State v. Lawrence
| Citation | 71 S.W.2d 740 |
| Decision Date | 23 February 1934 |
| Docket Number | No. 33369.,33369. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
| Parties | STATE v. LAWRENCE. |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Polk County; C. H. Skinker, Judge.
Charles Lawrence was convicted of arson, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Fred W. Barrett, of Springfield, and Herman Pufahl, of Bolivar, for appellant.
Roy McKittrick, Atty. Gen., and Olliver W. Nolen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
WESTHUES, Commissioner.
Appellant was charged, by indictment, with the crime of arson in the circuit court of Greene county. The alleged crime was committed in the city of Springfield. Appellant was granted a change of venue and the cause was transferred to Polk county. Upon a trial before a jury, appellant was convicted and a punishment of two years' imprisonment in the penitentiary was assessed. Being unsuccessful in his motion for new trial, he was sentenced, and from this judgment he appeals.
The most serious question presented on this appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict of guilty. It will, therefore, be necessary to make a full statement of the evidence which tends to connect appellant with the crime charged. The evidence was all circumstantial. From it we learn that appellant owned a number of pieces of property in Springfield, consisting of a large apartment house, known as the "Rock Castle Apartments," a restaurant near a government hospital, and the house located at 725 South Kansas avenue, which was burned and is the subject of the arson charge. This Kansas avenue property consisted of a five-acre tract. The two-story house with full basement, a part of which was used as a garage, was constructed principally of rock and cement. Access could be had to the basement through an outside door. There was also a stairway leading from the basement to the first floor of the building. Appellant and his family lived alternately in the Kansas avenue property and the Rock Castle apartments. At the time of the fire appellant and his wife were making their home at the apartments. Their five children, ranging from twenty to nine years of age; a niece of the wife of appellant, named Juanita Wright; and Fern Fletcher, the housekeeper, were occupying the Kansas avenue property. The fire occurred on Saturday, October 8, 1932, at about 9:30 p. m. Appellant's evidence discloses that on this Saturday afternoon the children had been taken to the apartment for the purpose of spending the afternoon and evening. Carl, the eldest son, was at this time managing the restaurant or lunch stand near the federal hospital. On the day in question he left the lunch stand about 6 p. m. and with his mother, Juanita Wright, and Fern Fletcher drove in his Ford sedan to the Kansas avenue property where he left Juanita Wright and Fern Fletcher. Carl drove to the apartment with his mother. The niece and the housekeeper mentioned testified that they remained in the Kansas avenue property until about 7:30 p. m., at which time they went to a party in another part of the city. They testified they did not notice anything out of the ordinary in the way of preparations made to burn the building. So far as the evidence in the case discloses, these two were the last known to have been in the house prior to the fire. The members of the household testified that usually there was some one at the Kansas avenue property, and occasions when all would be gone were rare.
Some time between 9 and 9:30 p. m., a neighbor noticed a red light in the basement of the Kansas avenue property. Within a few minutes thereafter an explosion occurred and almost immediately the entire basement seemed to be on fire. The fire quickly spread to other parts of the house. The fire department responded to the call and within a short time had the fire under control. Upon investigation, after the fire, it was disclosed that most elaborate preparations had been made for the burning of the building. The bedding, rugs, walls, and furniture gave evidence of having oil on them. Tubs, cans, and buckets containing gasoline and oil were found in every room of the house. A number of these had been placed on chairs and tied with rags saturated with gasoline and oil so that when the rags burned it would permit the containers to fall and spill the contents. Long fuses made of rags had been saturated with oil and so placed as to lead the fire to these various contraptions. It was estimated that about sixty or more gallons of inflammable oils and gasoline were so found. The prompt response of the fire department prevented the destruction of this evidence as well as the total destruction of the building and contents.
Appellant arrived at the scene of the fire while the firemen were fighting the flames. The state offered evidence of a number of statements alleged to have been made by appellant at the time. He is alleged to have stated upon arrival in substance: "What's going on here boys, a little fire?" During the time of the fire he is also alleged to have made the following remarks: "I would like to know who turned in the alarm?" "The boys just left here twenty minutes ago, it must have been burning then." "Who in the hell turned in the alarm?" The arson squad of the police department was notified. Appellant was told by the officers that it looked like the fire was of incendiary origin. Appellant responded: "It sure does." Officers also informed appellant that suspicion pointed toward him and they asked him to aid them in finding the guilty party. The officers testified that appellant was very reluctant and unwilling to shed any light on the matter in aid of the investigation. Often appellant would answer when questioned: "I'll talk when the proper time comes." The state offered in evidence the questions asked of appellant at the police headquarters and the answers given by appellant. This examination was made prior to the time appellant was indicted. The examination was taken and transcribed by a former court reporter and in part is as follows:
Appellant admitted at the trial that it would only take about five minutes to drive from the apartment to the Kansas avenue property.
On Monday, after the fire, appellant informed the police department that his house had been robbed; that a rug and radio had been found in a field near the home. Whereupon the officers accompanied appellant to the Kansas avenue property and a search was made. The only article found was the rug. The rug disclosed no evidence of having been in the fire and, therefore, must have been taken prior to the fire. It later developed that a neighbor had found the radio on Sunday, after the fire, and had taken it to his home. It also gave evidence of not having been in the fire. The record discloses that appellant did not learn that the neighbor had found the radio until after he had notified the police of the finding of the rug and radio. The neighbor testified that on Monday he noticed men in the field, evidently searching for something, and that they walked to the place where he had found the radio.
The home was insured against fire for $8,000 and the contents for $3,500. The evidence as to the value of both varied. Two witnesses for the state testified that the value of the house was not in excess of $3,000. Appellant offered the evidence of three witnesses, one an architect and two contractors. These witnesses stated that it would take from $9,000 to $11,000 to replace the house with one the same dimensions as the one burned. These witnesses, however, tacitly avoided placing a market value on appellant's home. They admitted it was not in a desirable residential location. In making their estimate of replacement cost they did not take into consideration the same kind of workmanship as was in the one burned. One of these witnesses admitted the workmanship found in appellant's home was very poor. Considering together the evidence of the state and that of defendant, the conclusion is inescapable that the house was insured far in excess of its market value.
By the evidence of appellant's own witnesses it is also evident that the contents were overinsured. We have carefully compared the proof of loss with the market value placed on various articles by witnesses for the appellant. We find a wide variance. From this evidence it was disclosed that the prices placed on the various articles, in the proof of loss, were prices at which the articles could be purchased if new. To illustrate the point: A piano was valued at $545. A witness for appellant testified that a piano of that kind could be bought for a price not in excess of $150.
A fireman of the Springfield fire department testified that while he was...
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