State v. Lee

• Decision Date: 03 March 1910
• Parties: STATE v. LEE.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

67 S.E. 141

85 S.C. 101

STATE v. LEE.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 3, 1910

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Oconee County; J. W De Vore, Judge.

E. B Lee was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals. Affirmed.

E. L Herndon, for appellant. Proctor A. Bonham, for the State.

JONES C.J.

The defendant was charged with the murder of Miles Smith, in Oconee county, on March 10, 1907, and was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced.

The first ground of appeal assigns error in permitting the solicitor on the examination of G. S. Massey, a witness for the state, to show that he was the putative father of the defendant. It is objected that it was not competent for the state to thus discredit its own witness. The general rule is that a party is not allowed to impeach the credibility of his own witness, either by testimony as to his general character or by showing that he made statements inconsistent with his testimony on the trial. Perry v. Massey, 1 Bailey, 32; Farr v. Thompson, Cheves, 44; Bauskett v. Keitt, 22 S.C. 187-189; State v. Johnson, 43 S.C. 126, 20 S.E. 988. The testimony admitted in this case, however, does not fall within the terms or reason of the rule. It merely shows the relation between the witness and the defendant. State v. Petsch, 43 S.C. 149, 20 S.E. 993; State v. Stukes, 73 S.C. 391, 53 S.E. 643.

The next exception is to the following charge: "If two persons are hunting for each other with a deliberate, willful, and malicious purpose of inflicting serious bodily harm upon each other, or of taking the life of eath other, if they start out with that purpose, each one hunting for the other, and they come in contact with each other and get in a difficulty, and that was their intention when they started out, and one is killed by the other, I charge you under those circumstances that the party who did the killing will be guilty of murder. If two parties start out hunting for each other, with the expectation of getting into a difficulty, and they come together and get into a difficulty, not with deliberation, not with malice aforethought, but if they get into a difficulty suddenly upon sudden heat and passion, one being as much at fault as the other, and one kills the other, I charge you that would be a case of manslaughter. The difference being, the law would say there was no malice in the latter illustration I have given to you, and that would reduce the killing from murder to manslaughter." The objection to the charge is that there was no evidence tending to show that defendant was at any time seeking the deceased for the purpose of doing him any injury, and that the charge was inapplicable and prejudicial. The record shows there was some evidence to render the charge applicable as to manslaughter. The verdict being for manslaughter, which negatives malice, it is unnecessary to inquire whether there was any testimony tending to show that defendant was seeking the deceased to injure him.

The third exception assigns error in refusing to charge the defendant's seventh request as follows: "Fault in bringing on a difficulty so as to deprive one of the right of self-defense must be a fault at the time of the fatal encounter, and not a fault at some previous time." The court refused to charge in that language. The instruction requested was inaccurate and misleading in restricting the "fault in bringing on the difficulty" to the precise time of the fatal encounter and in excluding from consideration fault, which, although not occurring at the precise time of the difficulty, but previously, may have been so closely connected with the difficulty in time and circumstances as to be fairly regarded as operating to bring it on. The evidence tended to show that there was bad blood between the parties; that the deceased believed that defendant had reported him to the revenue officers as running a still, and with having cut a pine bush as a pointer, and deceased had expressed his belief to others in hostile and threatening language; that the defendant was greatly angered by the charge that he was a reporter, denounced it as false and threatened to kill the deceased. There was some testimony that about two hours before the homicide defendant went to the house of the deceased and raised a fuss with him, and was prevented from shooting him by a companion, and that, as he went off, threatened to come back and kill deceased before sundown, and, after going off a short distance, shot off his pistol twice in the direction of the deceased. There was evidence tending...