State v. Leak

• Decision Date: 20 January 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2014–1273.,2014–1273.
• Citation: 2016 Ohio 154,145 Ohio St.3d 165,47 N.E.3d 821
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. LEAK, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

145 Ohio St.3d 165

47 N.E.3d 821

2016 Ohio 154

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee,

v.LEAK, Appellant.

No. 2014–1273.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Sept. 16, 2015.

Decided Jan. 20, 2016.

Bambi Couch–Page, Richland County Prosecuting Attorney, and Clifford Murphy and John C. Nieft, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Craig M. Jaquith and Eric M. Hedrick, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant.

O'NEILL, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Quayshaun Leak, was arrested on a warrant following a domestic-violence incident. Immediately prior to his arrest, he was a passenger in a car legally parked on a public street. In this case, we are asked to determine whether the warrantless inventory search of a lawfully parked vehicle violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. We conclude that in this case, it does.

{¶ 2} The state urges us to adopt a rule of law stating that the arrest of a recent occupant of a legally parked vehicle establishes an exception to the prohibition of unreasonable searches. We decline to do so. The arrest of a recent occupant of a legally parked vehicle does not, by itself, establish reasonableness to justify a warrantless search of the vehicle the arrestee had been riding in. Accordingly, we reverse the Fifth District's affirmance of the trial court's denial of Leak's motion to suppress evidence of the gun that was found in the unlawful search of the car in which Leak had been a passenger, and we vacate his convictions and sentence for carrying a concealed weapon and for improper handling of a firearm.

I. Case Background

{¶ 3} This case comes to us on review of a motion to suppress evidence of the gun that was found in a search of the legally parked car that Leak was sitting in just prior to his arrest on a warrant for domestic violence. On August 8, 2012, the Richland County Sheriff's Office issued an arrest warrant for Leak based on a charge of domestic violence. In order to assist the county in locating Leak, an officer from the Mansfield Police Department was dispatched to the area where Leak's apartment was located.

{¶ 4} The officer had a description of the car that Leak was reported to be in, a description of Leak, and his alleged location. The police officer did not have a copy of the warrant. He did not know when or where the alleged domestic violence had occurred. He did not know whether the domestic-violence charge was a misdemeanor or felony charge.

{¶ 5} Near Leak's apartment, the officer came upon a car parked behind another car "in an attempt to conceal itself behind that vehicle in the cul-de-sac." Leak was in the passenger seat of the parked car. The officer made contact with Leak, ordered him out of the car, arrested him, and placed him in the back of his patrol car.

{¶ 6} After Leak was arrested, the officer checked the Law Enforcement Automated Data System and found that the person who was in the driver's seat of the car did not have any outstanding warrants. The officer nevertheless went back to the car, got the driver and the other passenger out of the car, called to request a tow of the car, and conducted an inventory search of the car. During this search, the officer found a handgun under the passenger seat of the car. Leak admitted to the officer that the handgun was his and stated that he had it to protect himself.

{¶ 7} Leak filed a motion to suppress evidence of the gun that was found in the car following his arrest, asserting that the search of the car violated his Fourth Amendment rights. At the suppression hearing, the arresting officer testified that although he was not certain who owned the car, the only reason he had the car towed was because he believed that Leak owned it. He testified that despite the fact that the person in the driver's seat had no warrants, the officer still had authority to tow the car based on his belief that the owner had been arrested. He further testified that standard procedure is that once a tow truck is called, an inventory search is conducted and a notation is made of all items that are of value or that could be stolen. The officer testified that in this case, he was looking for evidence of a crime in the car because he did not know where the domestic violence had happened.

{¶ 8} The trial court denied Leak's motion to suppress. The court found that there was probable cause to arrest Leak based on the domestic-violence warrant and that pursuant to that arrest, the inventory search of the car prior to towing was proper.

{¶ 9} On June 12, 2013, Leak entered a plea of no contest to the charges of carrying a concealed weapon and improper handling of a firearm. The trial court sentenced Leak to one year on each of the charges, to be served consecutively, and suspended the sentence. The court put Leak on community control for 30 months and imposed a $1,500 fine.

{¶ 10} On appeal, the Fifth District upheld the validity of the impoundment and search and the denial of the motion to suppress. The court observed that Leak had been identified with the car and, despite the arresting officer's uncertainty of the vehicle's ownership, that the record establishes that at the time of the arrest, the arresting officer believed that Leak owned the car. The court held that the officer's subjective belief in Leak's ownership of the car was sufficient to justify the officer's decision to impound the car, which was done in accordance with department policy. 2014-Ohio-2492, 2014 WL 2592788, ¶ 16–18.¹

{¶ 11} Leak appealed to this court, asserting that the mere arrest of an occupant of a lawfully parked vehicle should not automatically trigger police impoundment of that vehicle and that a warrantless inventory search conducted in such a scenario violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. We agree.

II. Analysis

Standard of Appellate Review on a Motion to Suppress

{¶ 12} "Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. In ruling on a motion to suppress, "the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses." Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992). On appeal, we "must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence." Id., citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accepting those facts as true, we must then "independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard." Id.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution

{¶ 13} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution contains almost identical language, and we have interpreted it as affording at least the same protection as the Fourth Amendment. State v. Hoffman, 141 Ohio St.3d 428, 2014-Ohio-4795, 25 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 11, citing State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 238–239, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997).

{¶ 14} "The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). " ‘[W]hether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.’ " (Brackets sic.) South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). "Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances." Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996).

{¶ 15} Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, subject to only a few specific exceptions.

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Two such exceptions are a search incident to a lawful arrest and an inventory search conducted pursuant to law enforcement's community-caretaking function. Here we will determine whether either of these two exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement justifies the search of the car that Leak was sitting in prior to his arrest on a warrant for domestic violence.

Search Incident to Lawful Arrest

{¶ 16} The first exception we will examine is a search incident to a lawful arrest. This exception has two rationales: officer safety and "safeguarding evidence that the arrestee might conceal or destroy." State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 182, citing Gant at 338–339, 129 S.Ct. 1710. It is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a law-enforcement officer to search a vehicle without a warrant when a recent occupant of the vehicle has been arrested and (1) the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the vehicle or (2) it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense that led to the arrest. Gant at 343, 129 S.Ct. 1710.

{¶ 17} Here, there is no question that Leak was arrested, secured, and not within reaching distance of the car prior to the search of the car. The question then becomes whether it was reasonable to believe that the car...