State v. Leeson

• Decision Date: 18 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-764.,02-764.
• Citation: 2003 MT 354,82 P.3d 16,319 Mont. 1
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Nathaniel F. LEESON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

82 P.3d 16
2003 MT 354
319 Mont. 1

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Nathaniel F. LEESON, Defendant and Appellant

No. 02-764.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs May 29, 2003.

Decided December 18, 2003.

82 P.3d 17

For Appellant: Sunday Z. Rossberg, Rossberg Law Office LLC, Great Falls, Montana

For Respondent: Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Pamela P. Collins, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Brant Light, Cascade County Attorney; Susan Weber, Chief Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana.

Justice JIM REGNIER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Appellant Nathaniel Leeson (Leeson) was charged in Montana's Eighth Judicial District Court with operation of an unlawful clandestine laboratory in violation of § 45-9-132, MCA (2001). He filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing § 45-9-132, MCA (2001), is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The District Court denied the motion. Leeson appeals. We affirm the District Court.

¶ 2 We address the following issues on appeal:

¶ 3 1. Did the District Court err in finding that § 45-9-132, MCA (2001), is not unconstitutionally vague on its face?

¶ 4 2. Is § 45-9-132, MCA (2001), unconstitutionally overbroad?

BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Nathaniel Leeson was charged by Information for violating § 45-9-132, MCA (2001), which is entitled "Operation of unlawful clandestine laboratory penalties." The affidavit filed in support of the Information alleges that a van occupied by Leeson contained numerous items that could be used to operate an unlawful clandestine laboratory, including 27 pseudoephedrine boxes, two cans of acetone, Rooto drain cleaner, iodized salt, two plastic coolers smelling of ammonia, a plastic baggie of white powder, plastic tubing attached to a plastic bottle top and two funnels, a scale with white powder on it, rubber gloves, two syringes, and a fire extinguisher, among other items. The affidavit also states that detectives received information that Leeson had been purchasing large amounts of pseudoephedrine pills and references previous encounters law enforcement had with Leeson involving the manufacture of methamphetamine.

¶ 6 Leeson filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that § 45-9-132, MCA (2001), is vague and overbroad in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution. The District Court denied the motion. Leeson later pled guilty to the charges, but through an Order Nunc Pro Tunc preserved his right to appeal § 45-9-132, MCA (2001), as being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7 "The denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is a conclusion of law which we review to determine whether it was correct." State v. Dixon, 2000 MT 82, ¶ 10, 299 Mont. 165, ¶ 10, 998 P.2d 544, ¶ 10. "Our review of questions involving constitutional law is plenary. A district court's resolution of an issue involving a question of constitutional law is a conclusion of law which we review to determine whether the conclusion is correct." State v. Bedwell, 1999 MT 206, ¶ 4, 295 Mont. 476, ¶ 4, 985 P.2d 150, ¶ 4 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

ISSUE ONE

¶ 8 Did the District Court err in finding that § 45-9-132, MCA (2001), is not unconstitutionally vague on its face?

¶ 9 The State argues that Leeson does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 45-9-132, MCA (2001). Without regard

82 P.3d 18

to whether Leeson has standing, his argument fails on the merits

¶ 10 "It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." City of Whitefish v. O'Shaughnessy (1985), 216 Mont. 433, 440, 704 P.2d 1021, 1025. This Court has explained that vague laws offend several important values:

First, we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, and we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the

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