State v. Laurel

Decision Date30 May 2014
Docket NumberNo. 107,096.,107,096.
PartiesSTATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Edward D. LAUREL, Appellant.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus by the Court

1. In a criminal case, when newly discovered evidence comes from witnesses who are without credibility, no new trial need be granted.

2. When a jury cannot agree on whether a defendant is guilty of first-degree murder on a premeditation theory or a felony-murder theory, the defendant can be given a sentence only for felony murder.

Mark T. Schoenhofer, of Wichita, was on the brief for appellant and waived oral argument.

Boyd K. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by BEIER, J.:

Defendant Edward D. Laurel appeals from his convictions and sentences for first-degree murder and criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied building. He challenges the district court judge's denial of his motion for new trial and his sentence to life without parole for 25 years rather than 20 years.

Factual and Procedural Background

Teresa Anima heard a loud noise outside of her Wichita house shortly before 6 a.m. on June 20, 2010, and woke her husband, Jose. Teresa and Jose saw two men looking into the windows of a house directly across the street from theirs—one wearing a white jersey and the other wearing a red jersey. Seconds later, the two men started shooting at the front door of the house across the street. Bullets struck and killed a 13–year–old boy inside.

The Animas' daughter dialed 911, and responding officers were informed that one of the shooters was a Hispanic male wearing a white jersey. Minutes later, a patrol vehicle passed a green Jeep with a driver matching that description. The patrol vehicle turned and began to follow the Jeep. When the Jeep voluntarily pulled over to the side of the road, the officer inside the patrol vehicle turned on its overhead lights. The officer then directed the occupants to get out of the Jeep. The driver, Eli Betancourt, was the first to emerge, followed by his brother, Alejandro, and then by Gregory Patton. During a field lineup, witnesses identified Eli as one of the shooters. Neither Alejandro nor Patton was wearing a red jersey, and officers did not find a red jersey in the Jeep. The officers also found no guns were in the Jeep.

After officers took Eli, Alejandro, and Patton into custody, the three were separated and interviewed. Detective Thomas Fatkin interviewed Patton. For more than 2 hours, Patton told the detective that he had been asleep in the Jeep and denied any involvement in the shooting. When an officer entered the interview room and told Patton that he was going to be charged with first-degree murder, Fatkin would eventually testify, [Patton's] demeanor changed. He talked different. He broke down a little bit. And he began to change his story.”

Patton then confessed that he had been at a party with Eli, where many of the attendees were gang members. Patton was drinking and became intoxicated, and, near dawn, he fell asleep in the Jeep. When he awoke, he saw Eli, Alejandro, and a “dude in [a] red shirt” talking outside the Jeep in front of a white house. The three then got into the Jeep with Patton, at which point he saw that the man wearing the red shirt had a gun. The four drove to the victim's house, and, while Patton and Alejandro waited in the Jeep, the two others got out and fired into the home. Alejandro then drove the Jeep to pick up the two shooters. The four returned to the white house where they had been earlier and dropped off the man in the red shirt.

Patton said he did not know the individual in the red shirt, but he had seen him talking with Eli at the party. When presented with a photo array, Patton identified Laurel as the man in the red shirt.

At Laurel's trial on charges of first-degree murder and criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied building, Patton's testimony tracked his statements during his police interview. He also said that Eli had told him at the party about a plan to retaliate against someone who had fought with another brother of Eli. Patton testified that he did not know when Laurel entered the Jeep that the foursome was setting out to retaliate. It was not until the group drove past the house and Laurel pointed it out that Patton realized they were going to “run up to the house and shoot it.” Patton also testified that the group went past the house in the Jeep two more times before stopping to let Eli and Laurel get out. The 13–year–old murder victim was not the intended target.

Patton confirmed before Laurel's jury that he had secured a favorable plea agreement in exchange for his testimony against Eli, Alejandro, and Laurel. Patton pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, and the State joined his request for a dispositional departure to probation. On cross-examination, Laurel's counsel repeatedly emphasized that Patton's plea agreement would allow him to avoid a life sentence and receive probation.

