State v. LeCompte, 67060

• Decision Date: 22 December 1982
• Docket Number: No. 67060,67060
• Citation: 327 N.W.2d 221
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Gary Clinton LeCOMPTE, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 221

327 N.W.2d 221

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Gary Clinton LeCOMPTE, Appellant.

No. 67060.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 22, 1982.

Francis C. Hoyt, Jr., Appellate Defender, and Christian T. Odell, Asst. Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Shirley Ann Steffe, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and UHLENHOPP, McCORMICK, LARSON, and SCHULTZ, JJ.

LARSON, Justice.

Defendant Gary Clinton LeCompte appeals from his jury conviction of murder in the first degree, Iowa Code section 707.2 (1981), kidnapping in the first degree, section 710.2, and theft in the second degree, section 714.2. His principal defense at trial was that of compulsion. On appeal, he asserts (1) that the trial court's instruction on compulsion was in error as it was incomplete and misleading and (2) that the trial court erred in excluding post-arrest threats made against him by a co-defendant. We affirm.

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, showed the following. The defendant, along with four companions, went to the victim's apartment, in accordance with a robbery plan devised by them the previous day. The victim was fatally stabbed and beaten. A friend of the victim was shoved down on a bed and held there at knife point by the defendant. The defendant also held a knife at the throat of the victim. After the robbery, the defendant was told to bring a car, belonging to the friend of the victim, to the side of the building. The defendant complied, and the friend of the victim was taken hostage. The five proceeded, with the defendant driving, to Palisades State Park near Cedar Rapids. There, the hostage was tied to a tree, beaten and eventually abandoned. The defendant claimed he participated in the crime only out of fear of his companions.

I. Compulsion Instruction.

At the close of the evidence, the trial court presented the proposed instructions to be given to the jury. Included among them was the instruction on the defense of compulsion. The instruction read as follows:

Instruction No. 46

With regard to any element of intent as herein instructed, the defendant Gary Clinton LeCompte claims that at the time and place in question, he was acting under compulsion.

When a person is compelled to act by another's threat or menace of serious injury, and reasonably believes that such injury is imminent and can be averted only by their doing of the act, then no public offense has been committed, unless such person claiming compulsion intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury to another.

Counsel for the defendant objected to the instruction:

MR. BUZZELL: Defendant LeCompte objects to Instruction No. 46 in the inclusion after the last--"unless such person claiming compulsion intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury to another." The basic objection is that the offense of compulsion is not negated by the happening of physical injury, that the terms of compulsion merely places responsibility upon a defendant for any physical injury that he causes and does not negate the compulsion defense as to any of the other charges charged in the information.

(Emphasis added.) The objection was overruled.

In his brief, the defendant addresses a number of issues which are beyond the scope of his objection. He argues that the compulsion instruction was misleading and prejudicial because it was "automatically nullified" by the court's instruction defining aiding and abetting and its instruction defining intent. The defendant also submits that (1) the term "voluntary" defined in the court's instruction on intent allowed the jury to conclude that the term pertained to the defendant's voluntary bodily movements during the offense, and not his desire to participate in it; and (2) the aiding and abetting instruction required only that the jury find defendant's actions, although coerced, were knowingly done.

Objections or exceptions to instructions must be specific so as to alert the trial court to any alleged error to be corrected. State v. Aldape, 307 N.W.2d 32, 39 (Iowa 1981); State v. Rouse, 290 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Iowa 1980); State v. Williams, 256 N.W.2d 207, 209 (Iowa 1977). Moreover, if the defendant makes an objection to an instruction at trial court, he is bound by that objection on appeal. Rouse, 290 N.W.2d at 915 (Iowa R.Civ.P. 196, requiring timely preservation of error as to instructions, applicable to all criminal cases); State v. Fisher, 279 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Iowa 1979); Williams, 256 N.W.2d at 209. In addition, a defendant cannot amplify or change the objection on appeal. State v. Overstreet, 243 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Iowa 1976).

The defendant's objection to the instruction did not preserve the other grounds urged in his brief and the only issue for review regarding the instruction is, as the defense counsel stated: whether "the defense of compulsion is not negated by the happening of physical injury ...."

Iowa Code section 704.10 provides the defense of compulsion:

No act, other than an act by which one intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury to another, is a public offense if the person so acting is compelled to do so by another's threat or menace of serious injury, provided that the person reasonably believes that such injury is imminent and can be averted only by his or her doing such act.

The defendant argues that the language of section 704.10 "does not facially exclude" the defense of compulsion in a homicide case. We do not agree; while the statute makes the defense inapplicable where there has been a "physical injury" to the victim, it would clearly apply as well if the victim dies.

The defendant also argues that the...