State v. Layton

Decision Date25 March 2014
Docket NumberSCBD No. 6018.
Citation324 P.3d 1244
PartiesSTATE of Oklahoma ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION, Complainant, v. Jennifer Adina LAYTON, Respondent.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Bar Disciplinary Proceedings.

¶ 0 The complainant, Oklahoma Bar Association (Bar Association), charged the respondent, Jennifer Adina Layton (respondent/Layton), with one count of professional misconduct associated with her prosecution of three men in a rape trial. The Bar Association alleged that the respondent: 1) neglected to disclose to the court and opposing counsel that her witness was going to testify inconsistently with his previous police statement; and 2) falsely denied that she had spoken to the witness before and/or during the trial The Bar Association sought the “appropriate” imposition of discipline and the payment of costs. After the Professional Responsibility Tribunal (PRT) recommended a public censure, the Bar Association argued that “some length” of suspension is more appropriate. The respondent argues that she should not be disciplined because: 1) the circumstances surrounding the alleged events involved a miscommunication/misunderstanding with the trial judge; and 2) if she violated any rules, because it was an inadvertent mistake, she did not do so with any intent or for any ulterior motive. Upon de novo review,1 we agree with the respondent. The cumulative circumstances show that trial court failed to create a transcribed record of bench conferences and chamber conferences in this serious first degree rape trial. That, coupled with the complaining defense attorney's in-court behavior, and the contemporaneous testimony of the respondent, reflect the nature of the proceedings. Under the facts presented, the respondent's violation does not require the imposition of discipline. The bar disciplinary proceeding is dismissed. The respondent is exonerated of the charges, and the application to assess costs is denied.

BAR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS DISMISSED; RESPONDENT EXONERATED; APPLICATION FOR COSTS DENIED.

Gina Lynn Hendryx, Katherine M. Ogden, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Oklahoma Bar Association.

John Northcutt, John Wesley Raley, Ponca City, Oklahoma, for Respondent.

KAUGER, J.

¶ 1 The Bar Association alleged that Jennifer Layton (respondent): 1) neglected to disclose to the court and opposing counsel that her witness was going to testify inconsistently with his previous police statement; and 2) falsely denied that she had spoken to the witness before and/or during the trial. It contends that her conduct violated Rules 3.3 [falsifying evidence/foiling to disclose evidence to tribunal],2 3.8[special responsibilities of a prosecutor],3 and 8.4 4 [professional misconduct] of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S.2011 Ch.1, App. 3–A, and Rule 1.3 [discredit to the profession] 5 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings 5 O.S.2011 Ch. 1, App. 1–A. The Bar Association seeks “some length” of suspension. The respondent argues that she should not be disciplined given the circumstances surrounding the alleged events, the miscommunication/misunderstanding with the trial judge, and her lack of intent or any ulterior motives in making an inadvertent mistake.

¶ 2 We determine that the cumulative circumstances show that trial court's failure to create a transcribed record of bench conferences and chamber conferences in this serious first degree rape trial, coupled with the complaining defense attorney's in-court behavior, and the contemporaneous testimony of the respondent, reflect the nature of the proceedings. Under the facts presented, the respondent's violation of the rules does not require the imposition of discipline. The bar disciplinary proceeding is dismissed, the respondent is exonerated of the charges, and the application to assess costs is denied.

FACTS

¶ 3 The Bar Association's grievance against the respondent stems from a felony criminal rape trial held May 23–24, 2012, in Kay County district court. The respondent served as the prosecutor. Three different lawyers represented the three men who were on trial in consolidated cases for conspiracy, first degree rape, first degree rape by instrumentation, forcible sodomy and kidnaping.

¶ 4 Antral Miller was a witness for the prosecution. In a police report which was provided to defense counsel,6 Miller stated that at approximately 4 or 5 a.m. on the morning of the alleged rape, the victim came to his house, let herself in through the unlocked back door, and awakened him. She was crying and she told him that she had been raped at a nearby house. Milter stated that she did not tell me who raped her. She did not tell me who had done it.” Miller was friends with the defendants and also happened to be a cousin of one of the defendants. The victim had always maintained that she knew that the three defendants had raped her and that she told this to Miller. Identity of the defendants was not an issue in the case, nor a surprise. Respondent had stated to the defense that Miller would testify consistent with reports previously provided to them.

