State v. Lavell, A94A1114
| Decision Date | 26 August 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. A94A1114,A94A1114 |
| Citation | 214 Ga.App. 525,448 S.E.2d 270 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The STATE v. LAVELL. |
Ben F. Smith, Jr., Sol., Barry E. Morgan, Mark A. Basurto, Asst. Sols., for appellant.
Hesmer & Manning, Jane P. Manning, Marietta, for appellee.
Colleen Lavell was accused of driving under the influence of alcohol, possession of an altered driver's license, possession by consumption of alcohol by a minor, and operating an automobile with improper equipment. Lavell filed a motion to suppress claiming the state lacked probable cause to stop her car. During the hearing on Lavell's motion, the state called several witnesses who testified as to the events following the arrest, but was unable to present any witnesses to the actual stop of Lavell's car because the arresting officer died prior to the hearing. The state also offered the deceased officer's arrest report, but the trial court ruled it inadmissible. The court granted Lavell's motion to suppress based upon the inadmissibility of the police report and the state's resulting failure to carry its burden of establishing probable cause for the stop.
Pretermitting the issue of whether the motion to suppress was properly granted is whether this court has jurisdiction. Lavell contends we lack jurisdiction because the state is not authorized to appeal the grant of a motion to suppress where, as here, the trial court's ruling is based upon general evidentiary rules. We agree. OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(4) authorizes the state to directly appeal the grant of a motion to suppress whenever the trial court's exclusion of evidence is based upon its determination that the state unlawfully obtained the evidence. State v. Frye, 205 Ga.App. 508(1), 422 S.E.2d 915 (1992). However, the statute does not authorize an appeal by the state when the exclusion of evidence is based upon some general rule of evidence. State v. Brown, 185 Ga.App. 701, 365 S.E.2d 865 (1988). Our examination of the record reveals the trial court's grant of the motion to suppress was based upon rules against the admission of hearsay. It is apparent from the transcript the focus of the hearing was whether the report should be admitted pursuant to one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. In addition, it is clear from the court's order the decision to suppress was based upon the inadmissibility of the police report. The fact the order was one involving general rules of evidence is further borne out by the issues the...
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The State v. Smith.
...at least in part, “upon its determination that the [S]tate unlawfully obtained the evidence.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Lavell, 214 Ga.App. 525, 448 S.E.2d 270 (1994). If the exclusion of evidence is solely based upon some other ground, such as the general evidentiary rules of admissibi......
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State v. Forehand
...857 (1998). 10. (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(4). 11. Berky v. State, 266 Ga. 28, 29, 463 S.E.2d 891 (1995); State v. Lavell, 214 Ga.App. 525, 448 S.E.2d 270 (1994). 12. 226 Ga.App. 260, 486 S.E.2d 399 13. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) DeCastro v. State, 221 Ga.App. 83, 84, 47......
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...an appeal if the order is the result of the exclusion of evidence based upon some general rule of evidence. State v. Lavell, 214 Ga.App. 525, 448 S.E.2d 270 (1994) (motion to In this case, there was no defect in the accusation, nor was one alleged. Morris v. State, supra at 447-448, 421 S.E......