State v. Legnosky
Decision Date | 19 February 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 2D09-2169.,2D09-2169. |
Citation | 27 So.3d 794 |
Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Ian James LEGNOSKY, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Allyn M. Giambalvo, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee.
The State appeals the trial court's order granting Ian James Legnosky's motion to suppress, which resulted in the dismissal of all charges against him. We reverse.
The facts are essentially undisputed. On December 16, 2008, Deputy Mark Darst was attempting to serve a Marchman Act1 court order on Shannon Coteral. Upon receiving information that Coteral was in Legnosky's apartment, Deputy Darst visited the apartment. An individual who identified himself as Jason Gonzalez answered the door. Upon being told the reason for Deputy Darst's visit, Gonzalez indicated that Coteral was not in the apartment and invited the deputy into the apartment to look around. Gonzalez indicated that a woman had been in the apartment earlier. Thereafter, Legnosky came out from a bedroom. Recognizing Legnosky as Coteral's boyfriend, Deputy Darst told him that he was looking for Coteral. Legnosky responded, However, because Gonzalez had indicated that a woman had been in the apartment earlier, Deputy Darst did not believe Legnosky's statements and checked the bedroom from which Legnosky had just come. The deputy found Coteral hiding in the closet of that bedroom and arrested Legnosky for "lying" to him—obstructing him without violence based upon "lies" which hindered his investigation and ability to take Coteral for evaluation. Coteral intervened, acknowledging, "Please don't [arrest Legnosky], he was just trying to protect me." Upon Legnosky's arrest, the police found in his pocket Oxycodone, Oxycontin or its equivalent, as well as Xanax.
Legnosky was charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance and one count of obstructing or opposing an officer without violence. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Legnosky argued that words alone, unaccompanied by any physical conduct preventing the officer from searching—i.e., merely lying about Coteral's whereabouts when he knew she was hiding in the closet—could not constitute obstruction as a matter of law. The trial court agreed and granted Legnosky's motion to suppress, reasoning that Legnosky's "lies" did not ultimately hinder the police officer because he still searched and found Coteral almost immediately despite Legnosky's "lies." We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that this scenario could not constitute obstruction without violence as a matter of law.
Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Busciglio, 976 So.2d 15, 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). The appellate court will presume that the trial court's findings of fact are correct and will reverse those findings only if they are not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Cuervo v. State, 967 So.2d 155, 160 (Fla. 2007). However, application of the law to the historical facts is reviewed de novo. Id.
There is no evidence that Legnosky engaged in any physical conduct impeding the deputy's duties. The issue here is whether Legnosky's false statements to Deputy Darst that Coteral was not in the apartment, that he had not seen her in days, and that she had already been served and had been taken to a rehab center constituted obstruction sufficient to support arrest. Section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2008), provides:
Resisting officer without violence to his or her person.—Whoever shall resist, obstruct, or oppose any officer ... in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty, without offering or doing violence to the person of the officer, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree ....
Thus, to establish a charge of resisting an officer without violence, the State must prove that: (1) the police officer was engaged in the execution of legal process or execution of a legal duty, and (2) the defendant's actions constituted obstruction or resistance. Id.; Francis v. State, 736 So.2d 97, 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). It is undisputed that Deputy Darst was serving legal process. Therefore, the only question is whether Legnosky's actions rose to the level of obstruction or resistance. We conclude they did.
Typically, physical conduct must accompany words to support a charge of obstruction. In D.G. v. State, 661 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), while concluding that the defendant's words alone in that particular case did not constitute obstruction, this court explained the following "general proposition" applicable to section 843.02:
If a police officer is not engaged in executing process on a person, is not legally detaining that person, or has not asked the person for assistance with an ongoing emergency that presents a serious threat of imminent harm to person or property, the person's words alone can rarely, if ever, rise to the level of an obstruction. Thus, obstructive conduct rather than offensive words are normally required to support a conviction under this statute.
Id. (emphasis added). As noted in D.G., this court has identified three scenarios under which words alone are sufficient to obstruct a police officer. One of those scenarios is when an officer is attempting to serve process. Francis, 736 So.2d 97, 99 n. 2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) ( ) serving process; 2) legally detaining a person; or 3) asking for assistance." (emphasis added)); Jay v. State, 731 So.2d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (...
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