State v. Lester
| Decision Date | 13 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | A14-0431 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jimmy Dawayne Lester, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
Reversed
Hennepin County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O'Neill Moller, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Bridget Kearns Sabo, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Jonathan P. Schmidt, Special Assistant Public Defender, Briggs and Morgan, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Chutich, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Smith, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Jimmy Dawayne Lester challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence of heroin found in his seized rental car. He contends that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and to search the car. He also challenges his conviction of third-degree possession of heroin, claiming that the circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to establish that he constructively possessed the heroin found in the car. Because we conclude that probable cause did not exist to arrest Lester, we reverse.
On October 26, 2011, Minneapolis Police Officer Kyle Ruud received a call from a confidential reliable informant. Officer Ruud had worked with this informant for approximately two months, and in past investigations the police had corroborated the informant's information and used it to file charges. The informant told Officer Ruud that a man, nicknamed "J.," would be delivering heroin in approximately ten minutes to the area of Broadway Avenue North and Washington Avenue North in Minneapolis. The informant described J. as a black male, approximately 28 to 30 years old, between 5'9" to 5'10" tall, medium build, and medium/light complexion. The informant had personally witnessed J. possessing and selling heroin many times within the last month.
Officer Ruud and four to five other officers set up surveillance of the area. Within three minutes after receiving the informant's tip, Officer Ruud observed a car parked on Washington Avenue. Two black males were in the car, and the man in the front passenger seat matched J.'s description. Officer Ruud drove past the car with theinformant, and the informant identified the passenger as J. The driver was later identified as appellant Jimmy Dawayne Lester. After a few minutes, the officers observed the car pull into a nearby gas station. J. and Lester then left the car, went into the gas station, and came out a few minutes later.
When they emerged from the gas station, J. left and walked north to a sidewalk on the south side of Broadway. Police observed him pacing back and forth on the sidewalk for a few minutes, and he appeared to be talking on his cell phone. J., still talking on the phone, crossed University Avenue into a nearby parking lot. Officer Ruud noted that as J. was walking and talking on his phone, he was looking around as if waiting for somebody to arrive. Another car driven by a white male then pulled into the parking lot and J. got into the passenger seat. The car pulled out onto Broadway and headed east. After traveling several blocks, the police pulled the car over and arrested J. No contraband was discovered on J.'s person.
Meanwhile, Lester had pulled his car away from the gas pump and legally parked it on the north side of the gas station's parking lot. After watching Lester park, Officer Ruud ordered his squad to move in and arrest Lester. The police did not see any drugs in plain view when they arrested Lester; nor did they find drugs or any large sum of cash on Lester's person. Lester's car was then taken to the police station to be searched. Lester told police that the car was a rental in his name and that he rented it because his was being repaired.
A search of Lester's rental car revealed eleven plastic baggies containing "bindles" of suspected heroin hidden behind a panel in the car's center console. Thebindles tested positive for heroin with an estimated market value of approximately $400 to $600.
Lester was charged with third-degree possession of a controlled substance and second-degree sale of a controlled substance.1 Minn. Stat. §§ 152.023, subd. 2(a)(1) (Supp. 2011), .022, subd. 1(1) (2010). Each count alleged that Lester was either acting alone or aiding another within the meaning of Minnesota Statutes section 609.05, subdivision 1 (2010). Lester moved, in relevant part, to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of the car and dismiss all charges against him. The district court denied Lester's motions, concluding that the police had probable cause to arrest Lester and that the search of Lester's rental car was independently supported by probable cause under the automobile exception.
Lester asked the district court to reconsider his argument that the police impermissibly exceeded the scope of an inventory search when his car was impounded. In a supplemental order, the district court again denied Lester's motion to suppress, reasoning that it need not address the inventory search exception because police had probable cause to search the car under the automobile exception.
The case proceeded to a bench trial. When the state rested, Lester moved for a judgment of acquittal, and the district court denied his motion. Lester then rested without presenting further evidence. After the parties' closing arguments, the district courtconvicted Lester of third-degree possession of heroin but acquitted him of second-degree sale of heroin. Lester appealed.
Lester argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and any heroin discovered in the later search of his rental car was inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. We agree.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless "one of a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions applies." State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). Without a warrant, an officer may validly arrest a suspect if "a felony has in fact been committed, and the officer has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it." Minn. Stat. § 629.34, subd. 1(c)(3) (2014). The "reasonable cause" statutory requirement is synonymous with the "probable cause" constitutional requirement. State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 108 (Minn. 1978).
"Probable cause to arrest exists when a person of ordinary care and prudence, viewing the totality of circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a specific individual has committed a crime." State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). Whether probable cause exists is an objective inquiry that "requires something more than mere suspicion but less than the evidence necessary for conviction." Id. When we examine a district court's pretrialorder on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the factual findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 849.
The district court concluded that police had probable cause to arrest Lester based on the totality of the circumstances, including the informant's tip regarding the pending drug sale, the police officers' corroboration of the tip, and the officers' trained observations that J.'s behavior was consistent with that of a narcotics dealer and Lester's behavior was consistent with that of a "partner."
Police can rely on an informant's tip if it has sufficient indicia of reliability. In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. 1997). To assess the reliability of a confidential informant's tip, "courts examine the credibility of the informant and the basis of the informant's knowledge in light of all the circumstances." State v. Cook, 610 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000).
The reliability of a confidential informant is measured using six different factors, two of which are relevant here: (1) an informant who has historically given reliable information is likely currently reliable, and (2) an informant who provides information that police can corroborate is likely reliable. See State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn. App. 2004). The first requirement can be satisfied if an officer credibly testifies that the informant "has been reliable in the past because 'this language indicates that the informant had provided accurate information to the police in the past' and thus gives 'the magistrate . . . reason to credit the informant's story.'" Id. (quoting State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn. 1985)).
Here, the district court found the informant to be reliable, and we conclude that the record supports this finding. Officer Ruud testified that the informant had provided information in past investigations that led to the filing of charges. Police also corroborated the informant's tip: within minutes of receiving the tip, Officer Ruud observed a car parked in the area that the informant identified for the drug deal, and the informant positively identified the passenger as J.
"Recitation of facts establishing [an informant's] reliability by his proven 'track record,' however, does not by itself establish probable cause"; the informant "must still show a basis of knowledge." Cook, 610 N.W.2d at 668. The informant's basis of knowledge "may be supplied directly, by first-hand information," or "indirectly through self-verifying details that allow an inference that the information was gained in a reliable way and is...
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