(1)(d)(i), which is a fourth-degree felony. She pleaded not guilty.
{¶4} Eventually, the parties reached a plea agreement, and on August 1, 2021, the court held a change of plea hearing. Latapie agreed to plead guilty to OVI under R.C 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and (G)(1)(d)(i), and in return the state would not give a sentencing recommendation. During its colloquy, the court asked Latapie if she understood her OVI charge was a fourth-degree felony for which she could receive a sentence of "60 days mandatory prison with an option of an additional amount from six to 30 months." She responded affirmatively. The court went on to state that under an OVI, Latapie again responded affirmatively. She also stated that she had at least five prior OVI convictions. The court accepted her guilty plea and set a date for sentencing. On August 2, 2021, Latapie's guilty plea was filed.
{¶5} On August 30, 2021, the court held a sentencing hearing. The court indicated that it had considered Latapie's record, including that she was on probation when the OVI offense herein occurred, had prior OVI convictions, and had not responded favorably to prior sanctions. After considering the applicable factors in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, the court found Latapie was not amenable to a community-control sanction, so a prison sentence was necessary. The court sentenced Latapie to a mandatory 60-day prison sentence, an additional 24-month prison sentence to be followed by a 24-month community-control sanction with all three sanctions to be served consecutively.
{¶7} Finally, pursuant to 2929.19(B)(4), the court reserved a 30-month prison term as a possible sanction should Latapie violate her community control. On September 3, 2021, the court issued a sentencing entry reflecting these terms. It is this sentencing entry that Latapie challenges on appeal.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IS CONTRARY TO LAW
{¶8} Latapie maintains that her sentence is contrary to law, making several arguments explaining why.
1. The Trial Court Erred In Failing To Reduce Latapie's Additional Prison Term
{¶9} Latapie claims that her sentence is contrary to law because the trial court was required to reduce her "additional" 24-month prison term by her "mandatory" 60-day prison term pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(4), but failed to do so. Therefore, she argues her sentence was contrary to law.
2. The Trial Court Erred by Imposing a Mandatory Prison Term, Additional Term, and Community-Control Sanctions
{¶10} Latapie maintains "[t]he imposition of multiple community control sanctions consecutive to the prison terms is contrary to R.C. 2929.13(A)(2), R.C. 2929.13(G)(2), R.C. 2929.14(B)(4), R.C. 2929.16, R.C. 2929.17 and R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d)(i)." She claims that there are "no less than three different and conflicting grants of authority to trial courts with respect to the imposition of community control sanctions consecutive to a mandatory 60 day prison term imposed for a fourth degree felony OVI offense under R.C. 2929.13(G)(2)."
{¶11} Latapie first claims that in addition to a mandatory prison term, R.C. 2929.13(A)(2) also authorizes either an additional prison term or a community-control sanction. She continues:
Consistent with this grant of alternate authority (either an additional prison term or a community control sanction), R.C. 2929.13(G)(2), R.C. 2929.16, and R.C. 2929.17 grant authority for trial courts to impose a community control sanction or combination of community control sanctions, in addition to the mandatory prison term. R.C. 2929.13(G)(2) provides a grant of authority in the singular; one community control sanction as opposed to a combination of multiple community control sanctions. However, R.C. 2929.16 and R.C. 2929.17 provide a grant of authority for a community control sanction or combination of multiple community control sanctions. Significantly, each of these three sections state the authority to impose a community control sanction, or community control sanctions, is in addition to the mandatory term. These sections do not state that the community control can be imposed in addition to both the mandatory term of prison and an additional term of prison. In this respect these sections are consistent with R.C. 2929.13(A)(2). [Id., p. 13-14]
{¶12} Next, Latapie maintains that "R.C. 2929.14(B)(4) and R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d)(i) grant different, conflicting, and additional authority * * * authorizing] the imposition of an additional prison term of not less than six months and not more than thirty months and a community control sanction." These provisions conflict with R.C. 2929.13(A)(2), which authorizes additional prison or a single community-control sanction).
{¶13} Finally, Latapie maintains that "R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) provides different conflicting, and additional authority" by permitting a mandatory prison term, an additional prison term, and a community control sanction or combination of multiple community-control sanctions. In this regard, she argues that 2929.15(A)(1) conflicts with R.C. 2929.13(A)(2), which authorizes the trial court to impose an additional prison term or a community-control sanction, as well as
R.C. 2929.13(G)(2), R.C. 2929.14(B)(4) and R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d)(i), which all authorize a single community-control sanction.
{¶14} Therefore, Latapie maintains that the rule of lenity must be applied to these alleged conflicts in her favor, which would require application of R.C. 2929.13(A)(2) that would authorize the trial court to impose a mandatory prison term, as well as an additional prison term or a community-control sanction, but not both.
3. The Trial Court's Sentence Is Contrary to Law Because It Includes a Reserved Prison Term and It Is Beyond the Maximum Allowed
{¶15} Latapie first claims that the trial court was not authorized to reserve the 30-month prison term as a possible punishment for a violation of any condition or conditions of her community control. Specifically, she maintains that R.C 2929.13(A)(1) authorizes a court to impose a local jail sanction and a community-control sanction. It also authorizes a court to take an action under R.C. 2929.15(B) to punish an offender who violates a community-control sanction, including prison. Latapie points out that unlike R.C. 2929.13(A)(1), (A)(2), which authorized the trial court to impose her mandatory prison term and her community-control sanction, contains no language that authorizes a court to punish an offender who violates their community control. Because R.C. 2929.13(A)(1) and (A)(2) are in consecutive order, she argues the inclusion of the R.C. 2929.15 language in (A)(1) indicates that the absence of such language in (A)(2) was intentional. Consequently, she claims, when a court sentences a fourth-degree felony OVI offender to prison and a community-control sanction consistent...
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