State v. Lawson

• Decision Date: 18 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. WD 67457.,WD 67457.
• Citation: 232 S.W.3d 702
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Brandon Gerald LAWSON, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

232 S.W.3d 702

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Brandon Gerald LAWSON, Appellant.

No. WD 67457.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

September 18, 2007.

Nancy A. McKerrow, Columbia, MO, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Shaun J. Mackelprang, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Respondent.

Before HOWARD, C.J., and BRECKENRIDGE and ELLIS, JJ.

VICTOR C. HOWARD, Chief Judge.

Brandon Lawson appeals his conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, section 195.211.¹ Lawson admits to possessing a controlled substance, but argues his conviction was in error because the State put forth no sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Lawson had the intent to distribute the controlled substance.

We affirm.

Background

Lawson was convicted, in a jury trial, of possession with intent to distribute morphine, a controlled substance. The court sentenced Lawson, as a prior and persistent offender, to ten-year imprisonment with the promise of probation after successful completion of a long-term institutional drug treatment program pursuant to section 217.362.² Though Lawson admits to possessing morphine, he appeals his conviction arguing there was insufficient evidence put forth at trial from which a jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the intent to distribute the morphine. Viewed in light most favorable to the verdict, the following evidence was adduced at trial:

On the evening of February 8, 2006, an anonymous caller alerted the Moberly police department to a suspicious vehicle in the parking lot of a local swimming pool. Moberly police officer Grant Johnson was dispatched to the area and found a parked two-door vehicle alone in the lot. Upon making contact with the occupants, Officer Johnson observed Lawson sitting in the backseat of the vehicle with Lawson's two friends, Lawanna Woods and Heather Brooks, seated in the front seats. Officer Johnson asked Brooks, the owner of the vehicle, to exit the car and interviewed her in his patrol car. During the course of the interview, Officer Johnson believed Brooks was acting evasively, so he asked for her consent to search the vehicle. Brooks gave her consent to the search.

After Officer Johnson obtained consent to search the vehicle, but while he was still questioning Brooks in his patrol car, two backup police officers — Officer Michael Barrett and Corporal Shane Newbrough — arrived on the scene. While Officer Johnson was interviewing Brooks, Officer Barrett moved into a position where he could observe the remaining two occupants of the vehicle. Upon observing excessive movement in the rear of the vehicle, Officer Barrett asked Lawson to exit the vehicle. Officer Barrett then held Lawson, Brooks, and Woods in an area away from the vehicle while Officer Johnson and Corporal Newbrough performed a search of the vehicle.

When Officer Johnson and Corporal Newbrough searched the car, they noticed what appeared to be loose cigar tobacco outside the vehicle, which Corporal Newbrough described as being consistent with someone removing the tobacco from a cigar and replacing it with marijuana in order to make a "blunt." The officers also found a "little bit" of marijuana along the floorboard next to the passenger-side seat. In the rear of the car, the officers found one whole morphine tablet and three half tablets of morphine on the rear floorboard where Lawson had been sitting as well as an aluminum "Altoids" tin in the seat where Lawson had been. Lawson was then arrested and a female officer was called in to conduct a search of Woods and Brooks. Although the search of Woods and Brooks turned up nothing, Brooks later testified at trial that, at the time, she had a "blunt" hidden on her person that the officers did not find. At that point, the officers informed Woods and Brooks they were free to go and transported Lawson to the police department for booking.

At the police department, Officer Johnson conducted a more thorough search of Lawson's person and found additional morphine tablets in one of Lawson's shoes. Officer Johnson also found on Lawson's person two tablets of a different substance, which was identified at trial as a non-controlled prescription analgesic. It is unclear from the record where on Lawson the two tablets of the non-controlled substance were found and whether they were among the tablets found in Lawson's shoe. At trial, Officer Johnson testified that he found thirteen whole tablets and several half tablets in Lawson's shoe. It is unclear, however, whether that amount included the two tablets of the non-controlled substance, or whether the thirteen tablets and several half tablets in Lawson's shoe were all morphine. In any case, the officers found, in addition to the one morphine tablet and three half tablets on the vehicle floorboard, between eleven and thirteen morphine tablets and several half tablets of morphine on Lawson's person.

Lawson was charged pursuant to section 195.211 with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. At trial, Corporal Newbrough, an experienced narcotics officer, testified that someone who was abusing prescription drugs in tablet form would typically buy one to five tablets at a time and that "people who sold pills would typically have higher quantities on them." When asked about the significance of morphine tablets being cut in half, Corporal Newbrough testified: "if somebody is using a tableted morphine and maybe it's a little bit too strong for them, then maybe they'd cut them in half. They're either doing that, or they're selling them in halves; one of the two. In my opinion."

Lawson's motions for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's evidence and at the close of his evidence were denied and the jury found him guilty of possession with intent to distribute morphine. On appeal, Lawson argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all evidence, in accepting the jury's verdict, and in sentencing him, because the State put forth no evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Lawson intended to distribute the morphine in his possession.

Standard of Review

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313-17, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). No person may be deprived of liberty, "except upon evidence that is sufficient fairly to support a conclusion that every element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 313-14, 99 S.Ct. 2781.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court is limited to a determination of whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror might have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Mo. banc 1993). In making this determination, the appellate court does not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. State v. O'Brien, 857 S.W.2d 212, 215-16 (Mo. banc 1993). Instead, on review, this court accepts as true all of the evidence favorable to the State, including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence, and disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Grim, 854 S.W.2d at 405. The appellate court, however, "may `not supply missing evidence, or give the [State] the benefit of unreasonable, speculative or forced inferences.'" State. v. Whalen, 49 S.W.3d 181, 184 (Mo. banc 2001) (quoting Bauby v. Lake, 995 S.W.2d 10, 13 n. 1 (Mo.App. E.D.1999)).

Discussion

To convict Lawson of possession with intent to distribute, the State was required to show that Lawson (1) consciously and intentionally possessed a controlled substance, either actually or constructively; (2) was aware of the presence and nature of the substance; and (3) intended to distribute the substance. See State v. Sanderson, 169 S.W.3d 158, 164 (Mo.App. S.D.2005). The sole issue on appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence put forth at trial from which a reasonable juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Lawson intended to distribute the morphine he possessed.³

This case differs from other decisions reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in convictions for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, because most of those cases focus primarily on circumstances tending to suggest drug-dealing activity.⁴ In fact, Lawson points to the absence of evidence suggesting he was dealing in drugs to support his contention that his conviction lacked sufficient evidence. However, for sufficient evidence to exist in this case, the State was not required to show Lawson was dealing in drugs. Instead, the State had to present evidence showing Lawson had the intent merely to give or otherwise transfer the morphine to someone else. See State v. Salyer, 884 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Mo.App. S.D. 1994) ("The offense does not require a finding of intent to sell, or to engage in commerce in [the controlled substance]. All that need be shown is a purpose of sharing the cache with at least one other person."). Here, it is apparent that the prosecution's theory of the case at trial was that Lawson had the intent to distribute the morphine in his possession to Woods and Brooks.⁵

The State and Lawson disagree about whether the quantity of morphine tablets Lawson possessed supports a reasonable inference from which a juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Lawson intended to distribute the morphine. Many of the arguments made by both Lawson and the State in this regard center around this court...