State v. Layne

• Decision Date: 28 May 1896
• Citation: 36 S.W. 390,96 Tenn. 668
• Parties: STATE v. LAYNE. SAME v. SPRIGGS.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

36 S.W. 390

96 Tenn. 668

STATE v. LAYNE.

SAME v. SPRIGGS.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

May 28, 1896

Appeal from circuit court, Obiou county; W. H. Swiggart, Judge.

Brandon Layne and Walter Spriggs were indicted separately for disturbing public worship, and, their plea of former conviction being sustained, were discharged. The state appeals. Reversed.

The Attorney General, for the State.

J. W Burney, for appellees.

CALDWELL J.

Brandon Layne was presented for disturbing public worship. He pleaded former conviction before a justice of the peace, under the small offense law. The district attorney moved to strike out the plea, and, upon his motion being disallowed, he admitted the truth of the facts pleaded. Upon that admission the circuit judge sustained the plea, and discharged the defendant. The state appealed in error.

In the year 1801 the legislature enacted a law declaring "that if any person shall interrupt a congregation assembled for the purpose of worshiping the Deity, such person shall be dealt with as a rioter at common law." Acts 1801, c. 35; 1 Scott's Laws, 721 Caruthers & Nicholson's St. 558. In 1815 it was made the duty of all justices of the peace, sheriffs, coroners, and constables to put forth prompt and active efforts for the apprehension and punishment of all persons who, "either by words or gestures, or in any other manner whatever," should violate that law, or any published rule for the government of the congregation, in the presence of such officials or of others giving them information thereof. Acts 1815, c. 60, §§ 1, 2; 2 Scott's Laws, 208, 209; Caruthers & Nicholson's St. 558; Hollingsworth v. State, 5 Sneed, 519. The aforesaid provisions of the two enactments of 1801 and 1815 were consolidated by the compilers and carried into the Code of 1858 in the following language: "All justices of the peace, sheriffs coroners, and constables are required to arrest immediately any person, in their knowledge or observation, disturbing a congregation assembled for public worship, or violating any rule or regulation adopted by such denomination for their own government, or the preservation of good order. Such person shall be fined by the justice before whom brought, not exceeding five dollars, or bound over for his appearance at court, to be proceeded against as a rioter, for the offense." Code, § 1511 (Mill. & V. Code, § 2010). At the same time the compilers introduced into the Code of 1858 another section in these words: "If any person wilfully disturb or disquiet any assemblage of persons met for religious worship, by noise, profane discourse, rude or indecent behavior, or any other act, at or near the place of worship, he shall be fined not less than twenty nor more than two hundred dollars, and may also be imprisoned not exceeding six months in the county jail." Code, § 4853 (Mill. & V Code,§ 5663). Confessedly, the presentment in this case was framed under the latter section. The charge is that the defendant "then and there unlawfully did disturb and disquiet a congregation or assembly of persons met together for religious worship by loud talking, profane swearing, quarreling, being drunk, and other rude and indecent conduct, at or near the place where said congregation or assembly of persons had met for religious worship." The principal provision of what is known as the "small offense law" is as follows: "Any person brought before a justice of the peace for a misdemeanor, may plead guilty, whereupon the justice shall hear the evidence, and fine the offender according to the aggravation of his offense, not less than two nor more than fifty dollars, together with all costs." Acts 1847-48, c. 55, § 1; Code, § 4994 (Mill. & V. Code, § 5819); Nicholson's St. Laws, 18, 19. A regular and proper conviction under this statute may be successfully pleaded by the defendant in bar of an indictment against him for the same offense. McGinnis v. State, 9 Humph. 43; State v. Chaffin, 2 Swan, 493; State v. Clenny, 1 Head, 270; Rose v. State, 9 Lea, 389. Great strictness, however, is to be observed in presenting the matter of former conviction. A party seeking the benefit of that defense must aver all facts essential to the validity of the former proceeding and conviction. He must aver that he was brought before a justice of the peace on the same charge, by regular process duly issued and served (Mill. & V. Code, § 5819; State v. Colvin, 11 Humph. 601; State v. Atkinson, 9 Humph. 677); that the justice heard the evidence (Mill. & V. Code, § 5819; State v. Spencer, 10 Humph. 431; State v. Colvin, supra); that he pleaded guilty, and was fined (Mill. & V. Code, § 5819); and the amount of the fine (State v. Atkinson, 9 Humph. 679). The plea filed by defendant in the present case is in good form, and contains all the essentials just enumerated. Nevertheless it is clearly bad, in that it discloses at least one fatal defect in the proceeding before the justice; that defect being shown by the statement in the plea that the justice fined the defendant only "four dollars." The plea, to be good, must not only aver that the defendant was fined, and the amount of the fine, but the amount of the fine must appear to be such as the justice was authorized to impose in the particular case. The reverse appears in the plea before us. The minimum fine authorized by the statute (Code, § 4853; Mill. & V. Code, § 5663), which the defendant confessed he had violated, and under which it seems he was arrested and tried, is $20; hence the judgment for a less sum was coram non judice and void. There was no authority whatever for the judgment actually rendered,...