State v. Lawson
| Citation | 291 S.W.3d 864 |
| Decision Date | 24 August 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. E2007-00330-SC-R11-CD.,E2007-00330-SC-R11-CD. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Tennessee |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee v. Neddie Mack LAWSON. |
Michael Glenn Hatmaker, Jacksboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Neddie Mack Lawson, I.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Leslie E. Price, Assistant Attorney General; William Paul Phillips, District Attorney General; and Amanda Sammons, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
GARY R. WADE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J., CORNELIA A. CLARK, WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.
The defendant was originally indicted for driving under the influence, second offense. More than one year after the arrest, the grand jury returned a second indictment, charging the defendant with driving under the influence, fourth offense, a Class E felony. The State filed a nolle prosequi as to the first indictment and, upon motion by the defendant, the trial court granted an order to expunge these records. At trial, the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, third offense, a misdemeanor. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. This Court granted review in order to determine whether the one-year statute of limitations applicable to misdemeanors barred the prosecution. Because the trial court properly took judicial notice of the pendency of the first indictment at the time of the second, the statute of limitations, regardless of the efficacy of the order of expunction, was tolled and the prosecution was timely. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed.
On June 20, 2005, Officer Larry Mozingo of the Claiborne County Sheriff's Department observed Neddie Mack Lawson (the "Defendant") and one other individual driving four-wheel, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) on State Highway 90. As Officer Mozingo began to follow the two vehicles with his cruiser, he observed that the Defendant was holding loosely onto the handlebars of his ATV and weaving on and off the roadway, coming perilously "close to striking one of the road signs." The other driver appeared to be in proper control of his ATV and was not stopped. When Officer Mozingo activated his blue lights and siren in an effort to stop the Defendant, the Defendant continued to drive until the officer used his cruiser to force him to the side of the highway. Two unopened cans of alcoholic beverages were placed behind the seat of the ATV, and two more unopened cans were between the seat and the rear rack. After determining that the Defendant smelled strongly of alcohol and had slurred speech, the officer asked the Defendant if he could perform a field sobriety test, and the Defendant responded that he could not. When questioned, the Defendant admitted that he, together with his friend, had drunk "about a case" of beer. The Defendant, who was covered in mud and had blood on his face, arms, and legs, explained that he had wrecked the ATV while riding in the mountains. He was unable to stand without leaning on the vehicle, and the officer seated him on the pavement in front of the ATV so he would not fall and further injure himself. After being transported to the hospital, the Defendant consented to a blood alcohol test and was treated for his injuries. His blood alcohol content was measured at .19 percent.
Initially, the Defendant was indicted for driving under the influence, second offense, a misdemeanor.1 Later, the State discovered that he had as many as three prior convictions for driving under the influence. On August 8, 2006, some fourteen months after the arrest, the Grand Jury returned a second indictment, alleging driving under the influence, fourth offense, a Class E felony.2 The Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss "all misdemeanor counts, lesser included or specifically charged, with regard to" the second indictment. Afterward, he filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that the one-year statute of limitations applied because the underlying offense, driving under the influence, was a misdemeanor, and felony driving under the influence was merely an "enhancement offense." See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-2-102(a) (2003) (). The trial court denied each of the motions, ruling that the second indictment was timely because the two-year statute of limitations applied. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-2-101(b)(4) (2003) (). At the same hearing, however, the trial court did grant a defense motion to expunge the records pertaining to the first indictment based upon the nolle prosequi filed by the State. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-32-101(a)(3) (2003) ().
At the conclusion of the first phase of the bifurcated trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilt as to the primary charge of driving under the influence. During the penalty phase of the trial, the State presented certified copies of three previous judgments of conviction for driving under the influence. The trial court, however, excluded one of the documents, a February 25, 1992 judgment in Dalton, Georgia, as insufficiently reliable for admission as evidence. At that point, the Defendant successfully sought dismissal of the felony count because there were insufficient underlying offenses to support it. Later, after the jury received evidence of the prior convictions, the Defendant argued that because the exclusion of one of the three prior convictions limited the charge to a misdemeanor, the one-year statute of limitations barred the prosecution. The trial court denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the statute of limitations was not a bar. Ultimately, the jury found the Defendant guilty of driving under the influence, third offense, a misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, seventy-five percent of service, with 150 days of confinement in jail. The Defendant was fined $7,500.
After the trial, defense counsel filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, again asserting that the one-year statute of limitations as to misdemeanors precluded the conviction.3 While recognizing that the statute of limitations is tolled when a second or superseding indictment is filed while the original indictment was still pending, defense counsel pointed out that the order of expunction left the State without any proof that the previous indictment was pending when the second indictment was returned. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion.4
On appeal, our Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, ruling that the State was entitled to file the second, superseding indictment so long as the original indictment was pending and holding that the one-year statute of limitations applicable to misdemeanors did not, therefore, prevent prosecution. State v. Lawson, No. E2007-00330-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2557361, at *7 (Tenn.Crim.App. June 26, 2008). Our intermediate appellate court acknowledged that the prior indictment had been expunged, but ruled that it was the duty of the Defendant, not that of the State, to provide a transcript "with respect to those issues that are the bases of the appeal." Id. at *6 (quoting Tenn. R.App. P. 24(b)). We granted the application for permission to appeal in order to determine whether there was adequate proof, in light of the order of expunction, to establish that the statute of limitations on commencing the prosecution of a misdemeanor was tolled by the filing of a timely prior indictment.
The State, while acknowledging "the limited record" as to the first indictment, nevertheless argues that the indictment was clearly pending upon the return of the second indictment, thereby tolling the limitations period for a misdemeanor. The Defendant, however, maintains that the State has failed to establish any basis for an extension of the one-year limit. Because the record demonstrates that the trial court took judicial notice of the pendency of the prior indictment before granting the order expunging the underlying records, the one-year statute of limitations was tolled and did not bar the prosecution.
Judicial notice is defined as an acceptance by a court, "for purposes of convenience and without requiring ... proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact." Black's Law Dictionary 863-64 (8th ed. 2004). Traditionally, Tennessee courts have taken judicial notice of certain facts "as a substitute for the production of evidence." Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County v. Shacklett, 554 S.W.2d 601, 605 (Tenn.1977). The purpose of the doctrine is to save time and dispense with the necessity of the presentation of proof. State ex rel. Schmittou v. City of Nashville, 208 Tenn. 290, 345 S.W.2d 874, 883 (1961); State v. Nunley, 22 S.W.3d 282, 287 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999). Resort to judicial notice is, however, subject to limitations, as indicated by Rule 201 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, effective January 1, 1990, which is virtually identical to its counterpart under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Our rule provides as follows:
(a) Scope of Rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of Facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute, in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When Discretionary. A court may take judicial notice whether requested or not.
(d) When...
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...should be treated as law and placed into a case via the mechanism of judicial notice of law, not proof to the jury. State v. Lawson , 291 S.W.3d 864 (Tenn. 2009). Judges are permitted to take judicial notice of ilings in their own proceedings, facts relating to the operation of the courts, ......
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...should be treated as law and placed into a case via the mechanism of judicial notice of law, not proof to the jury. State v. Lawson , 291 S.W.3d 864 (Tenn. 2009). Judges are permitted to take judicial notice of ilings in their own proceedings, facts relating to the operation of the courts, ......
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