State v. Lentz
| Decision Date | 05 January 1891 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota v. William Lentz |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the district court for Blue Earth county, after a trial before Severance, J., and verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, and a motion for a new trial denied.
Order and judgment affirmed, and cause remanded with directions.
Pfau & Young and J. L. Washburn, for appellant.
Moses E. Clapp, Attorney General, D. Smith, and Lorin Cray, for the State.
The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree, committed by cutting the throat of one John G. Schwartz, with a razor. The following statement of facts established by the uncontradicted evidence will be sufficient to explain and illustrate all the questions involved in this appeal: William Schwartz was a farmer, living on his farm with his family, consisting of his wife, his son, the deceased, John G., a young man, aged about 21 years, his daughter Emma, aged about 18 years, three younger children, and his aged father-in-law. The defendant a young man, aged about 24 years, whose usual occupation seems to have been working out as a farm-hand, had come from Wisconsin to that neighborhood, and become acquainted with the Schwartz family, and thereafter, and for nearly a year previous to the alleged murder, had been making his home with them, but occasionally working for others in the neighborhood. The deceased and defendant occupied together a small bed-room in the second story of the house, sleeping in the same bed. On the night of the death of the deceased (July 10th,) the two occupied the room together as usual they being its sole occupants, the deceased lying in front and the defendant on the back, of the bed, which was against the wall of the room, the foot of the bed being towards the door. About 4 o'clock in the morning, the father of the deceased, who, with his wife, slept down-stairs, was awakened by a noise and commotion up-stairs, in the room occupied by the defendant and deceased, and, having arisen to ascertain the cause, and stepped out of his sleeping-room, met the deceased at the foot of the stairs, with his throat cut and bleeding profusely. The deceased went on out into the yard, and died in a very few moments, without uttering a word, one jugular vein and the carotid artery being entirely severed, and the windpipe nearly severed, and consequently the power of speech gone. Much blood was found in the room in which deceased and defendant slept, particularly on the pillow and upper part of the front side of the bed, where deceased slept, and on the floor near the door of the room. A bloody razor was found on the floor of the room. The razor was one that belonged to deceased, but had been used in common by him and the defendant. The defendant, partially dressed, and with blood on different parts of his person and clothing, came down-stairs very soon after the deceased did, and made the statement to the family which he subsequently repeated at the coroner's inquest, and again on the trial of this case, at which he was a witness in his own behalf. This statement is that he slept at the back of the bed, and the deceased in front; that, when he woke up in the morning, the deceased was sitting on the front of the bed with his feet on the floor and his hands on his knees; that he (defendant) thought it was too early to get up, and turned over with his face to the wall, but could not go to sleep any more, so he got up, and slipped around the deceased, who was still sitting on the edge of the bed, and passed between him and the foot of the bed, and got out, picked up his pants, put them on, and buttoned them, standing near the foot of the bed with his back towards the deceased; that, just as he finished buttoning his pants with his left hand, and was reaching for the door with his right, he received a push on his shoulder which caused him to fall on the floor, and against the wall, and, when he got up, the deceased was out of the room, and he then followed down, right after him, to find out what was the matter. Defendant also stated that not a word was spoken by either of them that morning, and that he did not see the deceased, or hear him move, after he last saw him sitting on the edge of the bed, until he gave him the shove and ran out of the room. There is not, and under the evidence could not be, any question but that the deceased's throat was cut with the razor, and that either defendant committed the deed or that the deceased committed suicide; the former being the theory and claim of the state, and the latter the theory of the defendant, upon the trial.
1. For the purpose of proving the absence of any motive to induce the deceased to commit suicide, the state, against the objections of the defendant, was permitted to introduce evidence to show the good health of the deceased, his cheerful disposition, particularly on the preceding evening, also that he had been keeping company with a young woman of the neighborhood, to whom he was expecting to be married, and that it was the expressed intention of his father, known to him, to give him an adjoining tract of land as a farm on which to start for himself. The admission of such evidence is assigned as error; but its competency and materiality are quite apparent. The case being shut up to the alternative of suicide or murder, evidence as to the conditions in life and personal surroundings of the deceased, which would tend to show an absence of any motive to commit suicide, was clearly competent on the part of the state, for precisely the same reason that, in so far as they might be likely to impel to suicide, such conditions and surroundings would be competent evidence on part of the defendant.
2. For the purpose of showing a motive on the part of the defendant to commit the crime, the state was permitted, also against defendant's objection, to introduce evidence tending to show that defendant was a suitor of the girl Emma; that his suit was acceptable to her and to her parents, but was opposed by the deceased, who preferred another suitor; that his opposition, as well as the declared intention of Emma "to mind" her brother in the matter, was communicated and known to the defendant, who evinced somewhat strong feelings at the chance of not getting the girl. This evidence was properly admitted. It is always competent, as well as of the greatest importance, to show a motive on part of the defendant to commit the crime of which he is accused. If there be a motive which can be assigned, the adequacy or inadequacy of it, according to our standard, is a matter of no controlling importance. What would be a motive to one mind might not be to another. Whether a motive is adequate to induce the commission of crime...
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