State v. Levich

• Citation: 104 N.W. 334,128 Iowa 372
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA v. MORRIS LEVICH, Appellant
• Decision Date: 11 July 1905
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

104 N.W. 334

128 Iowa 372

STATE OF IOWA v. MORRIS LEVICH, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

July 11, 1905

Appeal from Woodbury District Court.--HON. JOHN F OLIVER, Judge.

The defendant was convicted of the crime of receiving stolen property, and appeals.

Affirmed.

Sullivan & Griffen, for appellant.

Chas W. Mullan, Attorney-General, and Lawrence De Graff, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

OPINION

SHERWIN, C. J.

The defendant was tried on an indictment charging him with having received property that he knew had been stolen from C. T Hopper. The facts necessary to an understanding of the case and of the questions presented on appeal are, briefly, these: On the 23d day of March, 1904, and for two or three years prior thereto, the defendant was a dealer in new and secondhand house furnishing goods in Sioux City, Iowa. C. T. Hopper, the prosecuting witness in this case, was, during this time, a jobber in furniture, having a general storage warehouse not far from the defendant's place of business. The defendant had bought goods of Hopper almost every month during the period stated. At first, credit was extended to him, but about 18 months prior to the 23d day of March, 1904, he was notified that his purchases thereafter must be for cash, and subsequent purchases were, in fact, for cash, paid either when the goods were ordered or on delivery. On the 23d day of March, 1904, the defendant bought the property involved here of one of Mr. Hopper's warehouse employes, and sent his own wagon to the warehouse for the same. The man of whom he bought was not a salesman for Mr. Hopper, nor had he authority to make any sale, or authority to deliver property to any purchaser without a written order therefor, and the delivery of the property was without the consent of Mr. Hopper, and not in accordance with the usual course of business between him and the defendant. In fact, the property was stolen from Mr. Hopper, and soon thereafter on the same day it was found in the possession of the defendant. Some two or three weeks before this transaction a bale of ticking belonging to Mr. Hopper was stolen by another of his employes and was sold and delivered to the defendant, and it was found in his store at the time the property stolen on the 23d of March was recovered. There was evidence tending to show that the defendant had personally bought the ticking, and that he had afterward personally hidden it among a mass of other goods in his store. He knew that the seller thereof was an employe of Hopper's and paid him therefor only about one-third of its value. The state was permitted to prove the larceny of the ticking, its sale to the defendant, and his possession thereof at the time in question.

While it is the general rule that proof of the commission of a distinct and separate offense is not competent to prove the crime charged, it is also equally true that there are exceptions to this rule, and that evidence which tends to show guilty knowledge, intent,...