State v. Lavallee–davidson

• Decision Date: 25 August 2011
• Citation: 26 A.3d 828,2011 ME 96
• Parties: STATE of Mainev.Malcolm Bruce LaVALLEE–DAVIDSON.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

26 A.3d 828

2011 ME 96

STATE of Maine

v.Malcolm Bruce LaVALLEE–DAVIDSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: April 14, 2011.Decided: Aug. 25, 2011.

Verne E. Paradie, Jr., Esq. (orally), Trafton & Matzen, LLP, Auburn, ME, for Malcolm Bruce Lavallee–Davidson.William J. Schneider, Attorney General, Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of Attorney General, Augusta, ME, for the State of Maine.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.SAUFLEY, C.J.

[¶ 1] Malcolm Bruce LaVallee–Davidson killed a man by putting a gun to his head and pulling the trigger during consensual sexual activity. At trial, LaVallee–Davidson argued that he did not know that the gun was loaded. After a jury found him guilty of manslaughter (Class A), 17–A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A) (2010),¹ the court entered a judgment of conviction in the Unified Criminal Docket (Cumberland County, Crowley, J.). In this appeal, LaVallee–Davidson argues that the court committed obvious error in its jury instructions and that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he caused the death of the victim either recklessly or with criminal negligence. We affirm the judgment.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[¶ 2] LaVallee–Davidson was charged by indictment with manslaughter (Class A), 17–A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A), pleaded not guilty, and proceeded to trial. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, see State v. Filler, 2010 ME 90, ¶ 24, 3 A.3d 365, 372, the following facts were established at trial.

[¶ 3] On Friday, April 17, 2009, LaVallee–Davidson went to the victim's home in South Portland to engage in consensual sexual activity with the victim and another man. He brought with him three guns and ammunition for each gun. Throughout the evening, the men ingested or inhaled a combination of alcohol and drugs and used LaVallee–Davidson's guns for various sexual purposes. The activity culminated in LaVallee–Davidson placing a gun to the head of the victim and twice pulling the trigger without first checking to see if the gun was loaded. The victim died of a single gunshot wound to the head after LaVallee–Davidson pulled the trigger the second time.

[¶ 4] Following the shooting, LaVallee–Davidson twice said, “I think I killed him.” LaVallee–Davidson placed a blanket on the victim, he and the other man wiped down various items, and LaVallee–Davidson placed some items in the trash bucket. LaVallee–Davidson left and took with him his guns, ammunition, and personal items, as well as the victim's laptop and cell phone.

[¶ 5] After they left the victim's house, the other man told LaVallee–Davidson, both by phone and electronically, that the death needed to be reported. LaVallee–Davidson responded that he was not ready to do so and told the other man that he wanted to say that the victim had killed himself. The other man refused to corroborate that story and called the South Portland Police Department to report the shooting.

[¶ 6] LaVallee–Davidson later turned over to the police the guns, the ammunition, the victim's computer, and the victim's cell phone. He told the police that he had thrown the bullet casing from the shooting out his car window, and the police never recovered the casing. The police determined that LaVallee–Davidson's DNA was included in the mixture of DNA found on two of the guns and identified his DNA on several unfired cartridges.

[¶ 7] Although LaVallee–Davidson did not testify at trial, the jury viewed a video recording of an interview between LaVallee–Davidson and two police detectives that occurred on Sunday morning, April 19, 2009. During the interview, LaVallee–Davidson told the detectives that, just before the shooting, the victim told him that he wanted to play “roulette” with one of the guns.² LaVallee–Davidson stated that he “made sure everything was unloaded,” went to the bathroom, returned, put the gun to the victim's head, and twice pulled the trigger at the victim's request. LaVallee–Davidson also made inconsistent statements to the police regarding the location of the guns and the ammunition during these events.

[¶ 8] At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury on the states of mind necessary to prove manslaughter and included the following specific instructions on evidence of mistake of fact:

In determining whether the necessary mental state, either recklessness or criminal negligence, has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you should consider any evidence of mistake of fact because evidence of a mistake of fact may raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a required culpable state of mind, in this case either recklessness or criminal negligence.

Although LaVallee–Davidson initially objected to this instruction, he withdrew his objection and agreed to the instruction.