The jury was presented with three options to convict Laurel on the first-degree murder charge.

Theory 1(a) We, the jury, unanimously find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of premeditated murder.

....

Theory 1(b) We, the jury, unanimously find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder.

....

Theory 1(c) We, the jury, unable to agree under Theory 1(a) or 1(b), do unanimously find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on the combined theories of premeditated murder and felony murder.”

The jury chose Theory 1(c) on the first-degree murder. It also convicted Laurel on the criminal discharge count.

Laurel filed a motion for new trial, arguing that he had become aware of new evidence. He had received an in-house, inmate-to-inmate letter or “kite” from Sean Windsor, which said Patton “lied in order to get his plea.” Specifically, the kite said: “I was gonna tell you ... that I was in pod 5 with Greg Pattons rat ass & you coulda called me as a witness that he told me you wasn't there but had to lie to get a plea.” The district judge held an evidentiary hearing on the motion.

At the hearing, Windsor testified that he and Patton had been housed together in the Sedgwick County Detention Facility. His first of two conversations with Patton occurred when Patton approached and confided in him about his case. Patton apparently had overheard Windsor talking, and it had sounded like Windsor “knew a little bit about the legal system.” Windsor testified that Patton had told him that he was drunk on the night of the shooting and did not remember anything that had happened. According to Windsor, Patton also said that “the kid Eddie that's charged, my codefendant, he wasn't with us, didn't have nothing to do with nothing.”

During a second conversation, Windsor said, Patton told him about being offered a plea deal in exchange for his testimony against his codefendants. Windsor asked Patton how he could testify against anyone if he did not remember what had happened, and Patton replied: [F]or probation, I will lie.”

Cross-examination of Windsor focused on his habits as a “jailhouse lawyer.” The prosecutor inquired about several handwritten motions Windsor had drafted for other inmates, and Windsor admitted that he had offered to file a motion on behalf of Laurel based on ineffective assistance of counsel as a “stall tactic.” He also admitted that he had written a motion for Alejandro and that the two were friends.

The prosecutor also inquired about a letter, apparently in Windsor's handwriting, in which Windsor had instructed one of his codefendants on how to testify during Windsor's trial. The letter told the codefendant to say that an individual had pointed a gun at her, and it included a drawing of a gun with the instruction: “Tell the cop it looked like this gun.” Windsor denied writing the letter.

The prosecutor then asked Windsor about his 31 convictions for crimes of dishonesty. The convictions included felony and misdemeanor thefts, burglary, forgery, unlawful use of an identification card, obstruction of legal process, unlawful use of a financial card, and identity theft.

In response to further cross-examination questions, Windsor admitted that he had not informed anyone other than Laurel or Alejandro about his conversation with Patton. He also admitted that he had refused to talk with a detective who was investigating Patton's alleged statements.

Against the recommendation of his attorney, Eli also testified at the motion hearing. Although he had told investigators that Laurel was involved in the shooting, and he had testified consistently with that statement at his own trial, he changed his story at the motion hearing. He testified that Laurel was not present on the night of the shooting.

Patton also testified at the motion hearing and denied knowing Windsor.

After hearing counsels' arguments, the district judge first addressed Windsor's testimony: [I]f I w[ere] to assess, and I'll assess, the credibility of Mr. Windsor on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being the lowest, 10 being the highest, I would judge Mr. Windsor's credibility to be zero. It doesn't even reach to 1. He has no credibility.”

The judge then turned to Eli's testimony, saying: [B]ased on his own admission[,] I, again on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being the lowest, 10 being the highest, Mr. Eli Betancourt has zero credibility.” The district judge reasoned that Eli had perjured himself, either at his own trial or in the motion hearing, and his mutually exclusive accounts of Laurel's involvement in the shooting made him unbelievable.

Finally, the judge said: [O]f the three witnesses who testified, [Patton's] testimony is believable, whereas the other two are not.” Given his credibility assessments, the district judge denied the motion for new trial.

...

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