State v. Lewis, A98A1290.
| Decision Date | 01 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. A98A1290.,A98A1290. |
| Citation | 233 Ga. App. 390,504 S.E.2d 242 |
| Parties | The STATE v. LEWIS. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Timothy G. Madison, District Attorney, Robin R. Riggs, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.
William D. Healan III, Winder, for appellee.
Rachel Yvonne Lewis was charged with driving a vehicle under the influence of marijuana (OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6)), driving a vehicle under the influence of drugs to the extent that she was a less safe driver (OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(2)), possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, and following too closely. In response to Lewis' motion to suppress, the trial court entered a pretrial order suppressing evidence of any drug or substance other than alcohol discovered in tests performed on Lewis' blood and urine. The State appeals from the suppression order pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(4).
After the vehicle Lewis was driving struck the rear of a school bus, a Georgia State Patrol officer investigating at the scene of the accident observed that Lewis had dilated pupils, appeared glassy-eyed, and exhibited a slow pattern of speech. Based on these observations, the record shows that the officer concluded he had reasonable grounds to believe that Lewis had been driving her vehicle in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391, placed Lewis under arrest, and read her the implied consent notice. OCGA §§ 40-5-55; 40-5-67.1; 40-6-392. Pursuant to the implied consent notice, Lewis consented to State-administered tests of her blood and urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or drugs. Thereafter, the officer transported Lewis to a local hospital, Barrow Medical Center, where blood was withdrawn from her and she gave a urine sample. It is undisputed that Lewis' blood and urine tested positive for marijuana in tests performed by the State Crime Lab.
When the officer and Lewis arrived at Barrow Medical Center to obtain the blood and urine samples, the hospital required that Lewis and the officer sign a form entitled "Request For Alcohol Testing." The portion of the form signed by Lewis stated that: The portion of the form signed by the officer was subtitled "Statement of Officer" and stated that:
In entering the order suppressing evidence of any drug or substance other than alcohol discovered in the blood and urine tests, the trial court found that Lewis was required to sign the above hospital consent form which was also signed by the officer, and that the form referred only to testing for alcohol, not drugs. The trial court further found that, despite the implied consent notice given to Lewis, the hospital form caused her to reasonably believe that she was consenting only to a test of her blood and urine for alcohol. The trial court concluded that any consent given by Lewis to a blood and urine test for drugs was not free and voluntary and therefore such testing constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of Lewis' rights under the United States and Georgia Constitutions. The trial court also suppressed use of the blood and urine test results as evidence that Lewis was in possession of less that one ounce of marijuana on the basis that use of the evidence for this purpose was beyond the scope of the consent Lewis gave pursuant to the implied consent notice.
1. As to the charges for driving a vehicle under the influence of marijuana (OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(6)), driving a vehicle under the influence of drugs to the extent that she was a less safe driver (OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(2)), and following too closely, the trial court erred by suppressing evidence that Lewis' blood and urine tested positive for marijuana or drugs other than alcohol.
The trial court reasoned that Lewis did not give free and voluntary consent to testing for drugs, and that the test results should be suppressed, because the document which the hospital prepared and required Lewis and the officer to sign before taking the blood and urine samples led Lewis to believe that she was consenting to testing only for alcohol and not drugs. Whatever the form prepared by the hospital may have said or led Lewis to believe, it had no bearing on the State's right to test Lewis' blood and urine for alcohol or drugs pursuant to the consent she gave after receiving the required implied consent notice....
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...of the defendant's consent. See, e.g., Meiklejohn v. State, 281 Ga.App. 712, 714, 637 S.E.2d 117 (2006) ; State v. Lewis, 233 Ga.App. 390, 392(1), 504 S.E.2d 242 (1998). However, Williams rejected this per se rule automatically equating an affirmative response to the implied consent notice ......
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