State v. Law
| Decision Date | 07 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 20180898-CA,20180898-CA |
| Citation | 464 P.3d 1192 |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. Jason Thomas LAW, Appellant. |
Debra M. Nelson and Michael R. Sikora, Attorneys for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellee
Opinion
¶1 Jason Thomas Law was convicted of disarming a peace officer based on conduct during a scuffle with a police officer and hospital staff. Law argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the required mens rea—that he intentionally tried to take the firearm from the officer. We disagree and affirm.
¶2 In July 2014, Law was admitted to the emergency room of Intermountain Medical Center (the Hospital) due to concerns about him being suicidal. Following a mental health examination, Law was determined to be a risk to himself, and his rights to make his own medical decisions or refuse treatment were suspended. The Hospital's medical personnel decided that Law would be transferred to LDS Hospital for inpatient care.
¶3 When he was told about the impending transfer, Law responded, "I'll kill myself before going to that hospital." Unbeknownst to the Hospital staff, Law believed that LDS Hospital was responsible for the death of his grandmother. The Hospital staff explained to him that he did not have a choice in the matter and that if he "continued to make threats against staff or himself, ... he would have to be physically or chemically restrained."
¶4 At this time, several persons were with Law in the hospital room: an off-duty police officer (Officer), two hospital security guards, a critical care emergency room technician (Technician), a nurse, and Law's father. Officer was in his full police uniform, which included a patrol firearm holstered on his right hip. Shortly after reaching Law's hospital room, Officer began audio recording the events on his phone.
¶5 Law did not stop making threats regarding the transfer, and the staff accordingly prepared to give him a sedative injection. At this time, Officer was on one side of the hospital bed, while one of the security guards (Guard) was on the other. As Guard attempted to hold Law's right arm in anticipation of the injection, Law pulled away, "flailing his arms," and fell off the bed onto the hospital floor next to Officer. As Officer "hunched over" Law, "trying to gain control over his arms," Law reached out and "grabbed a hold of" Officer's holstered firearm and "began pulling on it, pulling up on it forcibly." Officer told Law that he made a "mistake," and he delivered a blow to Law's "upper rib cage to get him to release his grip, which was successful." Law responded, stating that he was "not trying to hurt [Officer]" but that he was "trying to kill" himself.
¶6 Following a continued struggle, Law eventually received the sedative injection. The State subsequently charged Law with, among other things, disarming a peace officer1 and disorderly conduct.
¶7 At trial, Officer, Guard, and Technician testified for the State. While their testimonies differed on some of the surrounding details, each testified that Law tried to take Officer's firearm during the altercation. Additionally, Officer's audio recording of the incident was played for the jury. The recording picked up the following exchange, which Officer testified occurred when Law tried to take his weapon:
¶8 Defense counsel moved for a directed verdict on the disarming a peace officer charge. As relevant here, defense counsel argued that the State had not made its prima facie case on that charge because it had not presented evidence on "the intentional mental state required for that crime." Specifically, counsel argued that the State had not demonstrated that Law "had created in his own mind the conscious objective of taking the officer's gun." In response, the State argued that the jury could infer Law's intent based on Law's words immediately after he tried to take the gun—that he had been trying to take his own life, not Officer's. The trial court agreed with the State and denied Law's motion, reasoning that the evidence could support an inference as to the required intent.
¶9 The jury convicted Law of both disarming a peace officer and disorderly conduct.2 Law appeals.
¶10 Law argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for disarming a peace officer. We ordinarily "review a trial court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict for correctness." State v. Gonzalez , 2015 UT 10, ¶ 21, 345 P.3d 1168. However, upon request, in the event certain issues raised in the sufficiency challenge were not preserved, we review them for plain error. See State v. Doyle , 2018 UT App 239, ¶ 20, 437 P.3d 1266.
¶11 Law argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because the State "failed to prove that [he] formed the required mens rea"—that he intentionally tried to disarm the peace officer. On this basis, he asserts that the evidence with respect to his intent was "too inconclusive and speculative" to support the jury's verdict.
¶12 The operative question on a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is "simply whether the jury's verdict is reasonable in light of all of the evidence taken cumulatively." State v. Ashcraft , 2015 UT 5, ¶ 24, 349 P.3d 664 ; see also Mackin v. State , 2016 UT 47, ¶ 29, 387 P.3d 986 (). We will therefore affirm the trial court's denial of Law's motion for a directed verdict and affirm Law's conviction if "some evidence exists" from which a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally disarmed Officer during the altercation at the Hospital. See State v. Gonzalez , 2015 UT 10, ¶ 27, 345 P.3d 1168 (cleaned up). Indeed, if that standard is satisfied, we will affirm the jury's finding with respect to Law's intent "even if the evidence presented at the district court lends itself to multiple reasonable interpretations," see Mackin , 2016 UT 47, ¶ 29, 387 P.3d 986, or even if "we can identify an ‘equally’ plausible alternative inference" from the evidence, see Ashcraft , 2015 UT 5, ¶ 25, 349 P.3d 664 ; see also id. ¶ 27 ( ).
¶13 To prove that Law disarmed a peace officer, the State was required to prove, as relevant here, that Law "intentionally" took or removed, or attempted "to take or remove[,] a firearm ... from the person or immediate presence of a person the actor knows is a peace officer." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.8(2), (3)(a) (LexisNexis 2017).
¶14 As defined by the Utah Code, a person acts intentionally "when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Id. § 76-2-103(1). Our courts have repeatedly explained that a defendant's intent is "rarely susceptible to direct proof," with the result that the jury may "rely on reasonable inferences from the circumstances surrounding the crime" to find the requisite intent. See, e.g. , State v. Chacon , 962 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1998) (cleaned up); State v. Carrell , 2018 UT App 21, ¶ 57, 414 P.3d 1030 (); State v. O'Bannon , 2012 UT App 71, ¶ 43, 274 P.3d 992 (). A reasonable inference is one that is "drawn from the evidence and is based on logic and reasonable human experience." State v. Harris , 2015 UT App 282, ¶ 9, 363 P.3d 555 (cleaned up); see also State v. Ashcraft , 2015 UT 5, ¶ 18, 349 P.3d 664 ().
¶15 We conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Law intentionally attempted to take Officer's firearm. To begin with, the jury heard evidence that Law was admitted to the Hospital due to general suicide concerns and that, upon being told that he would be transferred to LDS Hospital, Law clearly communicated that he would "kill [himself] before going to that hospital."
¶16 Next, the jury heard from Officer, Guard, and Technician, who each testified that Law tried to take Officer's firearm from his holster once Law was off the hospital bed. Officer testified that as he was trying restrain Law after Law had fallen off the bed, Law "grabbed" his firearm and "forcibly" "began pulling on it," while Technician testified that Law "placed his hands on [Officer] and attempted to remove his gun." And while Guard did not directly observe Law take hold of Officer's firearm after Law was on the floor, he did see one of Law's hands "going towards the right hip of the officer," which is the hip on which the firearm was holstered. Guard further testified that the incident with Law stood out in his mind as unusual because it involved "someone going for the officer's gun."
¶17 The State also played for...
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