State v. Latimer
| Decision Date | 11 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | A15-1923 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Mark William Latimer, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
Affirmed
Chisago County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, Beth A. Beaman, Assistant County Attorney, Center City, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Bjorkman, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Following a bench trial, appellant Mark William Latimer was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, and first-degree assault. On appeal, appellant argues that the attempted first- and second-degree murder convictions must be reversed because the state failed to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant raises a number of additional arguments in his pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
On June 8, 2012, Rush City Correctional Facility security cameras captured the following sequence of events. Appellant, an inmate at the facility, was working in the industry area when he picked up, inspected, and set down a large wooden board. Shortly thereafter, appellant retrieved the same board, carried it through the industry area, and approached inmate J.V. from behind. J.V. was seated in a chair and working. Appellant struck J.V. in the back of the head with the board, which caused J.V. to slump forward in his chair and rendered him motionless. Appellant proceeded to strike J.V. in the head five additional times. J.V. remained seated and motionless during this attack. After striking J.V. a total of six times, appellant walked away and watched as staff responded to J.V.'s injuries.
The facility's staff deemed J.V.'s injuries life-threatening and called an ambulance to transport him to a nearby hospital where he would spend approximately four weeks recovering. J.V. suffered fractures around his eye and a depressed skull fracture, which caused bruising, bleeding, and swelling of the brain. J.V. underwent emergency surgery and was placed in a medically induced coma. Expert testimony presented at trial indicated that J.V.'s injuries would generally lead to death within six to eight hours without medical treatment.
Appellant gave a taped statement to one of the facility's special investigators on the date of the attack. During this statement, appellant explained J.V. had discovered appellant's prior criminal sexual conduct convictions, had called appellant a "cho mo," and had threatened him that morning. Appellant told the special investigator, "I ain't got nothing to lose so I bust him in his head." Appellant also stated, Appellant further stated that another inmate voiced concern that appellant was "killing" J.V. and told appellant to "slow down a little bit." J.V. testified at trial that he knew of appellant but denied threatening him.
At trial, officer testimony established that threats between inmates often related to the offense that placed an inmate in prison, and that sex offenders are sometimes targeted by other inmates. At the facility, inmates are able to report threats in the following ways: (1) through the facility's kite system; (2) by verbally informing staff, who are present in all areas; (3) by having a family member call the facility to report a threat; and (4) by speaking directly with the lieutenant during rounds. Also, the facility has a policy to respond to kites within five business days, and inmates are instructed to verbally communicate with staff in emergencies.
Appellant was initially charged with first-degree assault. The criminal complaint was later amended to include additional charges of attempted first-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder. In his written closing argument, appellant's counsel raised the affirmative defense of self-defense, which hinged on J.V.'s alleged threat to appellant and appellant's known status as a sex-offender. The district court concluded thatthe state proved the elements of all three charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court also determined that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act in self-defense. The district court imposed a 240-month sentence for the attempted first-degree murder conviction. This appeal follows.
Appellant argues that the evidence presented at trial failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intended to kill J.V. One is guilty of attempted murder when he, "with intent to commit a [murder], does an act which is a substantial step toward . . . the commission of the [murder]." Minn. Stat. § 609.17, subd. 1 (2012). First-degree murder requires a defendant to act with "premeditation and with intent to effect the death of the person or of another." Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2012). "'[P]remeditation' means to consider, plan or prepare for, or determine to commit, the act referred to prior to its commission." Minn. Stat. § 609.18 (2012). Second-degree murder requires—as relevant to this case—that a person act "with intent to effect the death of that person or another, but without premeditation." Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2012). "'With intent to' or 'with intent that' means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause that result." Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2012).
"Because intent and premeditation are states of mind, they are generally proved only by inferences drawn from a person's words or actions in light of all the surroundingcircumstances." State v. Andrews, 388 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn. 1986) (citing State v. Kirch, 322 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Minn. 1982)). A fact-finder "may infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions and a defendant's statements as to his intentions are not binding on the [fact-finder] if his acts demonstrated a contrary intent." State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997) (citing State v. Lundstrom, 285 Minn. 130, 140, 171 N.W.2d 718, 724-25 (1969)).
With regard to premeditation, "the state must prove that some appreciable period of time passed after the defendant formed the intent to kill, during which the statutorily required consideration, planning, preparation, or determination took place." State v. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d 556, 563 (Minn. 2008). "[A]n inference of premeditation may be supported by several categories of evidence, including planning activity, motive, the nature of the [attempted] killing, and a defendant's actions following the [attempted] killing." State v. Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400, 412 (Minn. 2016) (citations omitted).
Because this appeal turns on questions of intent and premeditation, the evidence at issue is circumstantial in nature. When evaluating circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court uses a two-step analysis. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). "The first step is to identify the circumstances proved." Id. (citing State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010)). "In identifying the circumstances proved, we defer to the [fact-finder's] acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the [s]tate." Id. at 598-99 (quotation omitted). The reviewing court "construe[s] conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume[s] that the [fact-finder] believed the [s]tate'switnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses." Id. at 599 (quotation omitted). "The second step is to determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt." Id. (quotation omitted).
With regard to premeditation, we first look at the circumstances proved. Security footage shows appellant pick up and set down a large wooden board, walk away, return to the area to retrieve the same board, walk through the industry area, and approach J.V. from behind. Appellant proceeded to attack J.V. Appellant targeted the back of J.V.'s head with each of six blows, which the district court deemed "a vital area of the body." Appellant informed the facility's special investigator that this attack was in response to J.V. threatening appellant. Finally, appellant walked away after the attack without rendering aid to J.V. These proved circumstances are consistent with the conclusion that "some appreciable period of time passed after [appellant] formed the intent to kill, during which the statutorily required consideration, planning, preparation, or determination took place." Holliday, 745 N.W.2d at 563. Appellant has not offered a contrary, rational hypothesis. Therefore, we conclude that the state proved that appellant acted with premeditation to kill J.V.
With regard to intent, appellant argues that there is a reasonable inference, other than intent to kill, which can be drawn. Appellant argues that it is reasonable to infer that he instead intended to preemptively incapacitate J.V. to prevent J.V. from acting on his threats. However, to the contrary, the record establishes appellant carried out a vicious attack that went well beyond an attempt to merely incapacitate J.V. As discussed above, appellant struck J.V. in the back of the head with a board, which caused J.V. to slumpforward in his chair and rendered him motionless. Appellant proceeded to strike J.V. in the head five additional times. Finally, following the assault, appellant...
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