State v. Lawson, 76819
Decision Date | 07 March 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 76819,76819 |
Citation | 261 Kan. 964,933 P.2d 684 |
Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Timothy Doyle LAWSON, Appellee. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
Where a defendant is charged with driving on a suspended driver's license (K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-262[a][C] ), such license having been indefinitely suspended for failure to maintain motor vehicle liability insurance on his vehicle pursuant to K.S.A.1996 Supp. 40-3118(e), the record is examined and it is held: (1) Under the facts presented here, K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-262(a)(2) is inapplicable and provides no defense to the charge; and (2) the district court erred in dismissing the complaint.
Roger D. Struble, of Blackwell, Blackwell & Struble, Chtd., Salina, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellee.
Julie A. McKenna, County Attorney, argued the cause, and Thomas R. Stanton, Assistant County Attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General, were with her on the brief, for appellant.
This is an appeal by the State from the district court's dismissal of a complaint charging Timothy Doyle Lawson with driving on a suspended driver's license. The dismissal was based on the court's determination that, at the time of the commission of the offense, defendant was eligible for reinstatement of his driving privileges.
The pertinent facts may be summarized as follows. On August 9, 1995, Lawson's driver's license was suspended for failure to maintain automobile liability insurance. On September 15, 1995, defendant was arrested for driving in violation of the August 9 suspension order. A records check revealed defendant had two prior convictions for driving while his driving privileges had been revoked (November 20, 1990, and June 20, 1994). By virtue of the prior convictions, he was charged on October 5, 1995, pursuant to K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-262(a)(1)(C), a severity level 9, nonperson felony.
Defendant waived trial by jury, admitting he was driving a motor vehicle at the time and place charged. He moved for dismissal of the charge on the grounds prosecution for the offense was barred pursuant to K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-262(a)(2) as he was eligible for reinstatement of his driving privileges. In support of his motion to dismiss, defendant established that subsequent to his arrest on September 15, 1995, he had: (1) obtained automobile insurance; (2) filed the requisite forms with theDivision of Vehicles; (3) obtained reinstatement of his driving privileges on October 24, 1995; and (4) received a new driver's license on October 27, 1995.
K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-262(a)(2) provides:
"No person shall be convicted under this section if such person was entitled at the time of arrest under K.S.A. 8-257, and amendments thereto, to the return of such person's driver's license or was, at the time of arrest, eligible under K.S.A. 8-256, and amendments thereto, to apply for a new license to operate a motor vehicle."
The two statutes referred to within this statute follow.
"The division shall not suspend or revoke a person's license to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways for a period of more than one year, except as specifically authorized by statute."
"The division, upon suspending or revoking a license, shall require that such license shall be surrendered to and be retained by the division except that at the end of the period of suspension of such license, the license so surrendered shall be returned to the licensee, except as otherwise provided by law."
Defendant argued to the district court that as his driving privileges were restored a few weeks after his arrest, he was eligible for reinstatement at the time of his arrest and that, accordingly, K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-262(a)(2) barred the prosecution. The district court agreed, ruling from the bench as follows:
The State brings this appeal as of right pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(1) ( ).
The sole issue is whether the district court erred in dismissing the complaint based upon K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-262(a)(2) and is, accordingly, wholly a matter of statutory construction.
Some general rules of statutory construction need to be stated at this point in the discussion. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law. An appellate court's review of a question of law is unlimited. Foulk v. Colonial Terrace, 20 Kan.App.2d 277, Syl. p 1, 887 P.2d 140 (1994), rev. denied 257 Kan. 1091 (1995); see State v. Donlay, 253 Kan. 132, 133-34, 853 P.2d 680 (1993). When determining a question of law, this court is not bound by the decision of the district court. Memorial Hospital Ass'n, Inc. v. Knutson, 239 Kan. 663, 668, 722 P.2d 1093 (1986).
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. City of Wichita v. 200 South Broadway, 253 Kan. 434, 436, 855 P.2d 956 (1993). The several provisions of an act, in pari materia, must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony and giving effect to the entire statute if it is reasonably possible to do so. Guardian Title Co. v. Bell, 248 Kan. 146, 151, 805 P.2d 33 (1991) (quoting Easom v. Farmers Insurance Company, 221 Kan. 415, Syl. p 3, 560 P.2d 117 [1977] ). When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the appellate courts will not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read such a statute so as to add something not readily found in the statute. State v. Alires, 21 Kan.App.2d 139, Syl. p 2, 895 P.2d 1267 (1995). Our criminal statutes are to be construed strictly against the State. State v. JC Sports Bar, Inc., 253 Kan. 815, 818, 861 P.2d 1334 (1993).
The State argues that K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-262(a)(2) establishes only two instances in which a statutory defense exists: (1) when the driver is entitled, at the time of his or her arrest, to the return of his or her license under K.S.A. 8-257; and (2) when the driver is eligible, at the time of his or her arrest, to apply for a new license under K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-256. The State argues that defendant was ineligible for a license under either section.
Defendant argues that K.S.A.1996 Supp. 8-262(a)(2) provides that a person cannot be convicted of driving while suspended if, at the time of his or her arrest, the driver was eligible to take some affirmative action to get his or her license reinstated. Because defendant was subsequently able to obtain a new license, he argues that the district court was correct in dismissing the complaint.
Defendant's argument is flawed. He had not lost his driving privileges for a specified period of time under Chapter 8 of the Kansas Statutes which had expired at the time of his arrest. Rather, he was under an indefinite suspension order for violation of the Kansas Automobile Injury Reparations Act, K.S.A.1996 Supp. 40-3101 et...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Citizens' Utility Ratepayer Bd. v. State Corp. Com'n of State of Kan.
...it and will not read such a statute so as to add something not readily found in the statute. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Lawson, 261 Kan. 964, 966, 933 P.2d 684 (1997). " ' "In construing statutes, the legislative intention is to be determined from a general consideration of the entire ac......
-
State v. Wilson
...of more than one meaning, the precept that criminal statutes should be strictly construed against the State, State v. Lawson, 261 Kan. 964, 966, 933 P.2d 684 (1997), weighs in favor of adopting the definition posed by the The State would not require us to become mired in the semantics of th......
-
King v. White
..."Although appellate courts will not speculate as to the legislative intent of a plain and unambiguous statute, State v. Lawson, 261 Kan. 964, 966, 933 P.2d 684 (1997), where the construction of a statute on its face is uncertain, the court may examine the historical background of the enactm......
-
State v. McCown
...it and will not read such a statute so as to add something not readily found in the statute. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Lawson, 261 Kan. 964, 966, 933 P.2d 684 (1997). Moreover, "[w]hen the legislature revises an existing law, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the la......