¶ 5 Neither the respondent nor any of the defense counsel had an opportunity to discuss the case with Miller before the first day of trial Miller actively avoided subpoenas and was not a cooperating witness on anyone's behalf Even though the State unsuccessfully attempted to contact Miller on several occasions, he was only served in time to show up on the morning of the first day of trial The respondent saw Miller in the witness room where he told her that he did not want to be there and that he needed to leave because of his job. She informed him that he would not be needed that day, but that he had better show up the next day because he was still under subpoena.

¶ 6 The next day, Miller again reluctantly appeared at the trial to testify. Layton talked to Miller for about 90 seconds before she went into the courtroom while he was on the phone with his boss explaining his absence from work. Later that day, during a lunch break, Layton spoke with Miller for about 30 seconds, asking him about other people who were at the party. In one of these conversations, Layton admits that when she was walking away she heard Miller mumble something like “I can't believe Cuz, Kat and Soul raped her,” but she did not think anything about it because the identity of the alleged attackers was not an issue in the case. The respondent did not disclose to any defense counsel that she had talked to Miller at all before he testified. 7 When Miller did take the stand, after the lunch break, he testified that the victim told him they raped me. Your cousin, Kerry and Kat raped me.” Miller firmer explained that these were the nicknames of the defendants.

¶ 7 Miller's statements came as a surprise to defense counsel because they were inconsistent with his prior police report wherein he stated that the victim did not tell him the names of her alleged attackers. Accordingly, all three defense counsel objected on the grounds that Miller's testimony had not been disclosed to them prior to trial.8 They, along with the judge, and the respondent, discussed the matter at the bench.

¶ 8 Even though this was a serious felony criminal trial, the trial judge, apparently continuing his usual practice, chose not to include bench conferences on the official record.9 Consequently, there is no transcript of the conversation which occurred between the judge and lawyers. Later in the day, after the jury was excused, the trial judge went on the record and restated what happened during the conversation at the bench. He stated that the statement at the bench was made “to be fair to the State, was that the State had not met with this witness prior to trial” and that the “State did not anticipate that he would testify in the manner he testified today.”

¶ 9 The trial judge also found no lack of compliance of discovery on the State's part. According to the defense counsel, when the judge asked Layton if she had “spoken” to Miller before trial, she said that she had not “spoken” to him about his testimony prior to trial Consequently, the judge overruled the defense counsel's objections. The trial judge did allow the lawyers to add their own comments of “their own recollection of the bench conferences” if he were incorrect.

¶ 10 Layton continued direct examination of Miller, asking Miller to describe what happened on the night of the rape. She also asked if a man nicknamed June Bug had anything in his hand. Miller responded that June Bug was very intoxicated and was carrying a bottle of tequila. This line of questioning drew another objection which was overruled because Layton again denied speaking with Miller prior to trial.

¶ 11 On cross examination, Miller testified that he had not talked with anyone in the District Attorney's office about his testimony and that he “just came yesterday for court, and today.” Layton did not correct this inaccurate technicality, nor did she do so at the end of the day's court proceedings when the judge was summarizing the objections for the record. Rather, she allowed the court to believe that she had never discussed anything with Miller at all, when in fact she had “spoken” to him very briefly while she prepared to start the trial and during the chaos which was occurring with the arrival of the victim, witnesses, and the victim's family members.

¶ 12 One of the defense counsel expressed concern that Layton could not have possibly known to ask Miller about what someone had in their hand unless she had spoken with him prior to his testimony. The judge instructed all counsel to convene in his chambers first thing the next morning. What happened in the judge's chambers was again not recorded or transcribed, leaving this Court with little to review. By everyone's account it was tense, confrontational, but, and emotional. Apparently the judge yelled at Layton, asking if she had “spoken” to Miller prior to trial? Her testimony was that rather...

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