State v. Lee
Decision Date | 23 April 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 81,81 |
Citation | 821 A.2d 922,374 Md. 275 |
Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Kai Ruchell LEE. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Rachel Marblestone Kamins. Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
Geraldine K. Sweeney, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, JJ.
The sole issue, which the State of Maryland, the petitioner, raises in this Court is whether evidence seized pursuant to a warrant, executed without knocking and announcing the police presence prior to forcing the door to the premises, is admissible pursuant to the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. The Circuit Court for Harford County denied the motion to suppress, filed by the respondent, Kai Ruchell Lee, ruling that the possibility of the destruction of the cocaine recovered was an exigent circumstance that justified the unannounced entry. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. Lee v. State, 139 Md.App. 79, 774 A.2d 1183 (2001). It held that the failure to knock and announce, without justification, rendered the entry, albeit with a valid warrant, unreasonable and requires exclusion of the evidence seized. Id. at 94, 774 A.2d at 1192. Application of the doctrine of inevitable discovery under the circumstances of this case, the intermediate appellate court concluded in response to the State's motion for reconsideration, "would render the knock-and-announce provision of the Fourth Amendment meaningless." Id. We granted the writ of certiorari at the petitioner's request and, for the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgment of the intermediate appellate court.
During the month of August, 1998, the respondent made two separate sales of cocaine to a confidential informant, acting at the direction of the Baltimore County Police. After subsequent police surveillance, a warrant to search the respondent's home in Harford County was obtained from a District Court judge. The warrant did not contain a "no-knock clause;" authorizing entry, even by force, without first knocking and announcing police presence.1
The Court of Special Appeals described the search as follows:
Lee, 139 Md.App. at 81-82, 774 A.2d at 1185. Seized in the search were a clear plastic bag containing 26 grams of cocaine2; four smaller baggies containing a total of 6.6 grams of cocaine; $1,369 dollars in U.S. currency; a rental agreement; and a 1986 white Chevy Astro Van. The respondent, who acknowledged that the cocaine seized was his, was arrested and charged with possession with the intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance.
Before trial, the respondent moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search. He asserted that the search was invalid because the task force, lacking a reasonable suspicion to believe exigent circumstances existed to permit its doing so, failed to knock and announce its presence before entering his home. The motion was denied by the Circuit Court for Harford County. The court reasoned:
The respondent noted an appeal of that judgment to the Court of Special Appeals, which, as we have seen, reversed. The intermediate appellate court held that the failure of the police to knock and announce their presence prior to entering the respondent's residence was not justified by exigent circumstances:
Lee, at 89-90, 774 A.2d at 1189-90.
The State filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the court to address whether exclusion of the evidence was required in view of the inevitable discovery doctrine, arguing that, in any event, it would have been discovered inevitably pursuant to the validly issued search warrant. Although the Court of Special Appeals granted the motion for reconsideration, it rejected the inevitable discovery argument. That exception should not be applied in the case sub judice, the intermediate appellate court opined, because:
We granted the State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, State v. Lee, 366 Md. 246, 783 A.2d 221 (2001), to address this case of first impression. In its petition, the State did not challenge the determination by the intermediate appellate court that there were no exigent circumstances at the time of the unannounced entry. Thus, we will address only whether the doctrine of inevitable discovery applies under the facts of this case. Stated differently, all we shall decide is the correctness of the Court of Special Appeals' holding that the evidence seized should have been suppressed.
It is well settled in Maryland, and long has been so, that a police officer executing a search warrant "must give proper notice of his purpose and authority and be denied admittance before he can use force to break and enter" the premises to be searched. Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 521-22, 204 A.2d 516, 518-19 (1964); Goodman v. State, 178 Md. 1, 8, 11 A.2d 635, 639 (1940) (); Frankel v. State, 178 Md. 553, 561, 16 A.2d 93, 97 (1940) (...
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