State v. Latham

• Decision Date: 09 September 1916
• Citation: 98 A. 578
• Parties: STATE v. LATHAM.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

98 A. 578

STATE

v. LATHAM.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Sept. 9, 1916.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Cumberland County.

Howard M. Latham, being indicted for violation of Laws 1915, c. 32, demurrer to the indictment, and to the overruling of such demurrer he brings exceptions. Exceptions sustained, demurrer sustained, and indictment quashed.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and CORNISH, KING, BIRD, HALEY, and PHIL BROOK, JJ.

Jacob H. Berman, of Portland, for the State. W. K. & A. E. Neal, of Portland, for respondent.

SAVAGE, C. J. The respondent stands indicted for a violation of chapter 32 of the Public Laws of 1915, and the case comes to this court on exceptions to the overruling of his demurrer to the indictment.

The statute in question reads as follows:

"Every person, firm or corporation purchasing cream or milk for the purposes of reselling or manufacturing the same into other products, shall pay the producer, unless otherwise provided for by written contract, semimonthly; payment to be made on the first day of each and every month for all cream or milk received prior to the fifteenth day of the preceding month, and payment to be made on the fifteenth day of each and every month for all cream or milk received prior to the first day of the same month. Whoever violates the provisions of this act shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than fifty dollars."

The indictment before us is clearly demurrable for want of sufficiently definite allegations of the time and place of the commission of the alleged offense. But the respondent has not made that point. The ground of demurrer relied upon is that the statute upon which the indictment is based is unconstitutional, in that it denies "the equal protection of the laws" which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. The answer of the state is that the statute is the legitimate, constitutional exercise of the police power of the state, which is its inherent power to establish regulations to promote the public health, safety, morals, peace, comfort, and welfare (B. & M. R. R. Co. v. County Com'rs, 79 Me. 386, 10 Atl. 113), and that the Fourteenth Amendment does not impair the police power of the state.

That the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere with the proper exercise of the police power by the state was held in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923. And the doctrine has been reaffirmed since in many cases, both in the federal and in the state courts. It is settled doctrine. State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192, 47 Atl. 165, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386; State v. Mitchell, 97 Me. 66, 53 Atl. 887, 94 Am. St. Rep. 481; State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 72 Atl. 875, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 799.

The statute in question, when analyzed, appears to be designed to compel purchasers of a particular product, intended for a particular use, to pay their purchase debts at particular times on pain of criminal prosecution, punishment by fine, and, of course, imprisonment for 30 days, if the fine is not paid. R. S. c. 136, § 12. Whether such a statute, designed to aid in the collection of mere civil obligations by the use of the strong arm of the criminal law, is within the proper exercise of the police power is at least questionable. Certainly it is not unless the regulation intended be for the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, comfort, or welfare. As was said by the court in Wyeth v. Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147, 128 Am. St. Rep. 439, "No other interference of the public to the detriment of an individual is permissible."

But, passing this point without further discussion, we come to a consideration of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to this statute. The amendment forbids the state to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." It forbids what is called "class legislation." Its meaning and effect, as it relates to the question now before us, have been fully discussed in the recent cases of State v. Mitchell, supra, and State v. Leavitt, supra, and the discussion need not be repeated. In a word, discrimination as to legal rights and duties is forbidden. All men under the same conditions have the same rights. Diversity in legislation to meet diversities in conditions is permissible. But if legislative regulations for different localities, classes, and conditions differ, in order to be valid, "these differentiations or classifications must be reasonable and based upon real differences in the situation, condition, or tendencies of things. Arbitrary classification of such matters is forbidden by the Constitution. If there be no real difference between the localities, or business, or occupation, or property, the state cannot make one in order to favor some persons over others." State v. Mitchell, supra; Pearsons v. Portland, 69 Me. 278, 31 Am....