State v. Lawton

• Decision Date: 25 October 1990
• Citation: 581 A.2d 793
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. John LAWTON, III.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 793

581 A.2d 793

STATE of Maine v. John LAWTON, III.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted on Briefs Oct. 2, 1990.

Decided Oct. 25, 1990.

Janet Mills, Dist. Atty., Kevin Regan, Asst. Dist. Atty., Auburn, for the State.

Anthony W. Ferguson, Fales & Fales, Lewiston, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, COLLINS and BRODY, JJ.

COLLINS, Justice.

John Lawton, III appeals from his conviction after a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Delahanty, J.) of operating a motor vehicle after having been declared a habitual offender (Class C), in violation of 29 M.R.S.A. § 2298 (Supp.1989). He contends that his motion to suppress the results of the traffic stop should have been granted, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the Superior Court's finding that written notice of habitual offender status had been mailed to him at the last-known address shown by the records maintained by the Secretary of State. Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

Sometime in December 1988, the Sabattus Police Department received an anonymous letter stating that Lawton was living in Sabattus at Garden Heights Apartments apartment 34; that his driver's license was under suspension; and that he was operating a motor vehicle. The letter described the vehicle, gave the owner's name, and described details of Lawton's schedule and driving routine.

The Sabattus Police Department verified, by checking with the Department of Motor Vehicles, that Lawton's license was under suspension. Thereafter, a police officer observed "a male subject fitting the description of Mr. Lawton" come out of the apartment on December 21 at about 11:00 or 11:15 at night, take something out of the glove compartment of the vehicle, and re-enter the apartment.

On January 8, 1989, the same officer saw the same vehicle pull into a convenience store, and saw the same individual get out of the vehicle, go into the store briefly, and then come back out, get into the car, and drive away. The officer stopped the car and asked for a driver's license, registration, and insurance card; the driver said that he did not have a license, and identified himself as John Lawton, III.

At trial, the prosecution introduced a certificate from the Secretary of State's office that stated that Lawton's license had been revoked indefinitely pursuant to 29 M.R.S.A. § 2293 because he had been declared a habitual offender. Attached to the certificate were copies of a letter and mailing envelope showing that notice of habitual offender status had been mailed to Lawton in December of 1987 at 27 Dumas Street, Lisbon Falls, but returned marked "Moved. Left No Address."

Lawton testified that he had never received notice of his habitual offender status. He also testified that he had last lived on Dumas Street in Lisbon Falls in June of 1986, and that in December of 1987 he was living at the Garden Heights Apartments in Sabattus. He gave his current address at the time of the trial as 518 Webber Avenue, Lewiston, and testified that he had also lived there after leaving Dumas Street, Lisbon Falls, in June 1986. Lawton introduced a copy of a traffic ticket dated November 27, 1986, for operating after suspension, on which his address was listed as 518 Webber Avenue, Lewiston. ¹

The Superior Court justice found beyond a reasonable doubt that Lawton was operating a motor vehicle on a public way while a habitual offender, and that the Secretary of State had mailed notice of habitual offender status to his last-known mailing address. Accordingly, he found Lawton guilty. Lawton now appeals.

II.

Lawton first contends that the results of his traffic stop should have been suppressed because the anonymous letter was insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and therefore the stop was an unreasonable seizure.

We examine the precedents of the United States Supreme Court to determine whether the traffic stop was an unreasonable seizure subject to the exclusionary rule applied to the States pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See State v. Hasenbank, 425 A.2d 1330, 1332 n. 2 (Me.1981).

The United States Supreme Court has recently considered this issue on facts quite similar to those of this case. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). In White, police received an anonymous telephone tip naming White, describing her vehicle, the building she was about to leave, and the route she was about to take,...