[¶ 9] The jury returned a guilty verdict on the single count of manslaughter. See 17–A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A). The court sentenced LaVallee–Davidson to fifteen years' imprisonment, with all but ten years suspended and three years of probation, and required him to pay $7,135 in restitution and $25 to the Victims' Compensation Fund, see 5 M.R.S. § 3360–I (2010), and to forfeit the firearm used. LaVallee–Davidson timely appealed.³

II. DISCUSSION

A. Mistake of Fact

[¶ 10] To convict LaVallee–Davidson of the charged crime of manslaughter, the State had the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted either recklessly ⁴ or with criminal negligence. ⁵ 17–A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A); see 17– A M.R.S. § 35(3), (4) (2010). LaVallee–Davidson argues that the court failed to properly instruct the jury on his mistake of fact defense as it relates to these two mental states. See 17–A M.R.S. §§ 35(3), (4), 36 (2010).

[¶ 11] “No area of the substantive criminal law has traditionally been surrounded by more confusion than that of ignorance or mistake of fact or law.” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.6(a) at 394 (2d ed. 2003). That confusion is evident in this matter, where LaVallee–Davidson argues that his mistaken belief that the gun was empty of bullets gave rise to an affirmative defense to the charge of manslaughter based on a mistake of fact.⁶ He argues that the jury instruction regarding mistake of fact was deficient because the instruction did not place the burden of disproving the defense on the State and because the instruction failed to explain how the jury should consider the defense.⁷ LaVallee–Davidson's argument, however, misapprehends the application of mistake of fact as a defense to the crime of manslaughter. See 17–A M.R.S. § 36; ⁸ see also 17–A M.R.S. 203(1)(A).

[¶ 12] The error in LaVallee–Davidson's argument stems from a misunderstanding of the three broad categories of defenses that may negate criminal liability, and of the burdens placed on the State or defendant as a result of these defenses.⁹ In the first category, which is not technically a “defense,” a defendant in a criminal trial argues that there is a failure of proof by the State, that is, that the State has failed to meet its burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt one or more of the elements of the crime charged. When arguing a mistake of fact pursuant to 17–A M.R.S. § 36(1), the defendant asserts mistake of fact to “raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a required culpable state of mind.” Id.; see 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 9.1(a)(1) at 5–6 (2d ed. 2003). In such circumstances, the defendant bears no ultimate burden of proof, see Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 6–47 at 6–64 (4th ed. 2011), and, as the court instructed here, the State's burden to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt is not changed by the defense.

[¶ 13] In the second category, the defendant raises a defense, such as a justification or an excuse, that requires the State to disprove certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt in addition to meeting its burden of establishing each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.; 17–A M.R.S. § 101(1) (2010) (requiring the State to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt expressly designated defenses, exceptions, exclusions, or authorizations “in issue as a result of evidence admitted at the trial that is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt on the issue”); see also State v. Thurston, 2009 ME 41, ¶ 9, 969 A.2d 906, 909. A defendant putting forward such a defense regarding a state of mind may do so only pursuant to 17–A M.R.S. § 36(2) and “only if the law provides that the state of mind established by such ... mistake constitutes a defense.” 17–A M.R.S. § 36(2); see, e.g., 17–A M.R.S. § 254(2) (2010) (stating that it is a defense to prosecution of sexual abuse of minors “that the actor reasonably believed the other person is at least 16 years of age”). In such circumstances, the State would then be required to disprove evidence of mistake of fact beyond a reasonable doubt if the defendant raised evidence at trial sufficient to generate the issue. See 17–A M.R.S. § 101(1); see also Glidden, 487 A.2d at 644.

[¶ 14] In the third category are affirmative defenses. The Legislature has expressly designated certain affirmative defenses to some crimes. See, e.g., 15 M.R.S. § 1092(2) (2010) (affirmative defense to violation of condition of release); 17 M.R.S. § 1033(3) (2010) (affirmative defense to the crime of animal fighting); 17–A M.R.S. § 255–A(1)(Q), (R) (2010) (affirmative defenses to unlawful sexual contact); 17–A M.R.S. § 1105–C(1)(K), (L), (3) (affirmative defenses to aggravated furnishing of scheduled drugs); see also State v. Okie, 2010 ME 6, ¶ 16, 987 A.2d 495, 500 (addressing the affirmative defense of lack of criminal responsibility by reason of insanity). When a defendant raises an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of proving the facts necessary to the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 17–A M.R.S. § 101(2) (2010);...