State v. Lee, 56479

Decision Date16 October 1974
Docket NumberNo. 56479,56479
Citation222 N.W.2d 471
CourtIowa Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. John Henry LEE, Appellant.

Swift, Brown & Winick and Gary S. Gill, Des Moines, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Fred M. Haskins, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ray A. Fenton, Co. Atty., for appellee.

Heard before MOORE, C.J., and REES, UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, and McCORMICK, JJ.

UHLENHOPP, Justice.

This criminal appeal involves defendant John Henry Lee's motion to dismiss, predicated on the ground that the State failed to charge him in time.

On January 29, 1973, acting pursuant to a search warrant, Des Moines police officers searched defendant and found 48 packets of heroin in his pockets. They also found drugs and a plastic spoon in his sock and still more drugs on a shelf in his room.

The next day the officers filed a preliminary information charging defendant with possession of heroin with intent to deliver and took him before a magistrate, a judge of the Des Moines Municipal Court. As defendant's attorney, the magistrate appointed Mr. Gary S. Gill, who was informed of the appointment within a few days. The magistrate set bail and ordered a hearing for February 7, 1973. Defendant did not post bail and remained in jail throughout the case.

The record shows that several continuances were granted but a preliminary hearing was never held or waived, nor did defendant or Mr. Gill ask for such a hearing or demand speedy trial. No order was made holding defendant to answer to the grand jury. Mr. Gill did not request permission from the magistrate to withdraw as defendant's attorney or file a withdrawal.

On March 23, 1973, the Polk County Attorney filed his information in district court, charging defendant with the offense set forth in the preliminary information. Defendant appeared with Mr. Gill before Judge Missildine in district court, where defendant said he was charged in his right name, waived formal arraignment, stated he had no funds, and requested the court to appoint counsel at public expense. The court took the request under advisement. Defendant did not make a demand in district court for speedy trial.

The court subsequently set trial for May 21, 1973, which was 59 days after the county attorney filed his information. On that date, the assistant county attorney asked for a continuance. Mr. Gill did not agree to or resist the motion but stated that he had to be appointed by the district court as defendant's attorney. The court ordered that the trial commence two days later, May 23, 1973, which it did.

On May 23 Mr. Gill was again appointed defendant's attorney. Before trial actually began, Mr. Gill presented to the court a written motion to dismiss which is the foundation of this appeal. The motion itself and defendant's arguments in support of it both before trial and at the conclusion of the evidence disclose that it is based on two grounds: (1) the county attorney's information was not timely filed and (2) the offense could be charged only by indictment. Defendant does not now argue the second ground. The first ground itself has two bases: the county attorney's information was filed too late under the Iowa statute and under the Iowa and United States Constitutions.

The trial court overruled the motion, the parties selected a jury, and the State presented its case. Defendant did not introduce any evidence. The jury found defendant guilty, the trial court sentenced him, and he appealed.

In this court, defendant relies on the first ground of his motion to dismiss presented before the trial court, but he enlarges on that ground. He now contends that the trial court should have sustained the motion to dismiss because (1) he was not timely informed against by the county attorney and (2) he was not timely tried.

I. Timely County Attorney's Information. Pursuant to the motion, defendant contends that the county attorney's information was filed too late under (a) § 795.1 of the Code and (b) the speedy trial guaranties of the Iowa and United States Constitutions.

(a) Section 795.1 is inapplicable because defendant was not 'held to answer' after a preliminary hearing or waiver thereof. State v. Sowle, 218 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa); State v. Morningstar, 207 N.W.2d 772 (Iowa); State v. Mays, 204 N.W.2d 862...

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11 cases
  • State v. Brandt
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • April 20, 1977
    ...the four-factor balancing test announced in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, is involved. State v. Lee, 222 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Iowa 1974); Boyle v. Critelli, 230 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Iowa 1975). In Barker the Court held that a balancing test should be applied to each ......
  • State v. Williams
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • May 25, 2017
    ...804.21, .22. This procedure is a vital part of the arrest because it gives the arrested person the most protection. See State v. Lee , 222 N.W.2d 471, 473–74 (Iowa 1974). Once the arrested person is before the magistrate, the arrest process is complete, the person is no longer under the con......
  • State v. Iverson, 61638
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • November 22, 1978
    ...arrest and the filing of the county attorney's information did not deny him his Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial. State v. Lee, 222 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Iowa 1974). None of the grounds relied on by the trial court in sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss is supported by the facts or law......
  • State v. Proulx
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • April 20, 1977
    ...N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1973); State v. Morningstar, 207 N.W.2d 772 (Iowa 1973); State v. Sowle, 218 N.W.2d 573, 574 (Iowa 1974); State v. Lee, 222 N.W.2d 471 (Iowa 1974); State v. Thomas, 222 N.W.2d 488 (Iowa 1974); State v. Lyles, 225 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1975); State v. Emery, 230 N.W.2d 521 (Iowa ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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