State v. Evans

• Decision Date: 21 August 2018
• Docket Number: SC 19881
• Citation: 329 Conn. 770,189 A.3d 1184
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Alrick A. EVANS

329 Conn. 770

189 A.3d 1184

STATE of Connecticut

v.Alrick A. EVANS

SC 19881

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 18, 2017

Officially released August 21, 2018

April E. Brodeur, assigned counsel, with whom was Owen Firestone, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Rocco A. Chiarenza, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Brian Preleski, state's attorney, and Jeffrey M. Lee, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Palmer, McDonald, Robinson, D'Auria, Mullins and Kahn, Js.^*

ROBINSON, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether our decision in State v. Ray , 290 Conn. 602, 966 A.2d 148 (2009), which would require the defendant in the present case, Alrick A. Evans, to prove drug dependency as an affirmative defense to a charge under General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 21a-278 (b),¹ remains good law in light of (1) the subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314, 186 L.Ed. 314 (2013), and (2) the legislature's recent amendment of § 21a-278 (b) in No. 17-17, § 2, of the 2017 Public Acts (P.A. 17-17). The defendant appeals² from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) we should overrule our interpretation of § 21a-278 (b) in Ray , (2) under Alleyne , the state was required to prove his lack of drug dependency beyond a reasonable doubt because it is a fact that would result in an increased mandatory minimum sentence, and (3) the narcotics statutory scheme, which gives the prosecutor the sole authority to decide whether to proceed under § 21a-278 (b), rather than the otherwise identical General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 21a-277 (a),³ violates the separation of powers established by article second of the constitution of Connecticut, as amended by article eighteen of the amendments. The state contends to the contrary, and also argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant's motion to correct because that motion challenged his underlying conviction, rather than his sentence. Although we conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant's motion to correct, we disagree with the merits of the defendant's claims and reaffirm Ray 's holding that drug dependency under § 21a-278 (b) is an affirmative defense that, if proven, reduces a defendant's potential sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. On June 16, 2011, the state charged the defendant with one count of the sale of narcotics in violation of § 21a-278 (b), and one count of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 21a-279 (a), in connection with the sale of crack cocaine in Bristol. On November 16, 2011, the defendant pleaded guilty, in accordance with the Alford doctrine,⁴ to the sale of narcotics in violation of § 21a-278 (b); the state nolled the possession charge. Drug dependency was not discussed during the plea hearing.⁵

The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant to five years imprisonment with five years special parole.

Pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22,⁶ on November 5, 2015, the defendant filed the motion to correct an illegal sentence that underlies the present appeal.⁷ In that motion, the defendant claimed that his sentence is illegal because, inter alia, under Alleyne v. United States , supra, 570 U.S. at 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, and Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed. 2d 435 (2000), the sentence "exceeds the relevant statutory limits" and "the fact triggering the mandatory minimum [sentence] was not found by a proper [fact finder] or admitted by the defendant ...." On February 9, 2016, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision observing that, in State v. Ray , supra, 290 Conn. at 623–26, 966 A.2d 148, this court had concluded that Apprendi , which requires that the state charge, and prove to the fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt, any factor, other than a prior conviction, that increases the maximum penalty for a crime; see Apprendi v. New Jersey , supra, at 474–97, 120 S.Ct. 2348 ; did not apply to proof of drug dependency under § 21a-278 (b) because such proof constitutes an affirmative defense under that statute. The trial court then rejected the defendant's argument that Ray is no longer good law under Alleyne , which extended the rule set forth in Apprendi to facts that increase a statutory minimum sentence.⁸ See Alleyne v. United States , supra, at 103, 133 S.Ct. 2151. After rejecting the defendant's other challenges to his sentence,⁹ the trial court rendered judgment denying the motion to correct an illegal sentence. This appeal followed. See footnote 2 of this opinion.

