State v. LeMaster, Case No. 11CA3236
| Decision Date | 02 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11CA3236 |
| Citation | 2012 Ohio 971 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRANDY K. LEMASTER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
ENTRY
APPEARANCES:
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Jessica S. McDonald, Assistant Ohio Public Defender, Chillicothe, Ohio, for Appellant.
Toni L. Eddy, City of Chillicothe Law Director, and Michele R. Rout, Assistant City of Chillicothe Law Director, Chillicothe, Ohio, for Appellee.
{¶1} Appellant, Brandy Lemaster, appeals the Chillicothe Municipal Court's judgment denying her motion to suppress all evidence obtained from an allegedly illegal stop. On appeal, Appellant contends that the court below erred in ruling that there existed probable cause to stop her vehicle when the video did not show any traffic violation in which to justify the stop. As we conclude that the trooper had probable cause to stop Appellant's vehicle, we disagree. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
{¶2} Appellant's vehicle was stopped at 2:20 a.m. on May 28, 2010, as it was travelling north on State Route 23 after Trooper Morgan of the Ohio State Highway Patrol observed Appellant driving outside of the clearly marked lanes of travel and weaving within her lane. Based upon this observation, the trooper activated his emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop. Upon making contact with Appellant, Appellant informed Trooper Morgan that she was on her way to the hospital because she had just broken her ankle. The trooper noted Appellant's eyes appeared droopy, bloodshot and glassy, her speech was affected, and she seemed lethargic. Appellant also informed the trooper that she had taken Percocet and Xanax. After performing and failing a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus field sobriety test, Appellant was transported by ambulance to Adena Medical Center.
{¶3} As Trooper Morgan's shift was ending, Trooper Wilson took over the investigation and met with Appellant at the hospital. After Appellant refused a urine test, she was cited for OVI, as well as a marked lanes violation. Appellant initially pled not guilty to the charges and the matter was scheduled for trial. Prior to trial, on December 2, 2010, Appellant filed a motion to suppress any evidence obtained by the allegedly illegal stop. In support of her motion, Appellant argued that the videorecording of the traffic stop failed to show that she left her lane of travel or any other erratic driving that would have justified a stop.
{¶4} A suppression hearing was held on January 31, 2011, at which Trooper Morgan testified for the State. Trooper Morgan testified that he observed a marked lanes violation, and then turned on the video to observe further driving, which he further testified exhibited weaving within the lane of travel. In addition, the State introduced the video recording of the stop. In response to claims by Appellant's counsel that the video failed to show any traffic violation, Trooper Morgan testified that he "could better see" with his eyes "than this camera is showing." Appellant did not offer any evidence; however, Appellant's counsel argued that the video failed to show a marked lanes violation and as such there was no probable cause for the stop.
{¶5} The trial court issued its findings in open court denying Appellant's motion to suppress. In reaching its decision, the trial court noted that "if the Court had to rely solely on the video, the Court would agree with Mrs. McDonald [Appellant's counsel] that the video doesn't conclusively show marked lanes violation, but the Court believes the trooper had the better perspective seated at that distance." As a result, Appellant entered a plea of no contest to the OVI offense, in exchange for the Statedismissing the marked lanes charge. The trial court found Appellant guilty of OVI and sentenced her accordingly. It is from the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress that Appellant now brings her timely appeal, assigning a single assignment of error for our review.
{¶6} In her sole assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that there existed probable cause to stop her vehicle when the video did not show any traffic violation to justify the stop. Appellant further states that the issue presented for review is whether the trial court properly overruled her motion to suppress evidence when the video evidence of the events surrounding the traffic stop was in direct contradiction to the trooper's testimony, and failed to show any violation of law that would justify the stop.
{¶7} Our review of a decision on a motion to suppress "presents mixed questions of law and fact." State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 710, 707 N.E.2d 539; citing United States v. Martinez (C.A.11, 1992), 949 F.2d 1117, 1119. At a suppression hearing, the trial court is in thebest position to evaluate witness credibility. State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314, 1995-Ohio-243, 652 N.E.2d 988. Accordingly, we must uphold the trial court's findings of fact if competent, credible evidence in the record supports them. Id. We then conduct a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to the facts. State v. Anderson (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 688, 691, 654 N.E.2d 1034; State v. Fields (Nov. 29, 1999), Hocking App. No. 99CA11, 1999 WL 1125120.
{¶8} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution provide for "[t]he right of the people to be secure * * * against unreasonable searches and seizures * * *." Searches and seizures conducted without a prior finding of probable cause by a judge or magistrate "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to only a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." California v. Acevedo (1991), 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982; State v. Tincher (1988), 47 Ohio App.3d 188, 548 N.E.2d 251. If the government obtains evidence through actions that violate an accused's Fourth Amendment rights, that evidence must be excluded at trial.
{¶9} Appellant was initially stopped for a marked lanes violation. R.C. 4511.33, which governs rules for driving in marked lanes provides as follows:
{¶10} A police officer may stop the driver of a vehicle after observing a de minimis violation of traffic laws. State v. Guseman, Athens App. No. 08CA15, 2009-Ohio-952 at ¶ 20, citing, State v. Bowie, Washington App. No. 01 CA34, 2002-Ohio-3553, ¶ 8, 12, and 16, citing Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769. See, also, Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3, syllabus. When the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, the detention of a motorist is reasonable and constitutional. Id.; see, also, State v. McDonald, Washington App. No. 04CA7, 2004-Ohio-5395, ¶ 17-18.
{¶11} Appellant relies on the case of Village of New Lebanon v.
Blankenship (Montgomery C.P, 1993), 65 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 640 N.E.2d 271, in support of her argument the trooper did not possess probable cause to initiate a traffic stop. In Blankenship, the driver was stopped after he was observed weaving in his own lane of travel, on a road without a centerline. We find the facts of Blankenship to be distinguishable from the facts in thiscase. But see, State v. Guseman, supra (). In Blankenship, the state charged the defendant with a marked lane violation, contrary to R.C. 4511.33,...
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