State v. Lawrence

• Decision Date: 13 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 2951,2951
• Citation: 112 Ariz. 20,536 P.2d 1038
• Parties: The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Edward Stanley LAWRENCE, III, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 1038

536 P.2d 1038

112 Ariz. 20

The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Edward Stanley LAWRENCE, III, Appellant.

No. 2951.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

June 13, 1975.

Rehearing Denied July 14, 1975.

N. Warner Lee, Former Atty. Gen., Bruce E. Babbitt, Atty. Gen. by Thomas A. Jacobs, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

Frank E. Dickey, Jr. and Edward W. Parker, Phoenix, for appellant.

CAMERON, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from the conviction of Edward Lawrence III for the crime of second degree murder in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13--451, 452 and 453, and a sentence thereon of from 99 years to life in the Arizona State Prison.

Defendant, through his attorney, raises some 32 issues on appeal for this court's consideration. Many are without appropriate or adequate citation of authority and most are without merit. We have, however, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), State v. Burrell, 96 Ariz. 233, 393 P.2d 921 (1964) and A.R.S. § 13--1715, considered each and every question raised and we find no reversible or fundamental error. Disregarding those issues clearly unmeritorious we feel that we must answer the following questions:

1. Was it error for the trial court to refuse to require further disclosure by the prosecution after the defendant had failed to provide disclosure to the State as required by Rule 15.2 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure 1973, 17 A.R.S.?

2. Was the sentence so excessive as to be an abuse of discretion?

The facts necessary for a determination of this case are as follows. The defendant Edward Stanley Lawrence III and the victim Linda Faye Lawrence were divorced in June of 1973. The victim had custody of their son about 4 1/2 years of age and defendant was paying $100 a month for support. On the evening of 23 June 1973, the defendant visited the wife and there is some evidence that there was an argument. Defendant returned to his mother's and watched TV. Then, in his mother's presence, defendant tried to telephone his ex-wife. When there was no answer he returned to his wife's house for the avowed purpose of seeing to the safety of the boy. He entered the house and according to his statement to the police officer found his wife dead on the kitchen floor. He phoned the police at this time. Subsequent investigation revealed that the victim had been strangled to death. The defendant was questioned by the police and a complaint was refused by the County Attorney's Office at that time and the defendant was released.

Defendant was finally arrested on 30 October 1973. He was held to answer and the matter was tried to a jury. Although defendant did not testify, his defense appeared to be that he did not commit the crime. He was convicted and appeals.

FURTHER DISCLOSURE BY THE STATE

After the information was filed in the Superior Court, the prosecutor, pursuant to Rule 15.1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure 1973, made timely disclosure to the defendant.

Rule 15.2 provides for discovery by the defendant and reads in part as follows:

'b. Notice of Defenses. Within 20 days after the arraignment in Superior Court, the defendant shall provide the prosecutor with a written notice specifying all defenses as to which he will introduce evidence at trial, including, but not limited to, alibi, insanity, self-defense, entrapment, impotency, marriage, insufficiency of a prior conviction, mistaken identity, and good character. The notice shall specify for each defense the persons, including the defendant himself, whom he will call as witnesses at trial in support thereof. It may be signed by either the defendant or his counsel, and shall be filed with the court.

'c. Disclosures by Defendant. Simultaneously with the notice of defenses submitted under Rule 15.2(b), the defendant shall make available to the prosecutor for examination and reproduction:

(1) The names and addresses of all persons, other than the defendant himself, whom he will call as witnesses at trial, together with all statements made by them in connection with the particular case;'

Defendant's notice of defense read as follows:

'COMES NOW the defendant, EDWARD STANLEY LAWRENCE, III., by and through his present counsel, undersigned, and herewith files his compliance with A.R.S. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 15.2(b) and (c), as follows:

'At this point, defendant herewith offers as possible defenses under Rule 15.2(b), Alibi; Mistaken Identity; and Good Character; Insanity, only if evidence thereof 'comes to the attention of counsel; Innocence of any crime; and the Presumption of Innocence that is supposed to attend these proceedings from first to last: finally, defendant expressly reserves his constitutional right to present any defense that may develop prior to trial but as to which present knowledge is lacking; or any defense of any nature whatsoever that may be presented by any discovery of the state's evidence, or upon presentation of that evidence at a trial on the merits, including Illegal Seizure of Evidence, whether testimonial or physical.

'Other than possibly the defendant and his mother (whose full name and address will be furnished the state upon discovery), further defense witnesses are not known at this time.

* * *

* * *

'To the extent that Rule 15.2(b), or any other Rule, purports to require defendant to decide now whether he will later testify to any of the Defenses listed by him hereinbefore, said defendant herewith objects, and respectfully refuses to make any such decision, for the reason that such required pre-trial disclosure totally violates defendant's right to initial confrontation with his accusers, his unfettered right to benefit of aid of counsel, and most importantly, violates the constitutional protection of the presumption of innocence, and by its necessary import and tenor, infringes upon the accused's right not to testify if the evidence adduced at trial is deemed insufficient to sustain a jury verdict, and the unfettered constitutional right of the defendant to testify or not to testify at trial according to his sole prerogative; thus, this Rule amounts to a violation of the accused's right to have protection against testimonial compulsion, because the implicit holding in Rule 15.2(b) is that if the defendant fails to list himself as a witness as to any defenses listed, he will not be allowed to testify as to any such defenses in the trial on the merits--as gross a violation of his constitutional rights as could be imagined."

Later defendant filed a motion to compel additional discovery from the State. At the hearing on this motion the State resisted the motion. The State pointed out that they had, in fact, given the defendant almost everything that the defendant was entitled to and the record before us supports this assertion. The State, however, resisted further discovery on the ground that the defendant had not complied with Rule 15.2. The trial court agreed with the State and so do we.

The underlying principle of Rule 15 is adequate notification to the opposition of one's case-in-chief in return for reciprocal discovery so that undue delay and surprise may be avoided at trial by both sides. The rule, to be effective, must be applied with equal force to both the prosecution and the defendant. Indeed, Rule 15.8 recognizes that if Rule 15.2(b) is unenforceable then 15.1(a)(1)(b) and (c) is null and void. The United States Supreme Court has approved this premise--that the defendant in a criminal case may, where there is reciprocity of discovery, be required to provide the State with certain information prior to trial:

'Notice-of-alibi rules, now in use in a large and growing number of States, (footnote omitted) are based on the proposition that the ends...