In the present appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion to correct, the defendant claims the following: (1) we should overrule State v. Ray , supra, 290 Conn. at 602, 966 A.2d 148 ; and (2) the narcotics statutory scheme violates the separation of powers.¹⁰ The state disagrees with the merits of the defendant's claims and also contends that the trial court should have dismissed the defendant's motion to correct for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. All of these issues present questions of law over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell , 327 Conn. 650, 694, 176 A.3d 28 (2018) (constitutional issues); Hull v. Newtown , 327 Conn. 402, 413–14, 174 A.3d 174 (2017) (statutory construction); State v. Delgado , 323 Conn. 801, 810, 151 A.3d 345 (2016) (subject matter jurisdiction). We address each issue in turn.

I

As a threshold matter; see, e.g., State v. Koslik , 116 Conn. App. 693, 699, 977 A.2d 275, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 930, 980 A.2d 916 (2009) ; we begin with the state's challenges to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction,¹¹ namely, that (1) the defendant's motion to correct improperly challenged the underlying conviction, rather than the sentence, and (2) this case is moot because the defendant's sentence was the product of a plea bargain.¹²

A

Relying on State v. Lawrence , 281 Conn. 147, 913 A.2d 428 (2007), the state contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant's motion to correct because it did not challenge the sentencing phase of the proceeding but, rather, the underlying conviction. In response, the defendant cites State v. Henderson , 130 Conn. App. 435, 24 A.3d 35 (2011), appeals dismissed, 308 Conn. 702, 66 A.3d 847 (2013), and argues that issues raised under Alleyne and Apprendi are properly addressed in a motion to correct an illegal sentence. We agree with the defendant and conclude that his colorable claim of an illegal sentence under Alleyne and Apprendi gave the trial court subject matter jurisdiction over his motion to correct.

"It is well established that under the common law a trial court has the discretionary power to modify or vacate a criminal judgment before the sentence has been executed.... This is so because the court loses jurisdiction over the case when the defendant is committed to the custody of the commissioner of correction and begins serving the sentence.... Without a legislative or constitutional grant of continuing jurisdiction, however, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify its judgment." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lawrence , supra, 281 Conn. at 153–54, 913 A.2d 428.

As in Lawrence , the defendant in the present case "relies on a common-law exception to this rule, embodied in [Practice Book] § 43-22, allowing the trial court to correct an illegal sentence." Id., at 155, 913 A.2d 428. "Because the judiciary cannot confer jurisdiction on itself through its own rule-making power, § 43-22 is limited by the common-law rule that a trial court may not modify a sentence if the sentence was valid and its execution has begun.... Therefore, for the trial court to have jurisdiction to consider the defendant's claim of an illegal sentence, the claim must fall into one of the categories of claims that, under the common law, the court has jurisdiction to review." (Citation omitted.) Id.

"[A]n illegal sentence is essentially one which ... exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant's right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory.... In accordance with this summary, Connecticut courts have considered four categories of claims pursuant to [Practice Book] § 43-22. The first category has addressed whether the sentence was within the permissible range for the crimes charged.... The second category has considered violations of the prohibition against double jeopardy.... The third category has involved claims pertaining to the computation of the length of the sentence and the question of consecutive or concurrent prison time.... The fourth category has involved questions as to which sentencing statute was applicable." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 156–57, 913 A.2d 428. Considering these categories, which were first articulated by the Appellate Court's definition of the term "illegal sentence" in State v. McNellis , 15 Conn. App. 416, 443–44, 546 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809, 548 A.2d 441 (1988), this court held in Lawrence that "a challenge to the legality of a sentence focuses not on what transpired during the trial or on the underlying conviction. In order for the court to have jurisdiction over a motion to correct an illegal sentence after the sentence has been executed, the sentencing proceeding, and not the trial leading to the conviction , must be the subject of the attack." (Emphasis added.) State v. Lawrence , supra, 281 Conn. at 158, 913 A.2d 428.

Lawrence is not, however, the last word from this court in defining the trial courts' jurisdiction over motions...