State v. Lawrence, 17598.
Decision Date | 30 January 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 17598.,17598. |
Citation | 281 Conn. 147,913 A.2d 428 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Tarrance LAWRENCE. |
Donald D. Dakers, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and John M. Waddock, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.
The defendant, Tarrance Lawrence, appeals, following our grant of certification,1 from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court dismissing his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22,2 based on the Appellate Court's determination that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion. State v. Lawrence, 91 Conn.App. 765, 766-67, 882 A.2d 689 (2005). The issue before us is whether § 43-22 is an appropriate procedural vehicle by which to challenge an allegedly improper conviction or whether, as a result of the finality of the defendant's conviction, the trial court is without jurisdiction to entertain his claim. We conclude that the Appellate Court properly determined that, because the defendant's claim did not fall within the purview of § 43-22, the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The Appellate Court opinion sets forth the following undisputed facts. "The defendant was charged with one count each of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a(a), carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes [Rev. to 1995] § 29-35 and tampering with evidence in violation of General Statutes § 53a-155(a)(1). The murder charge alleged that the defendant caused the death of a person by use of a firearm. At trial, the defendant presented a defense of extreme emotional disturbance with respect to the murder charge. The court instructed the jury regarding that defense with the following instruction as the defendant had requested: `If you unanimously find that the state has proven each of said elements of the crime of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, and if you also unanimously find that the defendant has proven by the preponderance of the evidence each of the elements of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, you shall find the defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm by reason of extreme emotional disturbance and not guilty of murder.' The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55a(a) as well as guilty on the other two counts with which he had been charged. The court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict and sentenced the defendant to thirty-five years on the count of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, two years on the count of carrying a pistol without a permit and three years on the count of tampering with evidence. All sentences were to run concurrently, resulting in a total effective sentence of thirty-five years incarceration. The defendant appealed from his conviction on grounds unrelated to his present claim,3 and [the Appellate Court] affirmed the judgment. State v. Lawrence, 67 Conn.App. 284, 786 A.2d 1227 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 919, 791 A.2d 567 (2002).
State v. Lawrence, supra, 91 Conn. App. at 767-68, 882 A.2d 689.
In his appeal to the Appellate Court from the judgment of dismissal, the defendant claimed that he improperly had been convicted of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, and that, had he properly been convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, his sentence of imprisonment could not have exceeded twenty years. According to the defendant, because he was sentenced to thirty-five years imprisonment, his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum permitted under the sentencing statute and he properly invoked the jurisdiction of the court, pursuant to § 43-22; see footnote 2 of this opinion; to correct that illegal sentence. Thus, the defendant's claim in essence challenged the propriety of the underlying conviction.
The question the Appellate Court resolved, therefore, was whether "§ 43-22 is an appropriate procedural vehicle by which to challenge an allegedly improper conviction or whether the finality of the defendant's conviction, subject to any collateral challenges the defendant may raise via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, has left the court without jurisdiction to entertain his claim." State v. Lawrence, supra, 91 Conn.App. at 769, 882 A.2d 689.
The Appellate Court determined that the trial court properly had concluded that it did not have jurisdiction pursuant to § 43-22 and, accordingly, affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence.4 Id., at 776, 882 A.2d 689. This certified appeal followed.
The defendant claims before this court that, because his conviction is illegal, his sentence is necessarily illegal and, therefore, his claim falls within the purview of § 43-22. The state responds that, because the defendant is challenging what transpired at trial, his claim does not fall within § 43-22. We agree with the state.
We again rely on the Appellate Court's opinion for its discussion of the well established principles of jurisdiction guiding our resolution of this issue. "Jurisdiction involves the power in a court to hear and determine the cause of action presented to it and its source is the constitutional and statutory provisions by which it is created. Connecticut State Employees Assn., Inc. v. Connecticut Personnel Policy Board, 165 Conn. 448, 456, 334 A.2d 909 (1973); see Andrew Ansaldi Co. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 207 Conn. 67, 73, 540 A.2d 59 (1988) (Shea, J., concurring). Article fifth, § 1 of the Connecticut constitution proclaims that [t]he powers and jurisdiction of the courts shall be defined by law, and General Statutes § 51-164s provides that [t]he superior court shall be the sole court of original jurisdiction for all causes of action, except such actions over which the courts of probate have original jurisdiction, as provided by statute.... State v. Carey, 222 Conn. 299, 305, 610 A.2d 1147 (1992), on appeal after remand, 228 Conn. 487, 636 A.2d 840 (1994). The Superior Court is a constitutional court of general jurisdiction.... In the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions, the limits of its jurisdiction are delineated by the common law.... State v. Luzietti, 230 Conn. 427, 431, 646 A.2d 85 (1994).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lawrence, supra, 91 Conn.App. at 769-71, 882 A.2d 689.
The defendant does not dispute that the jurisdiction of the sentencing court terminates once a defendant's sentence has begun and that a court may not take action affecting a defendant's sentence unless it expressly has been authorized to act. See State v. Reid, 277 Conn. 764, 775, 894 A.2d 963 (2006) ( ; Cobham v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 30, 37, 779 A.2d 80 (2001) (). The defendant further acknowledges that there is no...
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