State v. Leonard
| Decision Date | 15 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | WD 77979 |
| Citation | 490 S.W.3d 730 |
| Parties | State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Gabriel L. Leonard, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Chris Koster, Attorney General, Shaun J. Mackelprang, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, Attorneys for Respondent.
Kent E. Gipson, Kansas City, MO, Attorney for Appellant.
Before Division Two: Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge, and Mark D. Pfeiffer and Karen King Mitchell, Judges
Gabriel Leonard appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, of the class B felony of kidnapping, § 565.110,1 the class B felony of first-degree burglary, § 569.160, and the class C felony of second-degree domestic assault, § 565.073, for which he was sentenced to a total of twenty-four years' imprisonment. On appeal, Leonard challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, the trial court's decision to allow Leonard to represent himself at trial, and the court's failure to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on lesser-included offenses. Finding no error, we affirm.
Leonard and Victim dated for approximately one and a half years before ending their relationship. Shortly after their relationship ended, in May of 2012, Victim's home (where she and Leonard had resided together during their relationship) caught fire, and she received money from an insurance policy to cover the damage.
Starting on January 4, 2013, Victim began receiving text messages from Leonard, begging Victim to talk to him. Among the messages were statements from Leonard such as:
Shortly before 6:00 a.m. on January 6, 2013, Victim awoke to use the restroom. When she glanced out of the bathroom window, she saw Leonard's vehicle parked in her driveway and became frightened. Victim headed back toward her bedroom to retrieve her glasses and cell phone, but, as she passed a second-floor window outside her bedroom, Leonard's arms reached through the curtains and grabbed her. Then, using Victim's body and the window frame, Leonard pulled himself into the house. Victim was “terrified,” and she struggled with Leonard, but he “held [her] down and put his hands over [her] mouth,” causing her to hit her head and strain her neck. Victim gasped, Leonard replied, “I know,” or “something to that effect.” Though Victim continued to fight, Leonard advised her that she “should just accept what was happening.” He then picked Victim up with one arm and carried her down to the basement, where Leonard forced Victim, at gunpoint, into a large dog kennel. Leonard then padlocked the kennel door with two padlocks that Victim had never seen before.
Leonard began looking through Victim's cell phone to see who she had been calling and texting. He also demanded bank information, such as Victim's account numbers and passwords. For the next thirty minutes to one hour, Leonard repeatedly pointed the gun at Victim, kicked the kennel, and struck the kennel with the gun. He also demanded money and would occasionally go upstairs to rifle through Victim's paperwork; Leonard had previously demanded $25,000 from the insurance settlement Victim received for her house fire.
During one of Leonard's trips upstairs, Victim managed to take apart one corner of the kennel and squeeze herself through a small opening. She then fled the basement and ran to her neighbor's house for help. Victim's neighbor let her in and contacted 911, but Leonard left Victim's home before the police arrived.
After the police arrived, they cleared Victim's home and then escorted her over to retrieve her glasses and some shoes. The home appeared to have been ransacked. While in her home, Victim found her cell phone, and shortly thereafter, she received a call from Leonard. Leonard told Victim, The police also discovered an orange ladder lying on the ground at the rear of the residence; Victim indicated that the ladder was not hers and that it had not been there before that day.
Leonard was eventually apprehended and charged, as a prior offender, with kidnapping, first-degree burglary, second-degree domestic assault, and unlawful use of a weapon. He was initially represented by an assistant public defender, but Leonard disagreed with the manner in which his counsel was handling his case, so he filed several motions, first seeking to dismiss and replace his current counsel, and then to dismiss counsel altogether and proceed pro se.
The trial court held an extensive hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), wherein it questioned Leonard about his request to proceed pro se and advised him of the dangers of self-representation, even going so far as to suggest that “this is [,] of probably all the mistakes that you've made in your life, this might be number one.” The trial court indicated to Leonard that he was likely to be convicted if he chose to represent himself, but Leonard nevertheless insisted, “unequivocally,” that it was his desire to represent himself. The trial court questioned Leonard at length about his education and understanding of the legal process and then concluded that Leonard had “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to b[e] represented by counsel in this proceeding with the full knowledge and understanding of his rights and an understanding of the consequences and effective waiver of that right.”
At trial, Leonard presented testimony from a friend, who indicated that Leonard had been at the friend's home during the relevant time frame, specifically between the hours of 6:30 and 7:00 a.m. on January 6, 2013.
The jury found Leonard guilty as charged. After trial, Leonard was able to retain counsel for the sole purpose of filing a motion for new trial and sentencing. In response to the motion, the trial court entered a judgment of acquittal on the unlawful use of a weapon charge, finding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence demonstrating that the gun was readily capable of lethal use. The trial court denied the motion in all other respects, and sentenced Leonard to consecutive terms of twelve years for kidnapping and burglary, and a concurrent term of seven years for domestic assault, for a total sentence of twenty-four years' imprisonment. Leonard appeals.2
Leonard ostensibly raises three points on appeal. Each point, however, is both deficient and multifarious. In his first point, Leonard challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support each of his three convictions. The point fails to identify “why the legal reasons, in the context of the case, support the claim[s] of reversible error” insofar as Leonard's point fails to identify in what way the State's evidence was insufficient—i.e., what elements lacked evidentiary support. See Rule 84.04(d)(1)3 (). Additionally, in challenging all three convictions in a single point, Leonard's first point is multifarious in violation of Rule 84.04(d) insofar as it challenges multiple rulings by the trial court. “Multiple claims of error in one point relied on renders the point multifarious and as such is a violation of Rule 84.04, made applicable to briefs in criminal appeals by Rule 30.06(c).” State v. Garrison, 276 S.W.3d 372, 378 n. 4 (Mo.App.S.D.2009). “Generally, multifarious points preserve nothing for appellate review and are ordinarily subject to dismissal.” Id.
Leonard's second point suffers from the same flaws. In his second point, he challenges both the trial court's granting of his motion to proceed pro se and its denial of his subsequent request to reappoint counsel. As with the first point, Leonard's second point fails to identify why the legal reasons, in the context of the case, support his claims of reversible error insofar as he fails to identify any facts supporting his claim that his waiver of the right to counsel was unknowing and unintelligent. Additionally, because he challenges two distinct rulings of the trial court, his point is also multifarious. Id.
Leonard's third point also suffers from the same defects. In his third point, he claims that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses for each of his three convictions. Yet, as with his first two points, he...
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State v. Sullivan
...who manages their own defense relinquishes many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. State v. Leonard , 490 S.W.3d 730, 739 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (quoting Faretta , 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 ). For this reason, in order for an accused to represent themselves......
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...this claim of error in his motion for a new trial, this Court is limited to review solely for plain error. See State v. Leonard , 490 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016).Rule 30.20 authorizes this Court, in its discretion, to review "plain errors affecting substantial rights ... when the c......
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...Murray had minimal familiarity with the trial process and a strategy for making (or not making) objections." Id. In State v. Leonard , 490 S.W.3d 730, 740 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016), a defendant challenged the knowing and intelligent nature of his waiver of the right to counsel. The trial court i......
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...Supreme Court] Rule 84.04,5 made applicable to briefs in criminal appeals by [Missouri Supreme Court] Rule30.06(c)." State v. Leonard, 490 S.W.3d 730, 736 (Mo. App. 2016) (quoting Garrison, 276 S.W.3d at 378 n. 4). "Generally, multifarious points preserve nothing for appellate review and ar......